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Moral intuitions play a vital role, not only in ordinary moral thought, but also in 
how philosophers choose between competing normative theories.  The standard view 
about how intuitions ought to be used in moral theory is John Rawls’ method of reflective 
equilibrium, according to which an agent ought to work back and forth between her 
intuitions, the principles that systematize them, and other background beliefs, revising 
each until all of her judgments are consistent.  My dissertation addresses two problems 
with the standard view.  First, the method makes use of moral intuitions but offers no 
account of why these judgments have the epistemic credibility to play a role in choosing 
between normative theories.  Second, when we find an inconsistency between an intuition 
and a moral principle, the method tells us to revise either the principle or the theory.  
However, this leaves the interesting question unaddressed.  Simple norms of consistency 
tell us that we ought to revise either the principle or the theory; the interesting question is 
which should we revise.  
 
            I argue that both of these problems can be solved simultaneously by conjoining 
the method of reflective equilibrium with an account of belief revision.   Accordingly, I 
formulate and defend what I call a contributionist account of belief revision, according to 
which, when faced with a conflict between beliefs, one revises so as to preserve the belief 
that makes the greatest overall contribution to the coherence one’s set of beliefs.  This 
account, I argue, not only solves the second challenge by making the method of reflective 
equilibrium more determinate.  It also explains why those intuitions that survive the 
reflective equilibrium process have the requisite epistemic credibility.  These intuitions 
have this credibility in virtue of the contribution they make to the coherence of one’s 
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Act-utilitarianism is the view that one ought to do that action which maximizes overall 
happiness.  There is a familiar argument against this view that begins by asking us to 
think about a case. 
You [are a doctor with]… five patients in the hospital who are dying, each in need 
of a separate organ.  One needs a kidney, another a lung, a third a heart, and so 
forth.  You can save all five if you take a single healthy person and remove his 
heart, lungs, kidneys and so forth, to distribute to these five patients.  Just such a 
healthy person is in room 306.  He is in the hospital for routine tests.  Having seen 
his test results, you know that he is perfectly healthy and of the right tissue 
compatibility.  If you do nothing, he will survive without incident; the other 
patients will die, however.  The other patients can be saved only if the person in 
Room 306 is cut up and his organs distributed.  In that case, there would be one 
dead but five saved.1 
Almost everyone who hears of this case has the intuition that it would be wrong to kill 
the one to save the five.  However, assuming all else is equal and there is nothing 
especially unique about the one (e.g. he is not on the verge of curing cancer), act-
utilitarianism yields the result that you ought to kill the one and save the five.  Thus, act-
utilitarianism is false. 
 This argument is an example of a type of argument that is very common in 
philosophy.  These arguments have the following structure. 
                                                





1) In case C, I/we/most people have the intuition that P 
2) Theory T yields the result ~P in C 
3) Therefore, T must be rejected 
This argument, as I have formulated here, is invalid.  Nothing logically follows from 1) 
and 2) about whether or not one should accept T.  It seems, thus, that this argument needs 
a further premise.  However, it is no easy task to determine what the missing premise is. 
 The following premise would do the trick: for all moral theories and all intuitions, 
if a theory conflicts with an intuition, then that must theory be rejected.  No philosopher 
that I know of accepts this universally quantified premise.  Indeed, as I will argue in 
chapter 2, our intuitions are not entirely consistent with each other.  Therefore, accepting 
this premise would commit one to a kind of incoherence. 
 Obviously, we should weaken the universal quantifiers.  However, once we do 
this, our argument no longer yields the result that T must be rejected.  If all we know is 
that on some occasions when a theory conflicts with an intuition that theory must be 
rejected, we still need to know that the case of act-utilitarianism’s conflict with our 
intuitions in the transplant case is one of those occasions in order to be justified in 
accepting the argument’s conclusion. The question that we need an answer to is the 
following: when is conflict with an intuition grounds for rejecting a theory? 
 It was perhaps with an eye toward answering this question that John Rawls 
developed the method of reflective equilibrium.2  We will have occasion to spell out the 
method in detail in chapter 3 but for now the rough idea is the following.  We begin by 
looking for the theory that best systematizes our intuitions.  Presumably, the theory that 
                                                
2 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).  




best systematizes our intuitions will still conflict with some of our intuitions.  In this case, 
we work back and forth, sometimes modifying our theory further to fit our intuitions and 
sometimes modifying our intuitions to fit the theory. 
 This use of this method is widespread in philosophy but it is far from 
uncontroversial.  Here, I want to consider two objections.  The first objection notes that 
intuitions play a crucial role in justifying moral theories in the method of reflective 
equilibrium.  It then asks what gives intuitions the epistemic credibility necessary to play 
this role.  Often this objection is motivated by the fact that there is considerable ground 
for skepticism about the reliability of moral intuitions.  If there are legitimate grounds for 
doubt about the reliability of a judgment, how can we use it to adjudicate between 
competing theories? 3 
 Most philosophers do not share the kind of skepticism about intuitions that 
underlies this objection.  Nonetheless, as I will argue in chapter 2, this skepticism cannot 
be dismissed out of hand.  Merely attempting to shift the burden of proof or offering a 
promissory note that one day we may be able to explain the epistemic credibility of 
intuitions is unsatisfying. 
                                                
3 Statements of this objection can be found in R.M. Hare, “Rawls Theory of Justice” 
Philosophical Quarterly 23 (1973): 144-55.  Reprinted in Daniels (ed.), Reading Rawls, 
pp. 81-107; Peter Singer, “Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium,” Monist 58 (1975): 490-
517.  Reprinted in Unsanctifying Human Life (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), pp. 27-50; R.B. 
Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), Ch. 
1; David Copp, “Considered Moral Judgments and Moral Justification: Conservatism in 
Moral Theory,” in David Copp and Michael Zimmerman (eds.), Morality, Reason, and 
Truth (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld, 1984); Stefan Sencerz, “Moral Intuitions and 
Justification in Ethics,” Philosophical Studies 50 (1986): 77-95; Robert Cummins, 
“Reflections on Reflective Equilibrium,” in Michael DePaul and William Ramsey (eds.), 
Rethinking Intuitions (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), pp. 113-28; Allen Wood, 
Kantian Ethics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 49-51.  
Whenever a reprint of a work is listed in the references, any page numbers will given 




 There is a second kind of objection that does not rely on any kind of general 
skepticism about intuitions.  Instead, one pressing this objection may grant that intuitions 
do have the kind of credibility to perform the task that the method of reflective 
equilibrium assigns them.  Still, the objector insists, the method does not have the 
resources to solve the problem that we began with. This objection is pressed by Kwame 
Anthony Appiah when he writes, 
Indeed, one could be forgiven for thinking that reflective equilibrium is really 
another name for the problem rather than the solution to it… As you might fear 
the procedure for reaching reflective equilibrium is less than determinate.4  
Appiah goes on to point out that given a conflict between theory and an intuition, the 
method of reflective equilibrium tells us to revise either the theory or the intuition.  
However, this does not answer the question that needs answering: should we reject the 
theory or the intuition? 
 Both of these problems are troubling.  Nonetheless, I will argue in this 
dissertation that they can be solved in, more or less, a single swoop.  The trick is to 
motivate and defend a theory of belief revision within the method of reflective 
equilibrium.  Accordingly, I formulate and defend what I call a contributionist account of 
belief revision, according to which when faced with a conflict between beliefs one revises 
so as to preserve the belief that makes the greatest overall contribution to the coherence 
one’s set of beliefs.  This theory, I will argue, not only solves Appiah’s challenge by 
making the method of reflective equilibrium more determinate.  It can also explain why 
those intuitions that survive the reflective equilibrium process have the requisite 
                                                




epistemic credibility.  These intuitions have this credibility in virtue of the contribution 
they make to the coherence of one’s overall set of beliefs. 
 This theory is motivated by the kind of concerns that motivate coherentist theories 
of justification generally.  I begin, therefore, by discussing these considerations in chapter 
1.  There, I argue that coherentist theories in moral epistemology have a decisive 
advantage over rival foundationalist theories. 
 In chapter 2, I turn to moral intuitions directly.  There, I examine the evidence for 
skeptical claims about the reliability of moral intuitions that underlie the first objection to 
the method of reflective equilibrium discussed above. 
 In chapter 3, I discuss in detail the method of reflective equilibrium and the 
considerations that motivate it.  In chapter 4, I take up the two objections mentioned 
above and attempt to solve them by formulating and defending the contributionist 
account of belief revision. 
 The two objections mentioned above are, in my view, the two most challenging 
objections to the method.  They are, however, far from the only objections.  In chapter 5, 
I take up a range of other objections and show that the method has the resources to meet 
these objections. 
 In chapters 4 and 5, I argue against a common objection to the method, that it is 
conservative in one or both of two senses.  In the first sense, the method is charged to be 
conservative because it cannot require, or perhaps even allow for, the revision of deeply 
held intuitive judgments.  In the second sense, the method is alleged to be conservative 




structure of the method of reflective equilibrium show that the method is not conservative 
in either of these senses. 
 Nonetheless, I recognize that abstract arguments from the structure of the method 
will not be satisfying to all.  Many will retain their doubts until they see that, in practice, 
the method can require revisions to deeply held moral intuitions and status quo morality.  
Therefore, in chapter 6, I turn to an actual moral problem in order to show that the 
method can, in fact, be useful in practice and that it need not merely reinforce deeply held 












 Things would be better if we, like God, had perfect access to truth.  
Unfortunately, we are not in such a position. Descartes famously argued that we are 
trapped behind a veil of experience; we only have access to our perceptions of the world 
and not the world itself.  Even if Descartes is correct, I suspect that this is the least of our 
problems.  For even if we suppose that experience is a reliable guide to truth, we are 
limited in what we can observe.  Furthermore, we are often forced to make judgments 
when our evidence is less than complete and even when we have good evidence we are 
prone to a range of cognitive biases that make us less than ideal judges. 
 Cognitively imperfect beings like us need an account of when it is epistemically 
appropriate to believe a proposition.  I suspect that this need is a deep, permanent feature 
of our epistemic condition.  The concept of epistemic justification fills this need.  To say 
that a proposition is justified is roughly to say that an agent can believe it rationally or 
without being epistemically irresponsible.   
 These brief remarks are not intended to provide a complete account of the concept 
referred to by the word ‘justification.’  Nonetheless, a few brief remarks about why I 
understand ‘justification’ this way are in order.  As a methodological matter, I think that 
the best way to understand a concept is to think about why we need it.  I have suggested 
that we need such a concept as justification because creatures like us are imperfect 
epistemic agents in need of some account of when it is appropriate to believe a 




 As minimal as this understanding of justification is, there is at least one group of 
philosophers that may object to it.  Currently in epistemology there is a dispute between 
internalists, who think that what justifies a belief must be in some sense accessible, or 
internal, to the believer, and externalists who hold that what justifies a belief may be 
something that is inaccessible, or external, to the agent.1  If externalism is true, an 
account of justification may hold that whether or not a belief is justified is inaccessible to 
believers.  An externalist account of justification may, for this reason, not provide an 
account of justification that is useful to actual epistemic agents deciding what is 
appropriate or rational to believe.  Thus, the externalist may object that the account of 
justification given here assumes internalism. 
 This is not the place to settle the debate between internalism and externalism.  To 
some degree, I doubt that such a debate can be settled.  A term like ‘justification’ is broad 
enough to admit of more than one analysis, and thus, it is at least possible that the 
internalist and the externalist are both providing plausible accounts of ‘justification.’   
What I want to point out here is that even if externalists have the correct account 
of ‘justification,’ the need that we imperfect epistemic agents have for an account of 
when one can rationally believe a proposition does not disappear.  Thus, even if the only 
plausible analysis of ‘justification’ is an externalist analysis, we would still need a 
(different) concept to fulfill this need.  If externalists think that there is a better term for 
this concept than ‘justification’ they can feel free to substitute their own word for my 
‘justification.’  I think that both internalist and externalist accounts may be plausibly 
called accounts of ‘justification.’ 
                                                
1 A useful collection of papers on this debate is Hillary Kornblith (ed.), Epistemology: 




One more point about my understanding of the concept of justification before we 
can move on to the issue of when a belief is justified. Whether or not it is rational to 
adopt a belief, or whether or not a belief is justified, surely depends on what evidence we 
have available to us.  This means that we should be prepared to accept that if I have 
different evidence than you, a proposition could be justified for me but not you.  To take 
a concrete example, I have a belief that I am wearing a green t-shirt today.  I am justified 
in accepting this belief because I see that I am wearing a green t-shirt.  Now imagine that 
it spontaneously occurs to my mother, who has not seen me in months, that I am wearing 
a green t-shirt today.  She would not be justified in believing that I am wearing a green t-
shirt today because she has no evidence to suggest that I am.  In this case, the same belief 
is justified for me but not for my mother.  We can, and should, accept this consequence 
while denying any kind of general relativism about truth. 
1.2 When a Belief is Justified 
 Having addressed, albeit briefly, what justification is, we can move on to the issue 
of when a belief is justified.  Ordinarily, when I am asked why I am justified in believing 
a particular proposition B, I will cite some further proposition (or set of propositions) C.2 
Let us say that propositions like B which are justified by another proposition are 
inferentially justified.  If I claim that B is justified by C, one could reasonably ask why I 
am justified in believing C, since if C is unjustified, it is doubtful that C could justify B.  
Usually I will answer that I am justified in believing C because of some further 
proposition (or set of propositions) D.  Most philosophers believe that this process cannot 
                                                
2 It is worth making a brief remark about the relationship between beliefs and 




continue ad infinitum.3  Furthermore, if the chain of inferential justification from B to C 
to D were to circle back around such that D was ultimately justified by B, it seems that 
we would be caught in a vicious circle, since B would ultimately be justified by itself.  
Since this chain of justification cannot be circular or infinite, it follows that it must end 
somewhere.  If it were to end in an unjustified proposition, then it seems doubtful that B 
is justified since, as we noted earlier, an unjustified proposition cannot justify a further 
proposition.  Therefore, if B is justified at all, then B must be part of a chain of inferential 
justification that ends with a proposition that is justified independently of any other 
proposition. 
 This argument, which traces back to Aristotle, has led many philosophers to adopt 
a position called foundationalism, the view that a belief is justified if and only if it is a 
basic belief, a belief that is justified non-inferentially, or it is part of a chain of inferential 
justification that ends with a basic belief.4  Foundationalism has a fair amount of intuitive 
appeal, but it faces a serious problem.  Many philosophers worry that it collapses into 
skepticism, the view that there are no justified beliefs.  To avoid skepticism, the 
foundationalist must hold that there is at least one basic belief.  But how could a belief be 
basic?  How could a belief be justified without being supported by another proposition?  
One might worry that no belief is justified without the support of any further 
propositions.  If this is true, then there are no basic beliefs.  Since, for the foundationalist 
all justified beliefs are either basic or inferentially justified by a basic belief, if there are 
                                                
3 For the exception that proves the rule see Peter Klein, “Foundationalism and the Infinite 
Regress of Reasons,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1998): 919-26 
 





no basic beliefs, then there are no justified beliefs.  Hence, the foundationalist is 
committed to skepticism. 
One way that traditional foundationalists have responded to this argument is by 
claiming that some beliefs guarantee their own truth. 5  The foundationalist can then avoid 
skepticism by identifying basic beliefs as just those beliefs that guarantee their own truth. 
Bet let us consider this claim. Take an ordinary true empirical belief such as ‘the 
Eiffel Tower is made of iron.’  This belief is true but does not guarantee its own truth.  It 
is only true in virtue of further facts about the world.  What would it be for a belief to 
guarantee its own truth?  Such a belief would have to be true just in virtue of the fact that 
the believer had it.  Perhaps, there is such a belief, something like the belief that I have a 
belief.  If there were such a belief, then the foundationalist would have avoided 
skepticism, in that she would be able to hold that there is at least one belief that is 
justified.  But the foundationalist is still committed to a kind of mitigated skepticism 
because she only has shown that one belief is justified.  To hold that at least some of our 
ordinary beliefs about middle-sized objects are justified, she has to be able to infer them 
from these basic beliefs.  To avoid mitigated skepticism the foundationalist must hold 
that there are some beliefs that guarantee their own truth and are robust enough to 
inferentially justify our ordinary beliefs about middle-sized objects.   
In response to this worry, the foundationalist could retreat from the claim that 
basic beliefs guarantee their own truth and make a weaker claim. Perhaps basic beliefs 
are those that are very likely to be true.  However, the fact that a belief is likely to be true 
                                                
5 This appears to be Descartes’ view in the Meditations on First Philosophy.  For a 
contemporary defense see Timothy McGrew, “A Defense of Classical Foundationalism” 
in Louis Pojman (ed.), Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings 




seems to be a further fact about the belief.  If a belief B is justified because it is likely to 
be true, then it seems that B is justified by appeal to a further proposition, namely the 
proposition that B is likely to be true.  But if B is justified because of a further 
proposition, then B is not basic at all.  The foundationalist seems to have avoided 
skepticism only by denying foundationalism. 
 Worries like these about foundationalism have led some philosophers to adopt 
coherence theories of justification according to which a belief is justified if and only if it 
coheres with certain other beliefs.6  To illustrate clearly what coherentism is, it is useful 
to think about how the coherentist might respond to the Aristotlean argument that we 
began this section with.  This argument notes that when asked why we are justified in 
believing a proposition, we usually cite a further proposition.  When asked how that 
further proposition is justified we usually cite yet another proposition.  There seem to be 
three distinct possibilities: this process of citing a further proposition continues ad 
infinitum, the process is circular (e.g. B is justified by C which is justified by D which is 
justified by B), or the process ends somewhere.  The first option is implausible.  It seems 
unlikely that there could a chain of beliefs that stretches onto infinity without circling 
back on itself.  The second option seems to allow for vicious circularity.  Surely we 
cannot invoke B to justify B.  Thus, by process of elimination we are left with the third 
foundationalist option. 
 The coherentist ultimately argues that we should, in some sense, adopt the second 
option.  But how can the coherentist avoid the problem of vicious circularity?  In the face 
                                                
6 This view is defended by W.F. Sellars in Science, Perception, and Reality (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963); Bruce Aune in Knowledge, Mind, and Nature (New 
York: Random House, 1967); and Gilbert Harman in Thought (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 




of this worry, the coherentist makes a radical move.  The Aristotlean argument relies on a 
conception of justification that is essentially linear.  A comparison may be useful here.  
According to this conception, the structure of justification is, in some respects, like that 
of a building.  A building rests on a foundation, which supports the first floor, which in 
turn supports the second floor, and so on. Each floor requires the previous floor for its 
structural support. 7  Therefore, if one were to remove the foundation, then the whole 
building would collapse.  Suppose S is a foundational belief and that it justifies T, which 
in turn justifies U, and so on.  On the linear conception of justification, a justified S is 
required for T’s justification.  If S turns out to be unjustified, the whole chain of beliefs is 
unjustified.  
The coherentist’s radical move in face of the problem of circularity is to deny the 
linear picture of justification on which the Aristotlean argument rests.  Instead of looking 
at a building as the appropriate model for the structure of justification, we should look to 
a spider’s web.  A particular thread derives support from nearby threads while the nearby 
threads derive support from each other and that particular thread.  According to the 
coherentist non-linear picture of justification, a belief S could be justified because of its 
inferential relationship to T, U, and other propositions, while T is justified because of its 
inferential relationship to S, U, and other propositions. 
                                                
7 The building metaphor is a bit oversimplified.  While the first floor of a building may 
depend on the foundation for all of its structural support, a defender of the linear picture 
of justification need not claim that all of a belief’s justification is derived from a 
foundational belief.  Instead, the linear view only requires the claim that epistemic 
support from a foundational belief is necessary for an inferentially justified belief to be 
justified.  For more discussion see Robert Audi, Epistemology: A Contemporary 




 It should be clear that the worry about circularity arises only if we assume a linear 
picture of justification.  If B requires C for its justification and C requires D for its 
justification while D requires B for its justification, then we can only show that B is 
justified by assuming it in the first place.  But if justification is not linear in this way, then 
we are not left with this result. B can be justified by its relationship to C, D and the other 
propositions the agent believes, while C is justified by its relationship to B, D and the 
other propositions the agent believes. 
 Rejecting the linear picture of justification would answer the worry about 
circularity.  But should we reject this picture in the first place?  After all, it seems rather 
intuitive. As we noted at the beginning of this section, when someone asks me why I am 
justified in having a belief, I cite a further proposition.  If someone asks me about this 
further proposition, I will cite yet another proposition, and so on.   
 The coherentist can agree that justification appears linear.  But it appears linear 
only because we are considering the justification of a small number of beliefs.  If I am 
asked why I am justified in believing a proposition, the right thing to do, whether we 
have a linear or non-linear picture of justification, is to cite nearby beliefs.  According to 
the coherentist, the mistake of a linear picture of justification is to assume nothing 
changes when we are asking about our entire set of beliefs or a large subset thereof.  In 
the latter case, we can cite the coherence of the set of beliefs.  We do not need to claim 
that some of these beliefs constitute a foundation upon which all other knowledge 
depends. 
These are obviously deep theoretical issues that require a lot more discussion.  My 




commitments and difficulties are for foundationalism and coherentism.  Note that even if 
the coherentist can successfully defend the rejection of the linear conceptions of 
justification, the coherentist about perceptual beliefs is not entirely out of trouble.  There 
are many other objections that a coherentist about perceptual beliefs must contend with.  
Let me mention one more here.  Suppose that the coherentist is right and justification is 
purely a matter of internal coherence between beliefs.  Suppose further that it is coherent 
with my overall set of beliefs to believe that you will not be in your office today.  Perhaps 
I believe that today is your day off and that you never come into your office on your day 
off.  Now let us imagine that I come to your office and I see you there.  In this case, it 
may be more coherent for me to continue to hold that you did not come to your office 
today despite the fact that I see you in your office.  In some cases, coherentism about 
perceptual beliefs may have the consequence that I should just ignore the evidence from 
my experience of the world. 
In light of these difficulties, many philosophers have elected to go moderate.  
Thus, contemporary epistemologists like Robert Audi and James Pryor have abandoned 
some central Cartesian claims and opted for a moderate foundationalism.8 Laurence 
BonJour and Keith Lehrer have allowed some elements of foundationalism to play a role 
in their coherence theories of justification,9 and finally Susan Haack has adopted a view 
                                                
8 Robert Audi, The Structure of Justification (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993) and James Pryor, “The Skeptic and the Dogmatist,” Nous 34 (2000): 517-49. 
 
9 Laurence BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1985) and Keith Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge (Boulder, CO: Westview 






that she calls foundherentism which seems to occupy a conceptual space between the 
moderate versions of foundationalism and coherentism.10 
For our purposes we can leave open the question of which of these views, if any, 
is correct.  This is because our project is moral epistemology and I want to leave open the 
question of whether or not the correct account of moral justification is the same as the 
correct account of non-moral justification. 
1.3 Moral Foundationalism 
 In the rest of this chapter I will argue that whatever its plausibility in the non-
moral case, foundationalism fails as an account of moral justification.  I do this in order 
to motivate the search for a coherentist theory of moral justification that will occupy the 
rest of this dissertation.  Let me begin by making clear what foundationalism about moral 
justification is committed to and how such a view might be developed.  Foundationalism 
about moral justification holds that a moral belief is justified if and only if it is a basic 
belief or it is part of a chain of justification that ends in a basic belief.  There are several 
different possible versions of foundationalism about moral justification, each of which 
takes a different set of beliefs to be basic.  Moral foundationalism holds that the basic 
beliefs that justify all other justified moral beliefs are themselves moral beliefs. Non-
moral normative foundationalism holds that the basic beliefs that justify all justified 
moral beliefs are non-moral normative beliefs.  Descriptive foundationalism holds that 
the basic beliefs in question are descriptive beliefs.    In this chapter, I will argue that all 
three versions of foundationalism about moral justification are untenable.  
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I begin with moral foundationalism.  I will devote more space to moral 
foundationalism than any of its rivals because moral foundationalism is the version of 
foundationalism about moral justification that has received the most attention.  In fact, 
moral foundationalism was perhaps the dominant view among moral philosophers in the 
early twentieth century.11  At some point in the early to mid-twentieth century it became 
the subject of serious criticisms that were thought to have shown the view to be 
implausible.  However, moral foundationalism is currently going through something of a 
revival in the contemporary literature.12  Contemporary defenders argue that many of the 
old criticisms were based on misunderstandings about the commitments of the view.   
 At first, moral foundationalism can appear puzzling.  How could a moral belief be 
epistemically basic?  There are two sort of answers moral foundationalists give to this 
question. The standard version of moral foundationalism claims that some moral 
propositions are self-evident.  Self-evident propositions are those true propositions such 
that “if one adequately understands them, then by virtue of that understanding one is 
                                                
11 For early twentieth century defenses of moral foundationalism see Henry Sidgwick, 
The Methods of Ethics 7th Ed. (London: MacMillan, 1907); G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1903); H.A. Prichard, “Does Moral 
Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?” Mind 21 (1912): 21-37; and W.D. Ross, The Right and 
the Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930). 
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justified in believing them.”13 Moral foundationalists, in this sense, disagree about which 
propositions are self-evident.  Henry Sidgwick holds that it is self-evident that “the good 
of any one individual is of no more importance from the point of view (if I may say so) of 
the universe than the good of another” and that “as a rational being I am bound to aim at 
good generally – so far as it is attainable by my efforts – not merely a particular part of 
it.”14 According to G.E. Moore, it is self-evident that certain things (e.g. pleasure, 
aesthetic appreciation, beauty) are intrinsically good.15 W.D. Ross and Robert Audi claim 
that it is self-evident that we have certain prima facie duties.16 While these theorists 
disagree about which propositions are self-evident, they agree that some moral principles 
are self-evident.   
 Two points of clarification about this version of moral foundationalism are in order.  
First, self-evidence should not be confused with obviousness.  The elementary principles 
of logic are good candidates for being self-evident but, as any teacher of logic can attest, 
they are not obvious to students who are attending to them for the first time.  Second, one 
can be justified in believing a self-evident moral principle without believing that the 
principle is self-evident.  Thus, these principles are justified independently of one’s 
further beliefs, including one’s beliefs about which, if any, principles are self-evident. 
 A different version of moral foundationalism holds that foundational moral beliefs 
are not self-evident moral principles but the propositional content of seemings, 
                                                
13 Audi, Epistemology, p. 94, emphasis in original. 
 
14 Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, p. 382. 
 
15 Moore, Principia Ethica. 
 




appearances, or intuitions.17  According to these views, we have a certain mental state 
with propositional content that is called ‘a seeming’ or ‘an appearance.’18  We often 
describe these mental states by using phrases like ‘it seems that…’ or ‘it appears that….’ 
We have perceptual seemings (“it seems that Mary is taller than Jane”), seemings from 
memory (“I seem to remember that she was at the party”), and seemings from 
introspection (“it seems to me that I am in pain”).  We also have mathematical seemings 
(“it seems that 7+5=12”) and, particularly important for our purposes, we have moral 
seemings (“it seems wrong to push the fat man”).  When these seemings are not derived 
from perception, memory, or introspection, we might call them ‘intuitions.’ 
 On this view we are justified in believing the propositional contents of these 
seemings, appearances, or intuitions independently of any other beliefs.  It is important to 
forestall a common misunderstanding.  Suppose I have the intuition that murder is wrong. 
It is important to note that what is foundational, according to this view, is the belief that 
murder is wrong, not the belief that it seems that murder is wrong.  This is important, 
because I may never form any beliefs about the seeming.  The justification of the 
proposition ‘murder is wrong’ is foundational, it need not be derived from any belief 
about what seems to me to be the case. 
My argument against these views proceeds in two stages.  I being by defending 
the following thesis: given our awareness of disagreement among epistemic peers 
regarding our moral beliefs, we are not justified in believing any moral proposition unless 
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we have a further belief that serves as a reason to believe that moral proposition.  I then 
argue that if this thesis is true, moral foundationalism is in trouble. 
1.4 Disagreement 
 This section defends the thesis that, given our awareness of disagreement among 
epistemic peers regarding our moral beliefs, we are not justified in believing any moral 
proposition unless we have a further belief that serves as a reason to believe that moral 
proposition.  
As it stands, the thesis to be argued for is in need of quite a bit of clarification.  
Much of this clarification will have to be done as we go along but one term is in need of 
defining at the outset.  As I understand the term, an agent’s ‘epistemic peer’ is one who 
has roughly the same evidence, cognitive powers (e.g. intelligence, creativity, etc.), and 
motivation to arrive at the truth as the agent.  In what follows, I argue that awareness of 
peer disagreement regarding our moral beliefs can change the epistemic status of these 
beliefs. 
This idea that peer disagreement can change the epistemic status of our moral 
beliefs goes back to an oft-quoted passage from Sidgwick: 
If I find any of my judgments, intuitive or inferential, in direct conflict with a 
judgment of some other mind, there must be error somewhere: and if I have no 
more reason to suspect error in the other mind than in my own, reflective 
comparison between the two judgments necessarily reduces me temporarily to a 
state of neutrality.19 
                                                





This idea persists.20  Consider the following passage from Russ Shafer-Landau. 
It is true that awareness of disagreement regarding one’s moral endorsements may 
serve as a defeater.  It will do so if one has nothing to say on behalf of one’s moral 
views, after receiving or conceiving of a challenge from a dissenter whose 
conflicting views are themselves coherent, compatible with the non-moral 
evidence, etc.  Crucially, one is in a different epistemic position before and after 
confronting such disagreement.  Prior to this sort of confrontation, one may be 
justified in one’s belief simply because of having understood a self-evident 
proposition.  But after the challenge is issued, one is required to defend oneself.21 
The crucial idea in Shafer-Landau’s passage is that awareness of moral disagreement 
serves as a defeater for the moral beliefs about which there is disagreement.  A defeater 
for a belief B is a further belief that cancels or overrides an agent’s justification for 
believing B.22  In the above passage, Shafer-Landau is noting that a further belief, a belief 
that there is disagreement regarding one’s moral endorsements, can cancel or override 
one’s justification for holding one’s moral views.  While one may have been justified in 
holding a particular moral belief without having further beliefs that serve as reasons for 
that belief, after encountering peer disagreement, one now requires further reason in order 
to be justified in holding one’s belief. 
                                                
20 In addition to the passage from Shafer-Landau quoted below, see Walter Sinnott-
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It is now widely accepted that in the non-moral case, peer disagreement can serve 
as a defeater in the way Shafer-Landau suggests.  Consider the following well-known 
example. 
Suppose that five of us go out to dinner.  It’s time to pay the check, so the question 
we’re interested in is how much we each owe.  We can all see the bill total clearly, 
we all agree to give a 20% tip, and we further agree to split the whole cost evenly, 
not worrying over who asked for imported water, or skipped desert, or drank more 
of the wine.  I do the math in my head and become highly confident that our shares 
are $43 each.  Meanwhile, my friend does the math in her head and becomes highly 
confident that our shares are $45 each.  How should I react, upon learning of her 
belief?23 
Let us suppose that I know that my friend is genuinely my epistemic peer.  We might, 
“suppose that my friend and I have a long history of eating out together and dividing the 
check in our heads, and that we’ve been equally successful in our arithmetic efforts: the 
vast majority of times, we agree; but when we disagree, she’s right as often as I am.”24   
 It seems to most people who consider this case that I should suspend judgment 
about whether or not we owe $43 each.  If the proper attitude towards the proposition ‘we 
owe $43 each’ is suspension of judgment, then it follows that I am not justified in 
believing that we owe $43 each.  I may have been justified in holding this belief before I 
learned of my friend’s disagreement but now that I am aware of my friend’s disagreement 
I should adopt a different attitude toward the proposition that we owe $43 each. The way 
                                                
23 Taken from David Christensen, “Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News,” 






this case seems to function is that my awareness of peer disagreement defeats my 
justification for believing that we owe $43 each. I may become justified in holding this 
belief again, if, for example, the three other persons at the table perform the appropriate 
calculations and come to the conclusion that we owe $43 each.  However, what has 
happened in this case is that I have adopted a further belief that serves as a reason to 
believe that we owe $43 each.  It seems that a further belief that serves as a reason to 
believe that we owe $43 each is necessary for my belief that we owe $43 to regain 
justification.25 
 I will argue that the moral case is relevantly similar.  Suppose I am eating lunch 
with my friends Judith and Shelly, when Judith tells us the following story:  
George is on a footbridge over the trolley tracks.  He knows trolleys, and can see 
that the one approaching the bridge is out of control.  On the track back of the 
bridge there are five people; the banks are so steep that they will not be able to get 
off the track in time.  George knows that the only way to stop an out-of-control 
trolley is to drop a very heavy weight into its path.  But the only available, 
sufficiently heavy weight is a fat man, also watching the trolley from the 
footbridge.  George can shove the fat man onto the track in the path of the trolley, 
killing the fat man; or he can refrain from doing this, letting the five die.26   
Upon hearing this story, I immediately judge that it would be wrong to push the fat man 
off the bridge.  I form the belief that this action is wrong and perhaps this belief is 
                                                
25 A further belief that serves as a reason to believe that we owe $43 each is necessary but 
perhaps not sufficient.  My belief that I am a reliable at dividing the check in my head is a 
further belief that is a reason to believe that we owe $43 each but it may not be sufficient 
to justify me in believing that we owe $43 each in cases of peer disagreement. 
26 Judith Jarvis Thomson, Rights, Restitution, and Risk (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 




justified.  However, suppose Shelly has exactly the opposite reaction, he immediately 
judges that it would be morally permissible to push the fat man off the bridge.   
 There are many things that could explain why my friend had a different reaction to 
the case than I did.  Perhaps my friend misunderstood the case, subscribes to a false 
moral theory, or reasoned poorly about the case.  However, as Sidgwick notes, if we are 
truly epistemic peers it is just as likely that I made an error as it is that my friend made an 
error. 
 If we believe that my friend’s disagreement in the restaurant in the case served as a 
defeater for my belief that we owe $43 each, then we should accept that Shelly’s 
disagreement in this case serves as a defeater for my judgment that it is morally 
impermissible to push the fat man off the bridge.  Of course, this does not mean that I 
cannot become justified once again in believing that it was impermissible to push the fat 
man off the bridge.  I could learn of the doctrine of double effect and note that this 
doctrine would forbid pushing the fat man.  Perhaps, inferring my judgment about 
pushing the fat man from the doctrine of double effect could render my judgment 
justified.  However, this requires a further belief in order to render my judgment about 
the fat man case justified. 
 So far, our discussion of moral disagreement has been restricted to cases where I 
make an immediate judgment, (i.e. cases where my belief is not based on further belief 
that serves as a reason for my belief).  However, suppose my belief is based on further 
beliefs that serve as reasons for my belief.   Does my awareness of peer disagreement still 
function as a defeater? 




regarding disagreement only requires that my awareness of peer disagreement function as 
a defeater when I have no further beliefs that serve as reasons for my belief.  This thesis 
leaves open what, if anything, is required of me when I encounter peer disagreement 
about a belief for which I have further reasons.  Thus, the claim made here is rather weak.  
It is only that peer disagreement functions as a defeater for a belief when I have no 
further beliefs that serve as reasons for holding that belief. 
 The weakness of this claim about disagreement is worth emphasizing.  Currently 
there is a dispute in epistemology about what peer disagreement requires of us.  Some 
think that peer disagreement requires us to radically alter our confidence in our beliefs.  
For instance, Richard Feldman writes that in cases where there is widespread peer 
disagreement, “suspension of judgment is the proper attitude.  It follows that in such 
cases we lack reasonable belief and so, on standard conceptions, knowledge.”27 In 
contrast, Thomas Kelly writes, “disagreement does not provide a good reason for 
skepticism or to change one’s view.”28 The position argued for here is merely that 
awareness of disagreement is a defeater in certain cases, namely, ones in which one does 
not have a further belief that serves as a reason for their belief.  Since most of our beliefs 
are supported by further reasons, we can, at least most of the time, agree with Kelly that 
disagreement does not give us a reason to change our view or become skeptics. 
 I have been arguing that awareness of peer disagreement is a defeater for a moral 
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belief and that to overcome this defeater requires at least a further belief that serves as a 
reason for the moral belief in question.  However, this only supports my general thesis 
that we require further reasons for all of our moral beliefs if it turns out that peer 
disagreement is widespread enough to provide a defeater for all of our moral beliefs.  In 
what follows, I argue that this is the case.29 
 Moral philosophy provides us with ample evidence.  Deontologists disagree with 
consequentialists about which moral theory is correct.  Practical ethicists disagree about 
whether abortion and euthanasia are morally permissible.  In the extreme case, moral 
nihilists such as J.L. Mackie and Richard Joyce hold that no first order moral propositions 
are true.30 This is especially important, for it means that there is a potential defeater for 
all of our moral beliefs. 
 One line of response is to deny that moral nihilists are our epistemic peers.  One 
who responded this way would not deny that there is widespread moral disagreement, but 
could at least resist my claim that there is moral disagreement about every moral 
proposition.  One who is tempted toward this response should keep in mind how I have 
characterized epistemic peers.  Our epistemic peers are those who have cognitive powers, 
motivation to arrive at the truth, and evidence that is roughly equivalent to ours.  I 
unfortunately cannot prove that Mackie, Joyce, and other nihilists are our peers in this 
sense.  Nonetheless, it seems to me likely that they are.   
                                                
29 A qualification: I take it that there is no peer disagreement about the truth of certain 
conditionals (e.g. ‘if killing is always wrong, then killing your child is wrong.’).  This 
fact is of no help to any actual moral foundationalist because no moral foundationalist 
holds that it is only these sorts of conditionals that are foundational. 
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 Another possible line of response is to concede that there is quite a bit of 
disagreement about what one morally ought to do all things considered but that there is 
little disagreement that we have certain prima facie duties.31  For example, it may not be 
particularly controversial that one has prima facie duty not to lie. To assess this claim we 
must keep in mind that to say that we have a prima facie duty not to lie is not merely to 
imply that we often or usually have a duty not to lie.  To claim that we have a prima facie 
duty not to lie is to claim that we have an all things considered duty not to lie unless lying 
is required by another duty.32  This latter claim is controversial.  It is denied by nihilists 
like Joyce and Mackie, but also by non- nihilists such as Jonathan Dancy.33 Many 
utilitarians are also committed to its denial.  To see this, imagine a case where telling a lie 
is not required by any duty and produces exactly as much overall utility as not lying.  In 
such a case the claim that we have a prima facie duty not to lie entails that we have an all 
things considered duty not to lie, since, by hypothesis, lying is not required by any other 
duties.  However, the act-utilitarian will hold that we have no duty not to lie since, by 
hypothesis, lying produces exactly as much utility as not lying.  Note that since the claim 
that we have a prima facie duty not to lie entails that, in this case, we have an all things 
considered duty not to lie, utilitarians who hold that we do not have an all things 
considered duty not to lie are committed to denying that we have a prima facie duty not 
to lie as well. 
 A third line of response is to concede that it appears that moral disagreement is 
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extremely widespread, but hold that the appearances are misleading.  In many cases the 
sentences one person utters seem to contradict the sentences uttered by another person.  
However, it does not follow that the propositions one person intends to assert contradict 
the proposition another person intends to assert.  This is because the relationship between 
the sentences we utter and the propositions we intend to assert is complicated.  Many 
times it appears that two sentences are contradictory but only because terms are being 
used imprecisely.  For example, suppose I believe that there is no omniscient, 
omnipotent, and perfectly moral being who created the universe.  I come across a friend 
who utters the sentence ‘God exists’ and I utter in reply ‘God does not exist.’  In this 
case, the sentences we utter make it appear that we disagree. However, suppose my friend 
believes that God is love and only means to be asserting that love exists.  In this case we 
may not actually disagree, since the proposition my friend is intends to assert is ‘love 
exists’ and that proposition is consistent with my atheism. 
 The sentences we utter are indeed imperfect guides to the propositions that we 
intend to assert.  However, this does not show that there is less disagreement than there 
appears to be. I may assent to the sentence you utter only because I am mistaken about 
which proposition you intend to assert.  Perhaps if I really knew what proposition you 
were trying to assert, I would dissent rather than assent to your statement.  If this happens 
often, there may actually be more disagreement than there appears to be.  Thus, the fact 
that the sentences we utter are imperfect guides to the propositions we intend to assert 
does not show that there is less moral disagreement then there appears to be. 
 I take it, then, that there is strong prima facie reason to think that peer disagreement 




beliefs.  This prima facie reason is not defeated by either the objection from prima facie 
duties nor the fact that the sentences we utter and the propositions that we intend to assert 
come apart.  If we are aware of extremely widespread peer disagreement about morality 
and such disagreement functions as a defeater in the way I have suggested, then it follows 
that we (those of us aware of widespread moral disagreement) must have a further reason 
for our moral beliefs in order for them to be justified.   
 There is, however, an objection to this line of thought that must be considered.  
Suppose Peter believes it is wrong to torture a puppy for amusement but David does not.  
However, Peter knows that David was bitten by a dog as a child and has had an irrational 
disdain for canines ever since.  Peter does not have a further reason to believe that it is 
wrong to torture dogs for amusement, however it does not seem that David’s 
disagreement in this case in any way undermines Peter’s justification for holding his 
belief.  The way that this case functions is that while normally David’s disagreement 
would be a defeater for Peter’s belief, this defeater is itself defeated by Peter’s knowledge 
that David has an irrational disdain for canines. Generalizing from this case, one might 
hold that there is a set of cases in which one need not hold a further belief that serves as a 
reason for their beliefs even in the face of disagreement.  These cases occur when one 
knows that the disagreement itself is motivated by beliefs that are irrational, delusional, 
etc.   
 In order to accommodate this objection, the thesis must be qualified somewhat.  Let 
us understand ‘reasons to believe that p’ in a very broad sense to include not only 
evidence for p but also defeaters for potential evidence for ~p.  I recognize that it is a bit 




however, I am using ‘reason to believe that p’ in a somewhat technical sense that is 
slightly divorced from its ordinary usage.  In this technical sense, one has a reason to 
believe p if and only if one has evidence for p or a defeater for would-be evidence that 
~p.   
1.5 Disagreement and Moral Foundationalism 
 In this section, I argue that the thesis defended in the last section raises serious 
problems for moral foundationalism.  I begin by restating what moral foundationalism is 
Moral Foundationalism: A moral belief is justified if and only if it is a basic 
moral belief, a moral belief that is non-inferentially justified, or it bears an 
appropriate inferential or evidential relationship to a foundational moral belief. 
 This formulation intentionally leaves some things open to allow for a variety of 
different views to count as instances of moral foundationalism.  For instance, it leaves 
open what sort of inferential or evidential relationships non-foundational moral beliefs 
must bear to moral beliefs in order to be justified.  Some older foundationalist views held 
that a non-foundational belief had to be deductively inferable from a foundational belief.  
However, contemporary foundationalists are much more liberal about what sorts of 
inferential and evidential relationships can justify a non-foundational belief and this 
formulation allows for that. 
 This formulation also leaves open the question of whether or not basic moral beliefs 
are indefeasibly justified or only defeasibly justified.34  A defender of the former view 
might hold that we are indefeasibly justified in believing a self-evident proposition so 
long as we understand it or they might hold that we are indefeasibly justified in believing 
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the propositional content of our seemings.  This view is in direct conflict with the 
argument from section 1.4.  For on this view there are some moral propositions for which 
our justification could not be defeated.  Fortunately, this view is implausible and rarely 
defended today.  On this view a self-evident proposition could be radically incoherent 
with my other beliefs, yet I would still be justified in believing the proposition so long as 
I understood it. 
 Contemporary moral foundationalists defend the view that foundational moral 
beliefs are only defeasibly justified.  On this view, understanding a self-evident 
proposition renders us prima facie justified in believing the proposition.  This prima facie 
justification could be defeated if, for example, this proposition fails to cohere with our 
other beliefs.  Similarly, one could hold that I am prima facie justified in believing the 
content of my moral intuitions.  However, this justification could be defeated.  These 
views are strictly compatible with the thesis of section I.  This is because they allow that 
there could be a defeater for foundational moral beliefs.  However, I will argue that these 
views can only accommodate the thesis of section I at a high cost. 
 The first thing to notice is that while one can be prima facie justified in believing a 
moral proposition non-inferentially, one cannot be all things considered justified in 
believing a moral proposition unless they have a further belief that serves as a reason to 
believe it.  This is because, as argued in section 1.4, our awareness of extremely 
widespread peer disagreement about morality serves as a defeater of our moral beliefs 
unless we have a further reason for them.   
 Notice also that these further beliefs that serve as reasons to believe foundational 




override or undermine a defeater.  Thus, even foundational moral beliefs must ultimately 
be supported by further justified beliefs. 
 This fact calls into question the regress argument that we began with.  For a belief 
to stop the regress that belief must have all things considered justification. Defeated 
prima facie justification cannot stop the regress.  However, we have seen that for 
foundational moral beliefs to have all things considered justification they must be 
supported by further beliefs and that these further beliefs must themselves be justified 
beliefs.  We can then sensibly ask, what makes these further reasons justified.  The 
regress begins again. 
 It follows from these considerations that no moral belief can stop the regress.  This 
is because our awareness of extremely widespread peer disagreement about the truth of 
our moral beliefs serves as a defeater that can only be overcome or undermined by a 
further reason that is itself a justified belief.  Thus, to achieve all things considered 
justification, a moral belief always requires a further justified belief. 
 If no moral belief can stop the regress, the threat of skepticism looms. For it may 
seem that unless something can stop the regress, given the implausibility of an infinite 
regress of justified beliefs, we may be forced to accept that none of our moral beliefs are 
justified.  However, as we have already seen there is another way of avoiding the regress 
argument without positing regress stoppers.  
 This alternative is to deny the linear picture of justification on which the regress 
argument rests.  However, for the foundationalist to take this route is to make a major 




beliefs require further justified beliefs in order to be justified, produces a view that is 
difficult to distinguish from coherentism.   
 It is worth spelling out explicitly what the moral foundationalist would have to 
give up.  This argument does not show that there are no self-evident moral propositions, 
so long as self-evidence is understood as conferring only defeasible justification on an 
agent’s beliefs.35  What the argument does show is that our prima facie justification for 
believing self-evident moral propositions, if there are any, is defeated by our awareness 
of extremely widespread moral disagreement.  Thus, in practice, self-evident propositions 
will function much like non self-evident propositions, in that they require evidential or 
inferential support from other beliefs in order to be justified.   
 This point is worth dwelling on because it is one that moral foundationalists have 
traditionally denied.  For instance G.E. Moore claims that it is self-evident that certain 
things are intrinsically good and he defines a self-evident proposition as one that is 
“evident or true by itself alone; that it is not an inference from some proposition other 
than itself.”36 W.D. Ross holds that the proposition that certain acts are prima facie right 
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evident moral beliefs.  The standard objection has been widely discussed by moral 
foundationalists (see Philip Stratton-Lake, “Introduction,” pp. 1-28; and Audi, The Good 
in the Right, pp. 60-68).  The argument discussed here is less often discussed.   It does not 
claim that the fact of widespread moral disagreement shows that there are no self-evident 
moral propositions.  Instead, this argument claims that even if there are self-evident 
moral propositions, the prima facie justification of these propositions is defeated.    This 
sort of argument has received little attention from moral foundationalists.  An exception 
is Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism, pp. 252-265 who distinguishes between these two 
arguments and discusses versions of both of them . However, Shafer-Landau does not 
discuss the fact that once the moral foundationalist concedes that further beliefs are 
required in order for a moral belief to be justified, the regress begins again. 





“is self-evident; without any need of proof, or of evidence beyond itself.”37 And Robert 
Audi claims that it is self-evident that we have certain prima facie duties where “a self-
evident proposition is knowable without our relying on any inferential ground for it.”38 If 
the thesis of the last section is correct, however, one cannot be justified in believing a 
moral proposition unless one has a further belief that serves as a reason to believe the 
proposition. 
 As I noted earlier, this raises the question of how one can stop the regress.  I 
suggested one plausible way of stopping the regress is to deny the linear picture of 
justification on which the regress argument depends.  However, to deny the linear picture 
of justification is to deny much of what makes foundationalism a distinctive position.  As 
we have seen, once one adopts a non-linear picture of justification there is no need to 
posit foundational beliefs on which other beliefs rest.  We have seen, then, that in order to 
account for the epistemic obligations we incur as a result of moral disagreement, the 
moral foundationalist has to give up exactly those claims that make their view distinct 
from moral coherentism.  I now move on to discuss another version of foundationalism in 
moral epistemology, non-moral normative foundationalism. 
1.6 Non-Moral Normative Foundationalism 
 The non-moral normative foundationalist agrees with the moral foundationalist 
that a moral belief is justified if and only if it can be inferentially justified by appeal to a 
basic belief.  However, the non-moral normative foundationalist disagrees with the moral 
foundationalist about which beliefs are basic.  Whereas the moral foundationalist claims 
                                                
37 Ross The Right and the Good, p. 29. 
 




that the basic beliefs that justify all justified moral beliefs are themselves moral beliefs, 
the non-moral normative foundationalist insists that they are non-moral normative 
beliefs. 
 To get an idea of how non-moral normative foundationalism might be fleshed out, 
consider the moral theories of R.B. Brandt and David Gauthier. 39  Both theorists begin 
by developing theories of practical rationality.  They then argue from these theories of 
rationality to particular moral theories. One might, inspired by such views, adopt the 
position that some non-moral normative claims, such as claims about practical rationality, 
are self-evident and that moral claims are justified by being part of an inferential chain 
that terminates in a self-evident non-moral normative belief 
 Neither Brandt nor Gauthier claim that any part of their theories of rationality is 
epistemically basic.  Therefore, Brandt and Gauthier cannot be said to have endorsed any 
kind of foundationalism. 40 In fact either theorist could, consistently with the main thrust 
of their writings, adopt coherentist positions according to which moral beliefs and beliefs 
about rationality are justified by being part of a coherent set of beliefs that may include 
beliefs about rationality and morality, as well as beliefs about psychology, economics, 
                                                
39 As defended by Brandt in A Theory of the Good and the Right and Gauthier in Morals 
by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). 
40 For this reason Dale Jamieson claims in his “Method and Moral Theory” in Peter 
Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), that the views of Brandt 
and Gauthier are neither coherentist nor foundationalist.  I think that it is best to say that 
such views are either coherentist or foundationalist.  They are foundationalist if they take 
non-moral normative beliefs to be basic and coherentist if they take them to be justified 




and perhaps even sociology.  Such a view would be coherentist and, I think, highly 
plausible.41 
 Still, even if no one has explicitly defended non-moral normative 
foundationalism, a foundationalist frustrated by the failure of moral foundationalism may 
be tempted to take up such a view. Let me attempt to block this temptation by noting that 
non-moral normative foundationalism faces the same problem as moral foundationalism.  
The argument against moral foundationalism can be run mutatis mutandis against non-
normative moral foundationalism 
 One may object that there is not such widespread disagreement about what is 
rational.  I grant that there may be claims about practical rationality that are 
uncontroversial.  But what is needed for non-moral normative foundationalism is, not just 
uncontroversial claims about practical rationality, but uncontroversial claims about 
practical rationality from which one can derive moral requirements.42  I conjecture that 
there is peer disagreement about any such claim. 
                                                
41 For more on the epistemological commitments of views like Gauthier’s see Christopher 
W. Morris, “A Contractarian Account of Moral Justification” in Sinnott- Armstrong and 
Timmons (eds.), Moral Knowledge, pp. 214-242.  Morris notes that Gauthier and other 
contractarians are committed to the view that certain non-moral normative beliefs have 
some epistemic priority over moral beliefs.  This may be incompatible with some radical 
coherentist views but a plausible moderate coherentism can allow for some notion of 
epistemic priority.  To be coherentist such views would have to reject the kind of radical 
epistemic priority that foundationalists are committed to.  However, it does not seem to 
me that contractarian views like Gauthier’s presuppose any radical foundationalist notion 
of epistemic priority.  Thus, contractarian views like Gauthier’s can be either coherentist 
or foundationalist. 
42 For skepticism about whether one can derive moral requirements from practical 
rationality see James Drier, “Humean Doubts about the Practical Justification of 
Morality” in G. Cullity and B. Gaut (eds.) Ethics and Practical Reason (Oxford: Oxford 





 If my conjecture is correct and disagreement functions as a defeater in the way I 
suggested in section 1.4, then it follows that those beliefs about practical rationality from 
which moral requirements can be derived are unable to stop the regress in the same way 
that moral beliefs are unable to stop the regress.  If this is right, then those theorists who 
hold that moral requirements can be derived from the requirements of practical rationality 
would be better off being coherentists. 
1.7 Descriptive Foundationalism 
 Descriptive foundationalism is also a version of foundationalism about moral 
justification in that it holds that a moral belief is justified if and only if it is inferentially 
justified by appeal to a basic belief.  However, it differs from moral and non-moral 
normative foundationalism because it takes some descriptive belief(s) to be the basic 
belief(s) from which all moral beliefs are derived. 
 The problem with descriptive foundationalism is that it violates Hume’s law, 
according to which one cannot derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is.’43  The fact that God 
commands me not to murder only entails that I ought not to murder if we assume that I 
ought to do what God commands.  Similarly, the fact that a certain experiment would 
cause babies pain only entails that I ought not to conduct the experiment if we assume 
that I ought not to cause babies pain.  It seems that descriptive ‘is’ claims do not, by 
themselves, tell me what I ought to do.  To arrive at a claim about what I ought to do, I 
must also assume a further ‘ought’ claim. 
                                                
43 Hume appears to state Hume’s law in A Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, Part I, 
Section I (final paragraph).  Some interpreters (e.g. A.C. MacIntyre, “Hume on ‘Is’ and 
‘Ought,” Philosophical Review 68 (1959): 451-68) doubt that Hume actually intended to 
state what is today called ‘Hume’s law.’ In any case, the philosophical plausibility of the 




 Some philosophers have employed logical tricks that actually allow them to 
derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is.’  Take the following examples: 
Argument A: 
A1) Bob is married and not married. 
A2) Therefore, you ought not to lie. 
A2 follows from A1 since A1 is contradiction and anything follows from a contradiction.  
Argument B: 
B1) Grass is green 
B2) Therefore, grass is green or you ought not to lie. 
While B2 follows from B1, in this case it is not so obvious that B2 is an ‘ought.’  Perhaps 
B2 is an ‘is.’  But consider the following argument 
Argument C: 
C1) Grass is green or you ought not to lie 
C2) Grass is not green 
C3) Therefore, you ought not to lie. 
If the disjunction, ‘grass is green or you ought not to lie’ is an ‘is,’ then argument C 
derives an ‘ought’ from an ‘is.’  If the disjunction is an ‘ought’ then argument B derives 
an ‘ought’ from an ‘is.’ 
I am willing to concede that strictly speaking one can derive an ‘ought’ from an 
‘is.’  But these arguments are of no help to the descriptive foundationalist because for 
descriptive foundationalism to be true, there must be an argument that derives ‘ought’ 
from an ‘is’ in a way that confers epistemic justification on the ‘ought.’  These arguments 




only work if the first premise is a contradiction, and all contradictions are false.  Surely, a 
false claim cannot confer justification on an ‘ought.’  The second and third arguments 
depend on ad hoc gerrymandered disjunctions, and thus are also unlikely to serve as an 
epistemic foundation for moral ‘ought’s.   
This has not been anything like a complete survey of attempts to derive an ‘ought’ 
from an ‘is.’44  Attempting such a survey would take us too far afield.  However, no 
attempt to derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ has yet gained widespread acceptance among 
philosophers.  I suspect that this is for good reason. 
1.8 Quasi-Foundationalism 
I want to close by considering quasi-foundationalism, a view suggested, though 
not endorsed, by Mark Timmons.45  The quasi-foundationalist believes in a coherence 
theory of justification for non-moral beliefs.  The quasi-foundationalist then picks out a 
particular non-moral belief (or set of non-moral beliefs) and argues that all moral beliefs 
must be justified inferentially by this non-moral belief (or set of non-moral beliefs). 
Strictly speaking the quasi-foundationalist is not a foundationalist. This is because 
she denies that there are any basic beliefs.  According to her, moral beliefs are justified 
inferentially by appeal to a non-moral belief that is justified on coherentist grounds.  
However, the quasi-foundationalist also disagrees with the moral coherentist.  This is 
because the moral coherentist thinks that moral beliefs are justified by being part of a 
coherent set of beliefs.  As such, moral beliefs are ultimately justified, for the moral 
                                                
44 For a more thorough survey, see Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Skepticisms 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), Ch. 7. 
 





coherentist, non-linearly.  However, the quasi-foundationalist holds that moral beliefs 
(but not non-moral beliefs) are justified linearly, by appeal to a non-linearly justified non-
moral belief. 
This view, if plausible, would constitute a serious rival to coherentism about 
moral justification.  So, is this view plausible?  Notice that if the non-moral belief in 
question is a purely descriptive belief, then quasi-foundationalism will violate Hume’s 
law and be implausible for the same reason that descriptive foundationalism is 
implausible.46 
But what if the non-moral belief in question is itself a normative belief?  Hume’s 
law does not say that we cannot derive an ‘ought’ from another ‘ought.’  I do not have a 
knockdown argument against this form of quasi-foundationalism.  However, I want to 
note that there is something peculiar about it.   
On this view some non-moral normative beliefs would be part of a coherentist 
web with a foundationalist building sticking out of it.  These non-moral normative beliefs 
are justified in a non-linear fashion while justifying moral beliefs in a strictly linear 
fashion.  The obvious question is, why should the non-moral normative beliefs be part of 
the web and not the building?  In other words, why should some normative beliefs be 
justified non-linearly while moral ones are justified linearly? 
If the quasi-foundationalist gives us no answer, then the claim that moral beliefs 
must be justified linearly is purely ad-hoc.  Thus, one who holds the quasi-foundationalist 
view must hold that there is some difference between the moral and the rest of the 
                                                
46 Timmons acknowledges this in a footnote (p. 609 n27).  However, he seems to be more 
sanguine about the possibility of deriving an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ (in a way that confers 




normative that compels us to adopt a different epistemology for the moral than the rest of 
the normative.  It is difficult for me to see what this difference could be.   
 As I said earlier, there is no knockdown argument against the quasi-
foundationalist here.  Until the view is further developed, the most I can do is make a 
burden-shifting move.  The quasi-foundationalist holds that the non-moral normative is 
justified non-linearly while the moral is justified linearly.  One who defends this claim 
inherits the burden of explaining why the moral and the rest of the normative should be 
treated so differently.  I am doubtful that such a burden can be met.  If I am right that it 
cannot be, then quasi-foundationalism preserves the idea that moral beliefs must be 
justified linearly only by making an ad hoc maneuver.  
1.9 Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have argued that three versions of foundationalism in moral 
epistemology are implausible.  I also considered a view that, while not strictly 
foundationalist, does pose a threat to coherence theories of ethical justification.  I argued 
that this view has a peculiar entailment in need of defense.   
 I have criticized these views in order to motivate the search for an alternative.  
Beginning in chapter three, I develop and defend a coherentist account, which I argue 
avoids the pitfalls of the views discussed in this chapter.  Before we do that, however, we 
will take a quick detour out of moral epistemology and into moral psychology.  Concerns 
from moral psychology will force us to rethink some traditional motivations for 






Chapter 2: Skeptical Doubts about Moral Intuitions 
 
2.1 Moral Psychology 
 If one’s only exposure to moral discourse and practice were moral philosophy, 
one might think that moral judgments about actions are arrived at by conscious inference 
from abstract principles and facts about the actions in question.  In fact, this was the 
dominant view of how mature moral reasoning worked in moral psychology for most of 
the twentieth century.1 
 Things changed quite a bit in the twenty first century when the psychologist 
Jonthan Haidt asked participants in a study about the following case: 
Julie and Mark are brother and sister.  They are traveling together in France on 
summer vacation from college.  One night they are staying alone in a cabin near 
the beach.  They decide that it might be interesting and fun if they tried making 
love.  At the very least it would be a new experience for each of them.  Julie was 
already taking birth control pills, but Mark uses a condom too, just to be safe.  
They both enjoy making love, but they decide not to do it again.  They keep that 
night as a special secret, which makes them feel even closer to each other.  What 
do you think about that?  Was it OK for them to make love?2 
 
Haidt found that, 
Most people who hear the above story immediately say that it was wrong for the 
siblings to make love, and they then begin searching for reasons.  They point out 
the dangers of inbreeding, only to remember that Julie and Mark used two forms 
of birth control.  They argue that Julie and Mark will be hurt, perhaps 
emotionally, even though the story makes it clear that no harm befell them.  
                                                
1 For examples see Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child (New York: Free Press, 
1932) and Lawrence Kohlberg The Philosophy of Moral Development Vol. 1 (San 
Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981). 
 
2 Haidt, “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to 





Eventually, many people say something like, “I don’t know, I can’t explain it, I 
just know it’s wrong.3 
 
  If people arrived at moral judgments via conscious inference, we might expect 
them to take some time to arrive at a conclusion about the moral permissibility of Mark 
and Julie making love.  Yet Haidt makes it clear that most of the participants in his study 
responded immediately.  People are able to state a reason for judging Mark and Julie’s 
lovemaking impermissible, but when that reason is shown not to be relevant to this case, 
people typically respond by inventing a second or perhaps a third reason.  Haidt observed 
that the typical participant behaved like “a lawyer trying to build a case rather than a 
judge searching for the truth.”4 When all the arguments ran out, many participants 
declared that they just knew the lovemaking was wrong, even though they could not 
provide a reason.  Surely, this is not what we would expect if they held their belief on the 
basis of conscious inference from a moral principle. 
 In order to explain his observations, Haidt proposed an alternative to the 
conscious inference model.  On Haidt’s model, people have an immediate judgment, an 
intuition, which they arrive at without conscious inference.  People then engage in an ex 
post facto search for reasons to justify their intuition.  This model explains why people 
are able to make moral judgments so quickly, even about unfamiliar cases.  It also 
explains why the conscious inference model was able to dominate moral psychology for 
so long.  When subjects are asked why they made a particular moral judgment, they are 
able to easily invent reasons for their intuition.  But Haidt argues that these reasons are ex 
post facto and not really the cause of the judgment.  This explains why people continue to 
                                                






hold on to their judgments even if their reasons are shown not to be relevant.  Their 
judgments were not actually made as the result of the reasons given.  Instead, these 
judgments are made intuitively.5 
 As Haidt’s research makes clear, intuitions play a vital role in ordinary moral 
judgment.  In this chapter, I offer a characterization of what intuitions are and a 
preliminary diagnosis of their reliability. 
2.2 Intuitions 
 In the last section, we saw that intuitions play a crucial role in our moral 
judgment.  But what are these intuitions?  This is the question that I hope to answer in 
this section. 
 One of the earliest attempts to explicitly state what an intuition is can be found in 
Descartes’ Rules for the Direction of Our Native Intelligence.   
By ‘intuition’ I do not mean the fluctuating testimony of the senses or the 
deceptive judgment of the imagination as it botches things together, but the 
conception of a clear and attentive mind, which is so easy and distinct that there 
can be no room for doubt about what we are understanding.  Alternatively, and 
this comes to the same thing, intuition is the indubitable conception of a clear and 
attentive mind which proceeds solely from the light of reason.  Because it is 
                                                
5 It might be objected that rather than having an intuition, perhaps subjects consciously 
inferred their judgment from a general principle: incest is wrong.  While this is a possible 
explanation, I do not think it is the best.  First, when asked why what Mark and Julie did 
was wrong, subjects tended to cite ways in which Mark and Julie’s act could have harmed 
someone (Mark, Julie, or a potential offspring) rather than a general prohibition against 
incest.  Second, Haidt has found similar results using other stories (Jonathan Haidt, Silvia 
Koller, Maria Dias, “Affect, Culture and Morality, or Is It Wrong to Eat Your Dog?,” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65 (1993): 613-28) including a story in 
which a woman cleans her bathroom with an American flag, a story in which a family 
eats their dog after it has been run over by a car, and a story in which a man eats a 
chicken carcass after using it to masturbate.  While it seems likely that the subjects 
subscribe to a general prohibition against incest, it is much less likely that subjects 
subscribe to a general prohibition against eating the family dog when it is deceased or 




simpler, it is more certain than deduction, though deduction, as we noted above, is 
not something a man can perform wrongly (AT 368).6 
 
Descartes goes on to contrast intuition with “deduction, by which we mean the inference 
of something as following necessarily from some other propositions (AT 369).” 
 
Hence we are distinguishing mental intuition from certain deduction on the 
grounds that we are aware of a movement or a sort of sequence in the latter but 
not in the former (AT 370) 
 
 For Descartes, to call something an ‘intuition’ is to make some psychological 
claims about it as well as some epistemic claims.  Let us begin with the psychological 
claims.  Descartes says that intuitions are distinct from perceptual judgments, judgments 
arrived at through deduction, and imaginings.  Furthermore, intuitions come to us when 
our minds are “clear and attentive.”  As far as the epistemic features of intuitions, 
Descartes claims that intuitions are “indubitable” and “more certain than deduction” even 
though deduction is “not something a man can perform wrongly.”  Later, he calls 
intuitions “self-evident (AT 369).”   
It is a somewhat peculiar feature of Descartes understanding of ‘intuition’ that 
‘intuition’ is defined by both psychological and epistemic features.  Compare this to 
perceptual judgments.  Most philosophers agree that perceptual judgments have certain 
psychological and epistemic features (though they disagree about what these features are) 
but one typically defines perceptual judgments by their psychological features and then 
argues for their epistemic features.  It would seem to beg all kinds of question in 
epistemology to just define perceptual judgments as having epistemic as well as 
                                                
6 All page references to Descartes will be included in the main text.  The page numbers 
give are those of the Adam and Tannery pagination found in the margins of most 
translations.  The translation I have used is from The Philosophical Writings of Descartes 
(trans. by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch) (Cambridge, UK: 




perceptual features.  Why does Descartes appear to do just this when he is defining 
intuitive judgments? 
We can find the answer when we look at the passage above. Descartes seems to 
be saying that the psychological features of intuitions entail that they also have certain 
epistemic features.  Descartes argues that because intuitive judgments are more simple 
and clear than judgments arrived at by deduction, that these judgments are more certain 
than judgments arrived at by deduction.  But why think that more simple or clear 
judgments are more likely to be true?  In other words, why think that these psychological 
features of intuitions always coincide with a certain epistemic status?  The objection I am 
raising here is essentially the same objection Mersenne raised about one of Descartes 
later works, the Meditations. 
How can you establish with certainty that you are not deceived, or capable of 
being deceived, in matters which you think you know clearly and distinctly?  
Have we not often seen people deceived in matters where they thought there 
knowledge was as clear as sunlight?  Your principle of clear and distinct 
knowledge thus requires a clear and distinct explanation, in such a way as to rule 
out the possibility that anyone of sound mind may be deceived on matters which 
he thinks he knows clearly and distinctly (AT 126). 
 
Descartes’ reply is intellectually honest but unsatisfying.  He says, “In such cases, 
I simply assert that it is impossible for us to be deceived (AT 144).” Simple assertion will 
not do here.  We need an account of why the psychological features of intuitions always 
coincide with a particular epistemic status. 7 
                                                
7 In fairness to Descartes, he does later give a further argument from God’s good nature 
(AT 144).  But many commentators think that to invoke God here is viciously circular 
since clear and distinct perceptions are used to prove God’s existence in the first place.  
This objection is known as the Cartesian Circle.  For references and further discussion 
see section 6 of Lex Newman, "Descartes' Epistemology", The Stanford Encyclopedia of 





The lesson to be learned from this dialogue between Descartes and Mersenne is 
that the epistemic features of intuitions are something to be argued for, not assumed at the 
outset.  Thus, in discussing what an intuition is, I will focus on the psychological features 
of intuitions.  What epistemic features these intuitions have will be a central topic of the 
rest of this dissertation. 
In regard to the psychological features of intuitions, Descartes suggests two very 
important points.  The first point is that intuitive judgments are a distinct cognitive 
process from perceptual judgments and imaginings. If I believe that there is a computer in 
front of me because I see it, then it would be odd to say that I have the ‘intuition’ that 
there is a computer in front of me. Intuitions are distinct from imaginings in that 
imaginings do not aim at truth in the way that intuitions do.  Descartes also claims that 
when we have intuitions we are not “aware of a movement or a sort of sequence (AT 
370)” the way we are when we come to know something by deduction.  I take the claim 
that we are not aware of “a movement” when we have an intuition to mean that intuitions 
are not arrived at by conscious inference.8  Thus, if I judge that killing Bob was wrong 
because I consciously infer that it was from my belief that killing is always wrong, then I 
have not had an intuition that killing Bob was wrong.   
                                                
8 The qualifier ‘conscious’ is important here because it is at least possible that most of the 
judgments we make are the result of inference at some non-conscious level.  For 
example, I now judge that there is a computer in front of me.  This judgment appears to 
me to be completely spontaneous.  But it is possible that at some non-conscious level this 
judgment is the product of an inference from my brute sensations and my knowledge of 
what a computer looks like.  I believe that there is some reason to think that intuitions are 
arrived at by non-conscious inference in the sense that my judgment that there is a 
computer in front of me is arrived at by non-conscious inference.  The reason to suspect 
that intuitions may be the product of non-conscious inference will become clear in the 




The second lesson to draw from Descartes’ account of intuitions is that intuitions 
strike us as being clear and obvious.  When we make an intuitive judgment we 
understand clearly what our intuitive judgment asserts.  Furthermore, the assertion has a 
certain feel of obviousness to it.  Borrowing a phrase from Hume, we might say that 
intuitions have a certain “degree of force and vivacity”9 
I take these to be the two most crucial features of intuitions. Let me now make 
two further points about intuitions.  First, an intuitive judgment need not be a judgment 
that is made quickly or automatically.  It may be that one only has an intuition after 
thinking deeply about certain features of a case.  As John Rawls puts it: 
By the term ‘intuitive’ I do not mean the same as that expressed by the terms 
‘impulsive’ and ‘instinctive.’  An intuitive judgment may be consequent to a 
thorough inquiry into the facts of the case, and it may follow a series of 
reflections on the possible effects of different decisions.10 
 
Holding that an intuition can be the product of reflection may seem to blur the line 
between intuitions and other sorts of judgments.  However, a crucial difference remains.  
Though an intuition can be the product of reflection, this reflection cannot involve 
conscious inference.  As soon as the agent makes a conscious inference, the resulting 
judgment can no longer be called an ‘intuition.’ 
A second further point about intuitions is that intuitions can be very particular or 
very general in scope and application.  One can have an intuition about a very general 
principle such as “the right action is that which produces the most overall good” and a 
particular case such as “it was wrong for Bob to lie to John.” 
                                                
9 A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Chapter 1, Section I, paragraph 3. 
 
10 “Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics” Philosophical Review 60 (1951): 177-97.  
Reprinted in Collected Papers (ed. by Samuel Freeman) (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 




 To summarize, intuitions have two crucial features.  First, they are a type of 
judgment that is distinct from perceptual judgments, imaginings, and judgments arrived 
at by conscious inference.  Second, intuitions have a certain degree of clarity and 
obviousness to them.  An intuition need not be arrived at impulsively or instinctively; it 
can be a product of careful reflection, so long as this reflection does not involve 
conscious inference.  In addition, an intuition can be a very general judgment about an 
abstract principle or a very particular judgment about an actual or hypothetical case. 
2.3 Intuitions and Reliability 
 Now that we have some idea of what an intuition is, we can turn to the issue of 
how often these intuitions are reliable.  This issue is highly contentious with some 
philosophers taking the view that intuitions are largely reliable and others taking 
positions that are much more skeptical.11  My own position is a moderate one.  I will 
argue that our intuitions are subject to a range of biases.  These biases infect our 
judgment even when our thinking is not distorted by self-interest or cognitive 
impairment.12  In this and the two following sections, I examine the case for this skeptical 
                                                
11 For examples of philosophers who think that moral intuitions are reliable see Ross, The 
Right and the Good, pp. 39-41; William Tolhurst, “On the Epistemic Value of Moral 
Experience” Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 supp. (1990): 67-87; and F.M. Kamm, 
Morality, Mortality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 7-9.  For examples of 
philosophers who are more skeptical see R.M. Hare, “The Argument from Received 
Opinion” in Essays on Philosophical Method (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1972), pp. 117-135; Peter Singer, “Sigwick and Reflective Equilibrium” Monist 58 
(1975): 490-517.  Reprinted in Unsanctifying Human Life (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), pp. 
27-50; and R.B. Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right, Ch. 1 
12 This is what differentiates my position from that of the optimists.  I take it that the 
optimists cited in the last footnote would agree that moral intuitions sometimes give us 
the wrong answer (though they are not always explicit about this) but that this rarely 
happens when someone is thinking clearly.  My view, instead, is that even when we are 





claim.  Some philosophers think that the skeptical case is easily dismissed.  I reject these 
dismissals in 2.6.  Nonetheless, I think it is an open question how widespread these biases 
are and, in section 2.7, I make the case that there are grounds for thinking that the impact 
of these biases is limited. 
2.4 The Reliability of Non-moral Intuitions13 
 The psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman gave the following 
scenario to a group of 88 undergraduates and the University of British Columbia. 14 
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in 
philosophy.  As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of social justice 
and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.15 
 
Participants were then asked to rank the probability that Linda was associated with 
various occupations and avocations.  Among the possibilities were “Linda is active in the 
feminist movement (F),” “Linda is a bank teller (T),” and “Linda is a bank teller and 
active in the feminist movement (T +F).”  Eighty-five percent of the students said that 
T+F was more likely than T.  Of course, it is a well-known fact of probability theory that 
the probability of a conjunction cannot be higher than the probability of a single conjunct.   
                                                
13 I became aware of some of the literature discussed in this and the next section after 
reading Tamar Gendler, “Philosophical Thought Experiments, Intuitions, and Cognitive 
Equilibrium,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (2007): 68-89 and Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong, “Framing Moral Intuitions” in Walter Sinott-Armstrong (ed.) Moral 
Psychology Volume 2 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), pp. 47-76.  Though I am not 
sure that either author endorses my philosophical conclusions, their thinking was a large 
influence on this and the following section. 
 
14 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The 
Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment,” Psychological Review 90 (1983) : 293-
315. 
 




 Tversky and Kahneman next tested a group of first year graduate students in 
psychology, education, and medicine who had taken one or more courses in statistics as 
well as a group “of doctoral students in the decision science program of the Stanford 
Business School who had taken several advanced courses in probability, statistics, and 
decision theory.”16  They found that “there is no effect of statistical sophistication on 
either the direct or indirect tests.”17 
 What could explain these findings?  Tversky and Kahneman argue that instead of 
calculating probability and using what Tversky and Kahneman call “extensional 
reasoning,” the participants in this study engaged in “intuitive reasoning.”  Kahneman 
describes intuitive reasoning as being “fast, automatic, [and] effortless.”18  He goes on to 
say “a defining property of intuitive thoughts is that they come to mind spontaneously.”19  
In other words, Kahneman’s ‘intuitive thoughts’ are not produced by any kind of 
conscious inference.20 
                                                




18 Daniel Kahneman, “Maps of Bounded Rationality: A Perspective on Intuitive 
Judgment and Choice,” in Tore Frangsmyr (ed.) Nobel Prizes 2002 (Almqvist & Wiksell 
International, 2003), pp. 449-489. 
 
19 Ibid, p., 452. 
 
20 I mention this because it if turned out that psychologists were using the term ‘intuition’ 
differently than I was, I would be guilty of an equivocation.  However, I think that 
psychologists appear to use the term roughly as I do.  In general, they seem to agree that 
intuitions are not made by conscious inference.  For example, Haidt, when explaining 
what intuitions are, claims that the process that generates intuitions is automatic and 
inaccessible (Haidt, “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail,” p. 818).  This entails that 
intuitions are not made by conscious inference.  Haidt and Kahneman are hardly 
idiosyncratic here.  Gerd Gigerenzer also holds that “the difference between moral 




According to Tversky and Kahneman, intuitive reasoning, rather than using 
computationally expensive calculations, proceeds by the use of quick and dirty heuristics.  
The heuristic at work in the Linda case is the representativeness heuristic in which one 
judges the probability of an event “by the degree to which that event is representative of 
an appropriate model.”21  In Linda’s case T+F is more representative of Linda than T, 
even though probability theory shows us that T+F cannot be more probable than T. 
 Heuristics have the virtue of being computationally cheap.  They do not require 
our brains to engage in any sophisticated mathematics.  However, because heuristics use 
simple judgments that only approximate more computationally complex judgments, they 
also often err.  If Tversky and Kahneman are correct, and many of our intuitive 
judgments are made by heuristics, this gives us good reason to doubt the reliability of our 
intuitive judgments. 
 Probability is far from the only domain where our intuitions lead us astray.  For an 
example of where our intuitions about logic go wrong, consider the Wason selection 
task.22  Participants are given four cards, each of which has a letter on one side and a 
number on the other.  For example, they may be given the following four cards: 
                                                                                                                                            
typically unconscious (Gut Feelings: The Intelligence of the Unconscious (New York: 
Penguin, 2007), p. 192)” 
 
21 Ibid, p. 295.  This helps make clear why it is important to stipulate that intuitions are 
not derived from conscious inferences.  Judgments made by the representative heuristic 
involve inference at some level.  At the very least, they involve inferences like ‘T+F is 
more representative of Linda than T.’  However, these inferences are not typically 
accessible to the person making the judgment.  Indeed, Kahneman argues that these 
judgments come to mind spontaneously (Kahneman, “Maps of Bounded Rationality,” p. 
452.) 
22 First described in P.C. Wason, “Reasoning,” in B.M. Foss, New Horizons in 
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They are then asked which cards they would have to turn over to determine the truth of 
the material conditional ‘if there is a T on one side of the card, then there is a five on the 
other.’  The correct answer is ‘T’ and ‘8’ but “typically, fewer than 10% of participants 
give this answer, however, and the most common responses are T alone or T and 5.”23  
The psychologist Jonathan Evans argues that the reason for this is a simple matching 
bias, “reasoners may simply be choosing the cards that are named in the conditional.”24 
 Matching bias and the representative heuristic are two out of a sea of cases where 
psychologists have found that intuitive reasoning gets the wrong answer.25  Rather than 
undertake a lengthy review of this enormous literature let me confine myself to one more 
example.  This example is particularly interesting because the error in our intuitions was 
not discovered by psychologists but by philosophers. 
 Recently, Stacey Swain, Joshua Alexander, and Jonathan Weinberg put Keith 
Lehrer’s truetemp case to a group of undergraduates at Indiana University.26  The case, a 
familiar one from the epistemology literature, is reprinted below: 
                                                
23 Jonathan Evans, “Matching Bias in Conditional Reasoning: Do We Understand it After 
25 Years?” Thinking and Reasoning 4 (1998): 45-82. 
 
24 Ibid, p. 51. 
 
25 A useful starting point for this large literature is Rudiger Pohl (ed.) Cognitive Illusions 
(Sussex, NJ: Psychology Press, 2004).  See also Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and 
Amos Tversky (eds.) Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heursitics and Biases (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (eds.) 
Choices, Values, and Frames (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and 
Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, Daniel Kahneman (eds.) Heuristics and Biases: The 
Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
26 Stacey Swain, Jonathan Alexander, and Jonathan M. Weinberg, “The Instability of 
Philosophical Intuitions: Running Hot and Cold on Truetemp,” Philosophy and 




Suppose a person, whom we shall name Mr. Truetemp, undergoes brain surgery 
by an experimental surgeon who invents a small device which is both a very 
accurate thermometer and a computational device capable of generating thoughts.  
The device, call it a tempucomp, is implanted in Truetemp’s head so that the very 
tip of the device, no larger than the head of a pin, sits unnoticed on his scalp and 
acts as a sensor to transmit information about the temperature to the 
computational system of his brain.  This device, in turn, sends a message to his 
brain causing him to think of the temperature recorded by the external sensor.  
Assume that the tempucomp is very reliable, and so his thoughts are correct 
temperature thoughts.  All told, this is a reliable belief –forming process.  Now 
imagine, finally, that he has no idea that the tempucomp has been inserted in his 
brain, is only slightly puzzled about why he thinks so obsessively abut the 
temperature, but never checks a thermometer to determine whether his thoughts 
about the temperature are correct.  He accepts them unreflectively, another effect 
of the tempucomp.  Thus, he thinks and accepts that the temperature is 104 
degrees. It is.  Does he know that it is?27 
 
 Swain and colleagues presented truetemp along with several other cases.  They 
found that students who were presented the truetemp case after a clear case of non-
knowledge are more likely to attribute knowledge to Mr. Truetemp than students who 
were presented the truetemp case after a clear case of knowledge.  In other words, the 
order in which cases were presented has an impact on how people judged the case in 
question.  Swain and colleagues wrote, “The fact that people’s intuitions about particular 
thought-experiments vary based on what other things they have been thinking about 
recently is troubling.  Philosophers who rely on thought-experiments should be especially 
concerned about findings that indicate that, at least in some cases, subjects’ intuitions are 
easily influenced.”28 
 Given that our intuitions have these defects in non-moral contexts, it would be 
somewhat surprising if, when we focused on moral goodness or badness or rightness or 
                                                                                                                                            
 
27 Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge , pp. 163-164. 





wrongness, our intuitions suddenly became very reliable. However, because surprise in 
psychology is possible, I now turn to an investigation of moral intuitions. 
2.5 The Reliability of Moral Intuitions 
 Let us begin, once again, with Kahneman and Tversky.29  Consider the following 
scenario. 
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, 
which is expected to kill 600 people.  Two alternative programs to combat the 
disease have been proposed.  Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the 
consequences are as follows: 
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. 
If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 people will be 
saved and a two-thirds probability that no people will be saved.30 
 
Kahneman and Tversky found that 72% of participants chose program A over program B.  
Another set of participants were given the same scenario but instead of program A and B 
they were asked to choose between program C and D. 
If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die. 
If Program D is adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody will die and a 
two-thirds probability that 600 people will die.31 
 
Given these options, 78% of participants chose program D over program C.  Note 
however, that C is equivalent to A and D is equivalent to B. 
 This result is explained by Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory according to 
which people are generally risk averse when it comes to potential gains but risk seeking 
                                                
29 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Choices, Values, and Frames,” American 
Psychologist 39 (1984): 341-350. 
 






when it comes to avoiding potential losses.32  What counts a gain or a loss is always 
relative to what the agent perceives as the status quo and that can be manipulated using 
simple wording.  Program A and B implicitly assume a status quo according to which 600 
people are going to be killed.  Program A represents a certain gain over the status quo 
whereas Program B is a risky gain over the status quo.  Since A and B represent potential 
gains from the status quo, participants are generally risk-averse.  Program C and D 
implicitly assume a status quo according to which no one has been killed yet.  Both C and 
D represent losses from the status quo and thus participants are risk seeking.33 
 There are two lessons that can be learned from our look at the Asian disease case.  
First, the familiar biases that distort our intuitive judgment in non-moral cases are still 
present when we turn our attention to moral cases.  Second, when the same case is 
described using different words, peoples’ intuitions about the case change.   
                                                
32 For a more formal statement see Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect 
Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,” Econometrica 47 (1979): 263-91. 
 
33 In her paper “Philosophical Intuitions and Psychological Theory,” Ethics 108 (1998): 
367-385, Tamara Horowitz argues that some widely held moral intuitions about various 
cases can be explained by prospect theory.  Cass Sunstein agrees: 
In short, I believe that some philosophical analysis, based on exotic moral 
dilemmas, is inadvertently and even comically replicating the early work of 
Kahneman and Tversky by uncovering situations in which intuitions, normally 
quite sensible, turn out to misfire.  The irony is that where Kahneman and 
Tversky meant to devise cases that would demonstrate misfiring, some 
philosophers develop exotic cases with the thought that the intuitions are likely to 
be reliable and should form the building blocks for sound moral judgments 
(“Moral Heuristics,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2005): 531-573). 
For an alternative view see F.M. Kamm, “Moral Intuitions, Cognitive Psychology, and 




 The latter result was also found in a study by Lewis Petrinovich and Patricia 
O’Neill. 34   Petrinovich and O’Neill gave over 400 undergraduates at my alma mater, the 
University of California, Riverside, 21 different versions of a familiar case from the 
moral philosophy literature.  Below is the standard version of the case.35 
A trolley is hurtling down the tracks.  There are five innocent people on the track 
ahead of the trolley, and they will be killed if the trolley continues going straight 
ahead.  There is a spur of track leading off to the side.  There is one innocent 
person on that spur of the track.  The brakes of the trolley have failed and there is 
a switch that can be activated to cause the trolley to go to the side track.  You can 
throw the switch, saving the five innocent people, which will result in the death of 
one innocent person on the side track.  What would you do?36 
 
 Participants were sometimes given two options that were phrased in Kill wording: 
1) Throw the switch, which will result in the death of one innocent person on the 
side track. 
2) Do nothing, which will result in the death of the five innocent people.37 
 
Other times, participants where given two options phrased in Save wording: 
1) Throw the switch, which will result in five innocent people on the main track 
being saved 
2) Do nothing, which will result in the one innocent person being saved.38 
 
In each case, participants were asked whether they agreed or disagreed that one should 
throw the switch.  Petrinovich and O’Neill found that,  
                                                
34 Lewis Petrinovich and Patricia O’Neill, “Influence of Wording and Framing Effects on 
Moral Intuitions,” Ethology and Sociobiology 17 (1996): 145-171. 
 
35 This case was invented by Philippa Foot, “The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine 
of Double Effect,” Oxford Review 5 (1967): 5-15.   
 
36 Petrinovich and O’Neill, “Influence of Wording and Framing Effects on Moral 








A tendency was found for a number of individuals to shift from disagree to agree 
when the answer was in the Save compared to the Kill wording, and this tendency 
was evident for 39 of the 40 questions.  In summary, the Save wording resulted in 
a greater likelihood that people would agree and the level of agreement was 
stronger.  The manner in which the questions were worded, therefore, had a 
considerable systematic influence on the decision of most of the individuals in 
this sample.39 
 
 The fact that our moral intuitions often judge an action permissible when a case is 
described one way and impermissible when the same case is described differently is 
strong evidence against the reliability of our intuitions.  However, it is far from the only 
evidence.  I now want to examine a study in which participants tended to have different 
judgments about cases that are similar but not identical.  The problem is that the 
difference between the cases is clearly not morally relevant. 
 An example of this is a recent study by Eric Uhlmann, David Pizarro and 
colleagues.40 
Participants received one of two scenarios involving an individual who has to 
decide whether or not to throw a large man in the path of a trolley (described as 
large enough that he would stop the progress of the trolley) in order to prevent the 
trolley from killing 100 innocent individuals trapped in a bus.  Half of the 
participants received a version of the scenario in which the agent could choose to 
sacrifice an individual named “Tyrone Payton” to save 100 members of the New 
York Philarmonic, and the other half received a version in which the agent could 
choose to sacrifice “Chip Ellswoth III” to save 100 members of the Harlem Jazz 
Orchestra.41 
 
 Uhlmann and colleagues found that participants were significantly less likely to 
sacrifice Tyrone than Chip.  Uhlmann and colleagues suspect that this is due to 
                                                
39 Ibid, p. 153. 
 
40 Eric Luis Uhlmann, David A. Piazarro, David Tannenbaum, and Peter H.Ditto, “The 
Motivated Use of Moral Principles,” (m.s.). 
 




overcompensating for racist attitudes.  Further analysis showed that this tendency 
manifests almost exclusively in participants who identified as politically liberal.42 
 In any case, it does not seem likely that the names (or ethnicities) of the people 
involved is a morally relevant consideration in this case.  Indeed, in a separate study 
Ulhmann and colleagues asked participants “If Chip’s (or Tyrone’s) race was different 
than what you imagined, do you think this fact would change the way you responded to 
the questions asked above (Yes or No)?”43  Ninety-two percent of subjects said no,44 yet 
this feature causes peoples intuitions about the case to shift significantly. 
 Let us now examine another type of distortion in our intuitions.  Recall that in the 
last section we found that subjects’ intuitions about the truetemp case vary depending on 
what cases are presented before it.  Unfortunately, the same effect can be found in the 
moral case.   
 Petrinovich and O’Neill gave participants a set of forms designed to test for 
ordering effects.45  Form 2 included three trolley cases.  The first case was the standard 
version of the trolley case, reprinted above, which Petrinovich and O’Neill call “pull 
switch.”  The second case on the form was a trolley case called “push button” in which 
there is a trolley speeding toward five people and this trolley can only be stopped by 
pushing a button which would cause a ramp to emerge from underneath the trolley, 
thereby directing the trolley onto a higher a set of tracks where it would run over one 
                                                
42 Ibid, p. 12 
 
43 Ibid, p. 13. 
 
44 Ibid, p. 15. 
 
45 Petrinovich & O’Neill, “Influence of Wording and Framing Effects on Moral 




person.  The third trolley case on form 2 was a case Petrinovich & O’Neill called “push 
person” in which the only way to stop a trolley is to push a large person off of a 
footbridge over the tracks.46  Form 2 was given to 30 persons.  An additional 29 
participants were given form 2R which contained the same cases in reverse order.  In 
each case participants were asked to choose between action (i.e. pulling the switch, 
pushing the button or person) or inaction. Pertrinovich and O’Neill found that “people 
more strongly approved of action when [pull switch] appeared first in the sequence than 
when it appeared last.”47  Furthermore, people approved of the pushing the button in the 
push button dilemma more strongly when it followed pull switch rather than when it 
followed push person.48  Ordering effects have also been found in studies by Jonathan 
Haidt and Jonathan Baron49 and Ulhmann and colleagues.50 
 In summary, we have seen that people’s moral intuitions can vary when the same 
case is described in different words, when morally irrelevant changes are made in cases, 
and when cases are presented in a different order.  We have also seen that some of the 
biases that are prevalent in non-moral intuitions do not go away when we contemplate 
morality.   
                                                
46 “Push person” is usually called “fat man” or “footbridge” in the moral philosophy 
literature.  It was invented by Judith Jarvis Thomson, “Killing, Letting Die, and the 
Trolley Problem,” The Monist 59 (1976): 204-17. 
 
47 Petrinovich & O’Neill, “Influence of Wording and Framing Effects on Moral 




49 “Social Roles and the Moral Judgment of Acts and Ommissions,” European Jouranl of 
Social Pyschology 26 (1996): 201-218. 
 




 What this shows us is that our moral intuitions systematically go astray.  Indeed 
the fact that these intuitions are subject to wording and ordering effects shows that these 
judgments are inconsistent.  (In the Asian flu case it is inconsistent to believe that A is 
preferable to B and that D is preferable to C when A just is C and D just is B).   
 These considerations suggest two related arguments that conclude that the process 
by which we form our intuitions is somewhat unreliable.51  The most direct argument 
begins with the premise that if a judgment forming process is subject to wording and 
ordering effects, then that judgment forming process is unreliable.  Since, as we have 
seen, our intuitive judgments about morality are subject to these sorts of distortions, our 
intuition forming process is somewhat unreliable. 
 A more indirect argument might appeal to consistency.  If a judgment forming 
process delivers results that are inconsistent, then that process is somewhat unreliable.  
Since the process at which we arrive at our moral intuitions does produce inconsistent 
results, that process is somewhat unreliable.  This point favors taking a skeptical view of 
the reliability of moral intuitions. 
2.6 Some Possible Responses on Behalf of Moral Intuitions 
 In this section I consider three possible responses to the argument of the last 
section.  I want to point out at the outset that philosophers who are inclined to these 
responses often do not realize how much they implicitly concede to the skeptical view of 
intuitions defended in the last section.  Indeed, all of these responses have a similar 
structure; they all argue that certain types of (or certain people’s) intuitions are left 
                                                
51 A judgment is reliable, I stipulate, just in case it tends to produce the correct answer.  
So understood, reliability is a matter of degree.  I speak of our intuition forming process 
as being “somewhat unreliable” because it seems to me that these arguments are 




untouched by the empirical considerations in the last section.  Even if such responses 
work they leave many of our intuitions open to the empirically motivated attacks of the 
last section.  It is also worth stating at the outset that all of these responses make 
substantive claims that can be tested empirically, though not all of them have.  However, 
even in the absence of empirical testing, these substantive empirical claims should not 
just be assumed to be true.  With these introductory remarks out of the way, let me now 
take up the perspective of one such response. 
 
The Reflective Response: In section 2.2 we noted Rawls’ claim that ‘intuitive’ need not 
mean ‘impulsive’ or ‘instinctive.’  An intuitive judgment can be made on the basis of 
thorough reflection on the facts, so long as no conscious inference involved.  Perhaps the 
subjects of the experiments discussed above failed to adequately reflect on the cases at 
hand.  If they had, perhaps they would have noticed that in the Asian flu case program A 
and program C were equivalent or perhaps they would have been less susceptible to 
ordering effects.  The research cited above does not show that intuitions that are the 
product of thorough reflection are unreliable. 
 
Reply: The first thing to notice is that this response only attempts to defend a subset of 
our intuitions, those that have survived a certain amount of reflection.  The second thing 
to notice is that the claim that reflection would improve our intuitions (e.g. make us less 
subject to biases) is a substantive empirical claim.  Indeed, it is one that has been 




According to Robyn LeBouf and Eldar Shafir,52 the results are somewhat mixed.  
A study by Miller and Fagley found that framing effects were reduced on the Asian flu 
problem when subjects were asked to provide a rationale, but their study was also unable 
to replicate some already well-known framing effects among the control group that was 
not asked to provide a rationale.53  Another study showed that framing effects were 
reduced when participants were asked to justify their choices on the Asian flu problem, 
but only after forcing participants to spend 50 minutes contemplating their choice.54 
Other studies considered participants with a high degree of what psychologists 
call Need for Cognition (NC), a construct that measures “differences among individuals 
in their tendency to engage in and enjoy thinking.”55  Some studies showed that 
individuals with high NC were able to make more consistent judgments.56  But LeBeouf 
and Shafir have argued persuasively that these studies do not show that high NC 
participants are not subject to framing effects; they only show that high NC participants 
                                                
52 Robyn LeBoeuf and Eldar Shafir, “Deep Thoughts and Shallow Frames: On the 
Susceptibility to Framing Effects,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 16 (2003): 
77-92. 
 
53 P.M. Miller and N.S. Fagley, “The effects of framing, problem variations, and 
providing rationale on choices,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 17 (1991): 
517-22. 
 
54 W. Sieck & J.F. Yates, “Exposition Effects on Decision Making: Choice and 
Confidence in Choice, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 70 
(1997): 207-19. 
 
55 J.T. Cacioppo and R.E. Petty, “The Need for Cognition,” Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 42 (1982): 116-131.  Quoted in LeBoeuf and Shafir, “Deep Thoughts 
and Shallow Frames,” p. 79. 
 
56 S.M. Smith & I.P. Levin, “Need for cognition and Choice Framing Effects,” Journal of 
Behavioral Decision Making 9 (1996): 283-90 and LeBeouf and Shafir, “Deep Thoughts 




are able to correct for consistency.  LeBeouf and Shafir found that when given the 
program A and B version of the Asian flu problem, high NC participants typically chose 
A, as prospect theory predicts, but then when given the program C and D version of the 
problem after they had been given the A and B version, high NC participants chose C, 
contra the predictions of prospect theory.   
So far, so good.  However, when high NC participants were given the program C 
and D version of the Asian flu problem first they chose D, as prospect theory predicts.  
When they were then given the program A and B versions of the Asian flu problem, they 
chose B, contra prospect theory 
What is going on here? It appears that when high NC participants look at the first 
question they have the intuition that prospect theory predicts.  Thus, when they look at 
the program A and B version of the Asian flu problem first they choose A and when they 
look at the program C and D version of the Asian flu problem first they choose D.  
However, when they look at a second problem they are able to override their intuition and 
correct for consistency.  Thus, when looking at the program C and D version after the A 
and B version most participants chose A. 
My explanation for what is going on here is that participants with high NC (i.e. 
those prone to reflection) have the same intuitions that other participants have.  However, 
they are able to override inconsistent intuitions.  This explains why they choose A if 
given the A and B version of the Asian flu problem first but tend to choose D if given the 
C and D version of the problem.  It also explains why they act contra to prospect theory’s 




If further confirmation is needed, a further study gave high NC participants the A 
and B version of the Asian flu problem and then, two weeks later, gave high NC 
participants the C and D version of the problem.57  In these circumstances, high NC 
participants gave exactly the answers that prospect theory predicts. 
It appears that people prone to reflection are still subject to the same biases on the 
Asian flu problem (though they do correct for consistency).  Of course, more research 
could be done.  Specifically, future research might inquire on the degree to which high 
NC participants are subject to ordering effects on trolley problems or the degree to which 
their judgments are altered in Chip/Tyrone cases.  However, initial research gives us 
some ground for pessimism and in the absence of further psychological research it cannot 
just be assumed that high NC participants would do better on trolley cases or 
Chip/Tyrone cases. 
 
The Elitist Response:  Those whose moral intuitions were surveyed in the section above 
were mainly undergraduates.  However, their intuitions are not the ones that we consider 
in philosophy.  We consider the intuitions of trained philosophers.  These are intelligent 
people with advanced degrees from respected institutions who have spent years 
pondering the deepest questions about us and our universe.  The research cited above 
does not show that the intuitions of trained philosophers are unreliable. 
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Distribution of Effect Sizes, Individual Differences, and Independence of Types of 




Reply: First, I want to distinguish between the elitist response and another response that 
is similar but not identical to the elitist response.  One could concede that philosophers’ 
intuitions are no better off than those of lay people but insist that philosophers have 
unique skills that allow them to correct their intuitions.  This, I do not deny.  However, 
the elitist response does not concede that philosophers’ raw intuitions are no better than 
ordinary people.  The elitist contends that some feature of philosophical training gives 
philosophers better raw intuitions. 
 As before, the elitist at least implicitly concedes that most peoples’ intuitions have 
been shown by the above research to be unreliable.  The elitist also makes a substantive 
empirical claim, a claim that philosophers would not be subject to the same distortions 
that the participants in the studies above are subject to.  This claim cannot just be 
assumed to be true.  It must be argued for. 
 Unfortunately, to my knowledge, the relevant empirical claim has not yet been 
tested, though I hear that studies are underway.  I do think that there is some ground for 
doubt about this empirical claim.  First, as mentioned above, even graduate students with 
advance training in statistics are not immune from the representative bias in the Linda 
case.  Tversky and Kahneman found that in the standard version of the Linda case, 
statistical sophistication had little effect. 58  A meta-analysis conducted by Anton 
Kuhberger found that, in regards to reference point framing, the sort of framing that we 
find in the Asian flu case, “although students and experts may differ in a variety of ways, 
                                                




with respect to framing experts are not immune to the reference effect… or at least, 
experts are also influenced by framing but to a lesser degree than students.”59 
 The fact that experts in other domains are still subject to the same distortions as 
undergraduates creates a presumption that moral philosophers will also be subject to 
these distortions.  However, no research that I have reviewed has looked specifically at 
the intuitions of moral philosophers.  Thus, I concede that further research may overturn 
this presumption. 
 Let me turn autobiographical for a moment and reflect, somewhat unscientifically, 
on how my training in moral philosophy has impacted my judgment of the Asian flu case.  
I can see that programs A and C are equivalent as are programs D and B.  However, even 
with this realization, I still feel intuitively pulled toward A, when I read the A and B 
version of the case, and pulled toward D when I read the C and D version of the case. 
 Perhaps, I am being idiosyncratic here but my reaction is strikingly similar to that 
of Stephen Jay Gould.  Discussing the Linda case, he writes, “I know that [T+F] is least 
probable, yet a little homunculus in my head continues to jump up and down, shouting at 
me – ‘but she can’t just be a bank teller; read the description.”60  If Gould and I are 
representative, then perhaps both a graduate education and awareness of the cognitive 
bias in question does not improve our raw intuitions. 
 
                                                
59 Anton Kuhberger, “The Influence of Framing on Risky Decisions,” Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes 75 (1998): 23-55. 
 
60 Stephen Jay Gould, Bully for Brontosaurus: Reflections on Natural History (New 




The Principled Response:  All of the research cited above deals with our intuitions 
about particular cases.  However, as noted in section 2.2, intuitions need not be about 
particular cases, they can be about abstract principles.  The research cited above does not 
show that our intuitions about abstract principles are unreliable. 
 
Reply: This response, like the other two we have discussed, implicitly concedes that 
many intuitions, our intuitions about particular cases, are still vulnerable to the objections 
discussed in the last section.  However, it holds that our intuitions about abstract 
principles are not vulnerable to these distortions.61  In holding the later claims, it makes a 
substantive empirical assumption, that such principles would not be subject to the type of 
distortions discussed in the previous section. 
 Unfortunately, there has been little empirical work on our intuitive judgments 
about principles.  I am aware of one study that found that American students were more 
likely to endorse the claim that “From time to time the tree of liberty must be watered 
with the blood of tyrants” when they were told that it was written by Thomas Jefferson 
                                                
61 This appears to be Peter Singer’s view.  Singer rejects appeal to case intuitions as a 
way of choosing between normative theories on the ground that such judgments may be 
unreliable while endorsing a view, which he attributes to Sidgwick, that one should start 
from “self-evident moral axioms (“Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium, p. 47)”.  He 
goes on to state, “While judgments of self-evidence may be regarded as appeals to 
intuition, they are intuitions about fundamental principles – like the principle already 
mentioned, that the good of one individual is of no more significance than the like good 
of any other – and not moral intuitions about what ought to be done in specific situations 
(“A Response” in Dale Jamieson (ed.), Singer and his Critics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 
p. 314).” As I hope the main text makes clear, I am somewhat perplexed as to why Singer 





than when they were told that it was written by Vladimir Lenin. 62  However, I wonder if 
some of the same results from the above section could be replicated using abstract 
principles. 
 For instance, consider the kill/save effect that Peterinovich and O’Neill observed.  
They found that participants were more likely to agree with certain options in trolley 
cases when ‘save’ rather than ‘kill’ wording was used.  Could we replicate the 
experiment using abstract principles?  Consider the following: 
A1) It is permissible to cause a few persons to die if doing so will prevent a larger 
number of deaths 
A2) It is permissible to save a large number of persons even if doing so will result in a 
few deaths 
I suspect that we would find that A1 is more widely endorsed than A2. 
I also suspect that the Tyrone/Chip effect can be replicated using abstract principles: 
B1) It is permissible to sacrifice a few black persons to save a larger number of white 
persons 
B2) It is permissible to sacrifice a few white persons to save a larger number of black 
persons. 
I suspect that political liberals may be more likely to endorse B2 than B1. 
I also suspect that our judgment about abstract principles may be subject to 
ordering effects.  Consider the following principles 
C1) It is morally impermissible for a wealthy person not to donate to charity. 
C2) It is morally impermissible to steal a paperclip from one’s employer. 
                                                
62 S.E. Asch, “The Doctrine of Suggestion, Prestige, and Imitation in Psychology,” 




C3) It is morally impermissible to torture a baby. 
I suspect that if C1 is presented after trivial moral violations like C2 people will be more 
likely to agree than if C1 is presented after serious moral violations like C3.  I suspect 
that this is because after hearing about serious moral violations like C3, C1 will not sound 
so bad but after hearing about trivial moral violations like C2, C1 will seem morally 
wrong.   
 Of course, in the absence of empirical research these are mere speculations.  
However, my goal here is not to definitively answer the principled response but to create 
a prima facie case against it. 
 It may be objected that the principles I have considered above are not abstract 
enough.  This would be an extreme version of the principled reply that implicitly 
concedes not only that our intuitions about cases are unreliable; our intuitions about 
concrete principles are also unreliable.   
 In response to such a reply Iclaim that once principles get so abstract, many of us 
only have intuitions about them when we think about how they might apply in actual 
cases.63  From my own perspective, I cannot generate an intuition about whether or not 
one ought to always do that action which produces the most overall good unless I think 
about how such a principle might apply in actual cases.  But these sorts of intuitions are 
                                                
63 In his paper “Thinking About Cases,” Social Philosophy & Policy 18 (2001): 44-63, 
Shelly Kagan makes the interesting suggestion that our judgments about principles are 
just judgments about types of cases rather than particular cases.  This claim, if it is true, 
could explain why it is difficult to generate intuitions about very abstract principles 
whose implications for cases are unclear.  This claim would also imply that it would be a 
mistake to hold that case judgments are unreliable while also claiming that principle 
judgments are reliable.  Since, according to Kagan’s suggestion, principle judgments are, 




dependent on our case intuitions.  When it comes to extremely abstract principles many 
of us find it difficult to generate intuitions that are independent of our case intuitions. 
2.7 The Good News about Intuitions 
 So far the results of our inquiry have been primarily negative.  In the last section, 
we saw that these negative results cannot be easily dismissed.  Nonetheless, our 
conclusion that moral intuitions sometimes deliver incorrect results leaves open the 
question of how often they do so.  It is compatible with what we have argued so far that 
our intuitions give us the right result 90% of the time. 
 The problem, however, is that it seems that we have no way of knowing when we 
are experiencing an incorrect intuition or when we are experiencing a correct intuition.  
Incorrect intuitions do not seem to be accompanied by a distinct phenomenology.  Thus, 
it seems that any of our intuitions could be in error and we have no way of knowing when 
this is so. 
 There is, however, some good news about intuitions.   In a recent study, Jennifer 
Wright tested various cases for ordering effects.64 Wright hypothesized that when 
subjects were very confident about their intuitive judgments these judgments would not 
be subject to ordering effects.  She first replicated Swain  et. al’s result that participants 
judgments about the TrueTemp case varies depending on the cases that precede it. She 
then found, however, that other epistemic cases were not subject to any ordering effect at 
all.  Here are two cases where no ordering effect was found: 
Testimony: Karen is a distinguished professor of chemistry. This morning, she 
read an article in a leading scientific journal that mixing two common floor 
disinfectants, Cleano Plus and Washaway, will create a poisonous gas that is 
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deadly to humans. In fact, the article is correct: mixing the two products does 
create a poisonous gas. At noon, Karen sees a janitor mixing Cleano Plus and 
Washaway and yells to him, ‘‘Get away! Mixing those two products creates a 
poisonous gas!”65 
 
Coin Flip: Dave likes to play a game with flipping a coin. He sometimes gets a 
‘‘special feeling” that the next flip will come out heads. When he gets this 
‘‘special feeling”, he is right about half the time, and wrong about half the time. 
Just before the next flip, Dave gets that ‘‘special feeling”, and the feeling leads 
him to believe that the coin will land heads. He flips the coin, and it does land 
heads.66 
 
Participants overwhelmingly thought that Karen had knowledge in Testimony but 
that Dave did not in Coin Flip.  Unlike in Truetemp, these results did not change no 
matter which cases preceded them.   Perhaps even more interestingly, participants 
reported that they were much more confident in their judgments in Testimony and Coin 
Flip than they were in Truetemp just as Wright’s hypothesis predicts. 
Importantly for our purposes, Wright found similar results in moral cases.  She 
gave the following three vignettes to participants. 
Break-Promise: Fred promises his girlfriend that he will meet her for lunch at 12 
pm on Wednesday at their favorite café. Wednesday at 11:45 am, on his way to 
the café, Fred runs into his grandfather, who is out for a stroll. They exchange 
hellos, and then suddenly Fred’s grandfather clutches his chest and falls to the 
ground unconscious. An ambulance arrives minutes later to take Fred’s 
grandfather to the hospital. Fred accompanies his grandfather to the hospital, even 
though he knows that doing so means that he will be breaking his promise to have 
lunch with his girlfriend. 
 
Sell-iPod: Laura and Suzy are roommates.  Laura asks Suzy if she has seen her 
new iPod, which she had worked an extra job over the summer to be able to 
afford.  Suzy did recently see it under a pile of papers on the bookshelf. But Suzy 
lies to Laura, telling her that she hasn’t seen it. She thinks that if Laura doesn’t 
find it on her own in a day or two, she can take it down to the pawnshop and get 
$100 for it, which would provide her with beer money for the week. 
 
                                                
65 Ibid, p. 502. 
 




Hide-Bombers: Martha hides her Jewish neighbors in her basement during the 
Nazi occupation of France. A German soldier comes to her door one afternoon 
and asks her if she knows where her neighbors have gone.  Martha knows that her 
neighbors are wanted by the Germans or bombing a German-only schoolyard and 
killing several children, injuring others. Martha lies to the soldier, telling them no, 
she hasn’t seen them recently, but she believes that they fled the country.67 
 
No matter what order the cases were presented in, participants overwhelmingly 
agreed Fred’s action in Break-Promise was not wrong and the Laura’s action in Sell-iPod 
was.  When participants read Hide-Bombers after Sell-iPod, 55% of them judged 
Martha’s action to be wrong.  However, when participants read Hide-Bombers after 
Break-Promise, only 33% of participants judged Martha’s action wrong.  In other words, 
the intuitive reactions of participants to Break-Promise were subject to ordering effects. 
As Wright’s hypothesis predicts, subjects were more confident about their judgments 
about Break-Promise and Sell-iPod than their judgments about Hide-Bomber. 
There are two optimistic conclusions we can draw from Wright’s research.  First, 
some intuitions do not seem to be subject to ordering effects.  Second, the intuitions that 
we are most confident in are least likely to be subject to ordering effects.  Can we infer 
from this that the intuitions that we are most confident about are correct?  Not quite.  
While the fact that a judgment forming process is inconsistent entails it is somewhat 
unreliable, consistency does not entail reliability.  It is possible that our intuitions could 
consistently track falsehood.  Nonetheless, Wright’s research does show that the effects 
of a certain kind of bias are limited and do not affect our most deeply held intuitions. 
                                                





 In this chapter I have offered an account of what moral intuitions are and the role 
they play in ordinary moral judgment.  I have also defended a kind of moderate position 
about their reliability.   
 Thinking about the conclusions we have reached in this chapter naturally brings to 
mind further questions.  What does this mean for the role of intuitions in moral 
philosophy?  What does this imply about the epistemic status of moral intuitions?  The 
answers to these questions are by no means obvious and will require us to think deeply 
about difficult issues in epistemology and ethics.  In the following chapters, I turn to 




Chapter 3: Reflective Equilibrium in Ethics 
3.1 Introducing Reflective Equilibrium 
 At the conclusion of Chapter 1, I said that this dissertation would defend a 
coherentist theory of justification that would avoid the pitfalls of the foundationalist 
views discussed in that chapter.  Roughly, that coherentist theory is that a moral belief is 
justified if and only if it would be the output of a version of the procedure that John 
Rawls has called “the method of reflective equilibrium.”1   
In this chapter, I discuss what the method of reflective equilibrium is and how 
best to formulate it.  This is the project of sections 3.2-3.5.  Once we have seen what 
reflective equilibrium is, we will be able to see the considerations that motivate it.  
Drawing out these considerations is the project of sections 3.7-3.9. 
3.2 Narrow Reflective Equilibrium 
 The term ‘reflective equilibrium’ is introduced by Rawls in his most well known 
work, A Theory of Justice.2  There, Rawls notes that “there are several interpretations of 
reflective equilibrium (p. 49).”  In this section I focus on the interpretation that is 
commonly called “narrow reflective equilibrium.”  In the next section, I consider an 
alternative interpretation, which is commonly called “wide reflective equilibrium.”3 
                                                
1 I follow a tradition established in the literature on this topic by using the phrase 
‘reflective equilibrium’ to refer to the state that one’s beliefs would be in had she 
completed the reflective equilibrium process and using the phrase ‘method of reflective 
equilibrium’ to refer to the process itself. 
 
2 All page references in the main text refer to this work. 
 
3 Rawls introduces this terminology in “The Independence of Moral Theory,” 
Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 48 (1974): 5-22.  




 The method of narrow reflective equilibrium begins with our intuitions as 
described in section 2.2.4  We then filter out those intuitions that were formed in 
circumstances in which we are likely to err.  For example, we filter out those judgments 
“made with hesitation, or in which we have little confidence.  Similarly, those given 
when we are upset or frightened or when we stand to gain one way or another can be left 
aside (p. 47).” The judgments we are left with after this filtering process are our 
considered moral judgments.   
We then look for the set of principles that systematizes our considered moral 
judgments.  Such a set of principles should not only yield the considered moral 
judgments that we already have, they should also be able to derive new judgments in 
cases where we are uncertain (p. 20). 
If we are lucky we will be able to find a set of principles that systematizes all of 
our considered moral judgments.  If so, then we have completed the procedure.  Most 
likely, however, we will find conflicts between our considered moral judgments and the 
principles that we have adopted in order to systematize them.  Rawls says that, “in this 
case, we have a choice (p. 20).”  We can either modify our considered moral judgments 
to accommodate our principles or we can modify our principles to accommodate our 
considered moral judgments.  We then work back and forth until we arrive at a consistent 
set of judgments and principles.  Once we have achieved a consistent set of judgments 
and principles, our moral beliefs are in narrow reflective equilibrium. 
                                                                                                                                            
 
4 Some textual evidence that the judgments that become our considered moral judgments 
are what I am calling ‘intuitions’ can be found in “Outline of a Decision Procedure for 
Ethics,” p. 6.  There, Rawls says “It is required that the judgment be intuitive with respect 
to ethical principles.  That is, that it should not be determined by a conscious application 




Before moving on, I want to correct a common misinterpretation of the method of 
reflective equilibrium.  It is sometimes thought that our considered moral judgments are 
simply our judgments about particular cases.  While it is true that our judgments about 
particular cases are among our considered moral judgments, they are not the only 
judgments that count as considered moral judgments.  As Rawls himself puts it, “people 
have considered judgments at all levels of generality, from those about particular 
situations and institutions up through broad standards and first principles to formal and 
abstract conditions on moral conceptions.”5  Indeed, Rawls’ only concrete examples of 
considered moral judgments, our judgments that “racial discrimination and religious 
intolerance are unjust (p. 19),” are not case judgments.6  As Rawls’ comments illustrate, 
considered moral judgments can be fairly wide or narrow in scope. 
3.3 Wide Reflective Equilibrium 
 Earlier, I noted that Rawls claims that are several different interpretations of 
reflective equilibrium.  While narrow reflective equilibrium is the version of reflective 
equilibrium that receives the most discussion in A Theory of Justice, Rawls makes it clear 
that he actually prefers a different interpretation, wide reflective equilibrium (p. 49).7  On 
this interpretation one considers not only those principles that best systematize her 
                                                
5 “The Independence of Moral Theory,” p. 289. 
 
6 Whether or not these judgments count as considered moral judgments depends on 
whether the agent arrived at them without conscious inference.  Some agents arrive at 
judgments like these on the basis of inductive inference from cases or as a consequence 
of certain theoretical commitments.  If so, then these judgments are not considered moral 
judgments for these agents.  However, it seems to me that at least some people simply 
assent to these judgments intuitively.  For such agents these judgments will count as 
considered moral judgments.  In any case, this does not affect the general point that 
Rawls considered certain non-case judgments to be considered moral judgments. 





considered moral judgments, but also alternative sets of principles “together with all the 
relevant philosophical arguments for them (p. 49).” 
 Like narrow reflective equilibrium, the method of wide reflective equilibrium 
includes a set of considered moral judgments and a set of moral principles.  However, 
wide reflective equilibrium introduces a third set, the premises of philosophical 
arguments relevant to determining the strengths and weaknesses of various moral 
principles.  Following Norman Daniels, let us call this third set, a set of background 
theories.8.  Background theories may be either moral or non-moral and may include 
claims  
about the right-making properties of actions, policies, and institutions; about the 
conflict between consequentialist and deontological views; about partiality and 
impartiality and the moral point of view; about motivations, moral development, 
strains of moral commitment and the limits of ethics; about the nature of persons; 
about the role or function of ethics in our lives; about the implications of game 
theory, decision theory, and accounts of rationality for morality; about human 
psychology, sociology, and political and economic behavior; about the ways we 
should reply to moral skepticism and moral disagreement; and about moral 
justification itself.9 
The method of wide reflective equilibrium thus begins with three sets: a set of 
considered moral judgments, a set of moral principles, and a set of background theories.  
It is worth noting that these sets can be overlapping.  For example, I may have the 
                                                
8 Norman Daniels, “Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics,” 
Journal of Philosophy 76 (1979): 256-282.  Reprinted in Justice and Justification 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996). pp. 21-46. 




considered moral judgment that causing another person to have excruciating pain for my 
amusement is prima facie wrong and this may be among the principles that best 
systematizes my other considered moral judgments.  If so, this belief will be a member of 
both the set of considered moral judgments and the set of moral principles.  I may also 
have the considered moral judgment that rational beings have a special moral status.  This 
judgment may also be among the background theories that I am committed to.  If so, this 
judgment will be included in both the set of considered moral judgments and the set of 
background theories. 
Most of us will find conflicts between our considered moral judgments and moral 
principles as well as between our considered moral judgments and background theories 
(recall that we have considered moral judgments at all level of generality).  For instance, 
we may have the considered moral judgment that it is wrong to torture unloved animals 
and infants while holding a Kantian background theory according to which only rational 
beings are worthy of moral consideration.  In this case, we have a conflict between a 
background theory and a considered moral judgment. 
Having found such conflicts, we then begin the process of revising for 
consistency.  We may choose to revise a moral principle to accommodate a considered 
moral judgment.  Of course, such a revision may cause our moral principles to conflict 
with our background theories.  In such a case we may choose to modify the considered 
moral judgment, leaving the moral principles and background theories as they were, or 
we may modify our background theory.  We may also modify a background theory 
because it directly conflicts with a considered moral judgment and vice-versa.  When we 




3.4 From Intuitions to Considered Moral Judgments 
 There is one question about the way in which both the methods of wide and 
narrow reflective equilibrium have been formulated that I have not answered. Recall that 
only some of our intuitions, those that count as considered moral judgments, play a role 
in the method of reflective equilibrium.  Why are some intuitions filtered out at the 
beginning of the process?  
 Rawls claims that we filter out the intuitions that were formed in situations in 
which we are likely to err (p. 47).  However, Michael DePaul has argued convincingly 
that this suggestion has two problems.10  The first problem is that this suggestion would 
require us to formulate an account of when our moral intuitions are likely err and such an 
account is bound to be controversial.   
There is a second and perhaps more serious problem.  Suppose we had such an 
account.  We can now say that at the beginning of the wide reflective equilibrium 
process, the agent must rule out all those judgments made in circumstances where she is 
likely to err according to this account.  But now suppose that the agent herself has no 
reason to accept this account.  Maybe this account claims that she is likely to err when 
she is frightened but has reason to believe that one can gain genuine moral insight when 
frightened and has no evidence to the contrary.  The second problem with Rawls’ 
formulation is that it would force the agent to make changes to her set of moral beliefs 
that she herself may have no reason to make.  Indeed, her evidence may dictate that she 
not make these changes. 
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As DePaul recognizes, solving this problem is simple.  Instead of ruling out those 
judgments made when the agent is likely to err, we rule out those judgments made when 
the agent herself believes that she is likely to err.11 If we interpret the initial filtering out 
process this way, we are not guilty of imposing constraints on agents that they themselves 
have no reason to accept.  Of course, the judgments ruled out by this filtering process are 
those that presumably would not survive long in reflective equilibrium anyway.  
Dropping them early on is partly a matter of convenience.  It is also to ensure that those 
judgments that are not trustworthy by the agent’s own standards do not play a role in 
constraining the moral principles that she adopts. 
This modification of Rawls’ description of the method of reflective equilibrium 
has another important consequence, it allows us to expand the scope of which judgments 
are allowed to play a role in reflective equilibrium.  Martha Nussbaum and others have 
worried that Rawls’ initial filtering procedure would rule out “information given us by 
our fear, or grief, or love” from the reflective equilibrium process.12  However, the 
modified filtering procedure described in this section will not necessarily have this result.  
As long as the agent herself beliefs that she is not likely to err when she is afraid, 
grieving or in love, then information gained from these emotions will play a role in the 
method of reflective equilibrium.13  
                                                
11 Ibid, p. 18. 
 
12 Martha Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 175.  
13 This point is also made by Henry Richardson in Practical Reasoning about Final Ends 





3.5 Against The Independence Constraint 
 Daniels has argued that the method of reflective equilibrium, as formulated above, 
is not complete.  It requires one further modification.14  I do not accept this 
modification.15   
 Daniels worries that the set of background theories in the method of wide 
reflective equilibrium may just be reformulations of the set of considered moral 
judgments.  This claim gains some plausibility if we recognize that many of the 
background theories we accept are generalizations of our considered moral judgments.  
For example, consider the well-known case discussed in the introduction in which a 
surgeon can save five lives by killing a healthy patient and harvesting his organs.  Most 
of us have the considered moral judgment that this action would be wrong.  One might 
infer, from cases like this, the background theory that there are deontic constraints on 
what agents may do to maximize the good.  Note however, this background theory seems 
to be a sort of generalization of our case judgments. 
Suppose that all our background theories were like this.  If this were so, then wide 
reflective equilibrium would be no different than narrow reflective equilibrium.  For 
those of us who think that wide reflective equilibrium is preferable to narrow reflective 
equilibrium (a thesis I will argue for in section 3.8), this appears problematic. 
 Daniels attempts to solve this problem by introducing two sets of considered 
moral judgments: one to constrain the set of moral principles and another to constrain the 
set of background theories.  Furthermore, he insists that these two sets “be to some 
                                                
14 Daniels, “Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics,” pp. 22-23. 
 
15 DePaul also rejects the independence constraint (Balance and Refinement, pp. 21-22).  




significant degree disjoint.”16  This constraint is what he refers to as the independence 
constraint.  The independence constraint is a requirement that the set of background 
theories and the set of considered moral judgments are constrained by two different sets 
of considered moral judgments and that these two sets must be to some significant degree 
disjoint.  If these sets are somewhat disjoint then the set of background theories is 
constrained in a way that the set of considered moral principles is not and vice-versa.  
This, Daniels thinks, will ensure that the contents of these sets is significantly different 
and thus that the agent’s beliefs in wide reflective equilibrium are distinct from those in 
narrow reflective equilibrium. 
 I do not think that there is a problem.  It would be an odd sort of agent who 
accepted only background theories that were merely reformulations of their considered 
moral judgments.  Surely most people have some beliefs (e.g. beliefs about religion, folk 
psychology, politics and its relation to morality, perhaps even proto-metaethical beliefs)17 
that would count as background theories and are not just mere re-hashes of their 
considered moral judgments.  Among those who are less philosophically inclined, the set 
of background theories will be sparse enough that the beliefs they would hold in wide 
reflective equilibrium may not be that different from the beliefs that they would hold in 
narrow reflective equilibrium.  But this does not seem to me to be especially problematic.   
                                                
16 Daniels, “Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics,” p. 23. 
 
17 The view that ordinary people have metaethical beliefs is defended by Mackie in 
Ethics, pp. 30-35, Joyce in The Myth of Morality, (especially chapters 2 and 6), Terence 
Cuneo in “Saying What we Mean: An Argument against Expressivism” in Russ Shafer-
Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006), pp. 60-65, and David Copp, Morality in a Natural World (Cambridge, UK: 




 In any case, whether or not there is a genuine problem here, there is a significant 
cost to introducing the independence constraint.  Let us call the set of all of an agent’s 
considered moral judgments {CMJ}.  In the method of wide reflective equilibrium, as 
described in section 3.3, {CMJ} constrains both the set of moral principles and the set of 
background theories.  Call this option 1.  Let me spell it out for clarity’s sake.   
Option 1: {CMJ} constrains both the set of moral principles and the set of 
background theories (and these sets constrain {CMJ}. 
What Daniels is proposing is that there be two sets, {CMJp}, which would 
constrain the set of moral principles, and {CMJb}, which would constrain the set of 
background theories.  Call this Option 2: 
Option 2: {CMJp} constrains the set of moral principles and {CMJb} constrains 
the set of background theories, where {CMJp} and {CMJb} are somewhat disjoint. 
I think that option 1 is actually preferable to option 2.  Recall that the independence 
constraint requires that we break {CMJ} up into two sets, {CMJp} and {CMJb}, which 
must be somewhat disjoint.  This entails that either {CMJp} or {CMJb} will lack some 
judgments that there were present in {CMJ}.   Suppose that {CMJp} lacks some 
judgments that were present in {CMJ}.  This means that in option 2, the set of moral 
principles will be constrained by fewer beliefs in option 2 than it was in option 1.  Thus, 
when one achieves wide reflective equilibrium they may still have at least some 
considered moral judgments (those judgments in {CMJ} that were not included in 
{CMJp}) that are inconsistent with the set of moral principles.   
 If {CMJp} does not have fewer beliefs than {CMJ}, then by the requirement 




{CMJ}.  If this is the case, then we run into the same problem with {CMJb} and 
background theories that we did with {CMJp} and moral principles.  The beliefs that are 
part of {CMJ} but not {CMJb} then may remain inconsistent with the set of background 
theories even when one has reached wide reflective equilibrium.  I take this to be a 
decisive objection against the independence constraint. 
3.6 A Coherentist Theory of Justification 
 Let me now re-describe the method of wide reflective equilibrium with the 
modification suggested in section 3.4.  One begins the process with three sets: 
1) A set of considered moral judgments, which are those intuitions that are not made 
in circumstances in which the agent believes she is likely to err.   
2) A set of moral principles 
3) A set of background theories, which are those beliefs that might serve as premises 
in an argument for or against a set of moral principles. 
We then work back and forth to make these three sets consistent. 
 As stated at the outset of this chapter, I aim to defend the view that a moral belief 
is justified if and only if it is the output of this method.  It should be clear that such a 
theory of justification is coherentist.  An agent’s justified moral beliefs are justified not 
because they are derived form self-evident truths but because of the way in which they 
cohere with the agent’s other beliefs, namely because they are in wide reflective 
equilibrium with the other things an agent believes.  As Rawls puts it, “A conception of 
justice cannot be deduced from self-evident principles or conditions on principles; 
instead, its justification is a matter of the mutual support of many considerations, of 




 A natural question for the reader to ask at this point is ‘I see what the method of 
reflective equilibrium is, but why should I believe that it is the appropriate method for 
moral inquiry?’  The rest of this chapter is devoted to answering this question.  In what 
follows, I give three considerations that, when taken together suggest that reflective 
equilibrium is the correct method for moral inquiry.  These three considerations are not to 
be thought of as premises in a deductive argument with the conclusion that one ought to 
accept the method of reflective equilibrium.  While I wish there were such an argument, I 
doubt that there is one to be found.  However, I do not want to be too modest.  I will 
argue that these three considerations, when taken together, do strongly suggest, even if 
they do not entail, that the method of reflective equilibrium is the appropriate method for 
moral inquiry.  Moreover, the plausibility of these considerations is independent of the 
method of reflective equilibrium, or so I shall argue. 
3.7 The First Consideration - In Ethics, Intuitions are Unavoidable 
 The first of these considerations is that, in ethics, intuitions are unavoidable. To 
see that this consideration is true ask yourself the following question: if ethical inquiry 
did not require intuitions, how would it get started?   
 Let us survey the alternatives.  Many types of inquiry start with sensory 
perception.  Could ethical inquiry start this way?  In answering this question, we have to 
keep in mind that ethical inquiry deals essentially with ‘ought’s.  We also must keep in 
mind Hume’s law that one cannot derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is.’  I think it is fairly 
obvious that, while our senses give us much valuable information about the world, they 




claims, and since we cannot derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is,’ ethical inquiry cannot get 
started with sensory perception. 
 In section 2.2, I said that a judgment made by conscious inference is not an 
intuition.  Perhaps, ethical inquiry could start with an inferred ‘ought.’  Hume’s law 
shows us that such an inference must be from a further ‘ought’ claim. This means that 
every validly inferred ‘ought’ presupposes a further ‘ought.’  A regress threatens, and 
since we are concerned with how ethical inquiry could ever get started, it will not do to 
say there is an infinite regress of ‘ought’s or that this inference travels in a circle.  For 
ethical inquiry to even get started, we need an un-derived ‘ought’ claim. 
 It is difficult to see where such an un-derived ‘ought’ could come from if not from 
intuition.  We have already seen that sensory perception does not give us ‘ought’s.  In the 
absence of any other alternatives, it seems that ethical inquiry must start with an intuition.  
Those who wish to avoid this conclusion must show that there is something other than 
intuition that could be the source of an un-derived ‘ought’ claim.  If there is no other 
plausible starting place for ethical inquiry, then at least some appeal to intuition is 
unavoidable in ethics.   
 I recognize that talk of ‘the starting point of ethical inquiry’ is somewhat artificial.  
However, the main point here does not rely on the assumption that there is some moment 
in time that we can characterize as the starting point of ethical inquiry.  It is simply that 
without some appeal to intuition, we would not be able to think about ethics at all.  
 This last point entails something rather stark that is worth emphasizing.  Ethical 
inquiry cannot get off the ground without intuitions.  This means that to repudiate all 




between doing ethics with intuitions or without any appeal to intuitions whatsoever.  
There latter option is not an option. 
3.8 The Second Consideration - Intuitions are Sometimes Unreliable 
 The second consideration is that intuitions are sometimes unreliable.  This was 
argued for back in chapter 2.  I will not rehearse those arguments here.  Instead I want to 
consider a possible objection.  It may be thought that when taken together, the first two 
considerations leave us condemned to a kind of skepticism about ethical inquiry.  If we 
have to rely on intuitions in ethics and intuitions are unreliable, then perhaps ethical 
inquiry is a non-starter to begin with. 
 This line of thought ignores an important possibility, that we can subject our 
intuitions to scrutiny.   The claim that intuitions are unavoidable in ethics does not entail 
that we are forced to blindly accept every intuition we have.  Instead, we can subject our 
intuitions to a kind of scrutiny and accept those intuitions that have passed scrutiny.  This 
way we neither have to avoid intuitions (which the first consideration shows us is 
impossible) nor do we have blindly trust judgments that are sometimes unreliable   
 Of course, this response to the skeptic only works if we can provide some means 
of scrutinizing our intuitions.  How could this be done?  Our next consideration shows us 
that there is only one possible answer. 
3.9 The Quinean Consideration 
 Throughout his philosophical writings, Quine frequently invokes the image of 
Neurath’s boat.  Quine argues that science is like “a boat which, if we are to rebuild it, we 
must rebuild plank by plank while staying afloat in it.”18  Perhaps the best way to 
                                                




understand Quine’s metaphor is to see what it is intended to rule out: the Cartesian 
project of abandoning everything we believe and starting again from scratch.  In 
metaphorical terms, if we hope to modify or add on to the raft we must stand on another 
part of the raft.  In literal terms, if we hope to modify our conceptual scheme, we must do 
so by appealing to other parts of our conceptual scheme.   
 This, I realize, is an ambitious claim.  As a descriptive matter, I believe that it is 
actually one of the claims motivating Rawls’ acceptance of the method of reflective 
equilibrium.19  As a prescriptive matter, I believe that there is much that can be said in 
defense of this claim.  Suppose we had abandoned our entire conceptual scheme, as 
Descartes asks us to in the first Meditation.  Now suppose we are deciding which belief 
we should adopt as our first.  How would we scrutinize such a belief?  In other words, 
how would we decide whether or not we should believe a first belief?  We cannot see if it 
contradicts other things that we believe, since we have no other beliefs.  Even rejecting a 
first belief on logical grounds would require a further belief, namely belief in the laws of 
logic.   Thus, even Descartes’ claim that his existence is certain because denying his 
existence involves contradicting himself requires a further belief in the law of non-
contradiction.  It seems that in the absence of further belief we have no means of 
scrutinizing our beliefs.  In order to scrutinize our beliefs, we must do so from the 
standpoint of other beliefs.  This is the lesson I wish to draw from Neurath’s boat. 
 Returning to our main line of thought, in the last section we saw that we could 
avoid being led into skepticism if we could provide some way to scrutinize our moral 
                                                                                                                                            
 
19 Rawls notes that his account of the method of reflective equilibrium “has benefited 
from the conception of justification found in W.V. Quine, Word and Object, ch. 1 (A 




intuitions.  The Quinean consideration shows us that there is only one way to scrutinize 
our beliefs and that is by bringing our other beliefs to bear on it.  This entails that the 
most scrutiny that we can subject a belief to is scrutiny from the perspective of all of our 
relevant beliefs.  Thus, the only way to scrutinize our moral intuitions is to see how they 
fare against the beliefs that are relevant to their truth or falsity.20  To subject our moral 
intuitions to the most possible scrutiny is just to see how they fare against all the beliefs 
relevant to their truth or falsity.  Of course, this just is the method of wide reflective 
equilibrium.  In the method of wide reflective equilibrium we bring the full force of all of 
our relevant beliefs to bear on our moral intuitions.   
 This reasoning also suggests why we should prefer the method of wide reflective 
equilibrium to the method of narrow reflective equilibrium.  The method of narrow 
reflective equilibrium puts our intuitions under much less scrutiny than the method of 
wide reflective equilibrium does.  Subjecting out intuitions to more scrutiny can increase 
the credibility of those intuitions that survive this process.  Unfortunately, a full defense 
of this claim will have to wait until the next chapter.  For now, I can only say suggest that 
if we take the worries about intuitions raised in chapter 2 seriously, we should not ignore 
those background theories that are relevant to the truth or falsity of our considered moral 
judgments.  Instead, we should see what these background theories have to say about the 
plausibility of our moral intuitions. 
                                                
20 Of course, determining which beliefs are relevant to the truth or falsity of our moral 
beliefs will be a challenge.  I assume that this can be done, though I have no unique 




3.10 From Methodology to Epistemology 
 Allow me summarize the argument so far. Ethical inquiry requires some appeal 
to intuition and intuitions are sometimes unreliable.  This suggests that intuitions must be 
subjected to scrutiny.  This scrutiny can only come from the perspective of one’s other 
beliefs.  These considerations, when taken together, suggest that one should scrutinize 
their moral intuitions from the perspective of all their beliefs that bear on their moral 
intuitions.  To do this is just to engage in the method of wide reflective equilibrium. 
Let us suppose that this argument is successful.  What does it show?  Does it 
show that the method of wide reflective equilibrium is a correct method of moral inquiry?  
Does it show that the method of wide reflective equilibrium is the only correct method of 
moral inquiry?  I believe that these three considerations suggest that the method of 
reflective equilibrium is the only correct method of moral inquiry. If the method of wide 
reflective equilibrium is the process which subjects our moral intuitions to the most 
possible scrutiny, then an alternative method must either eschew intuitions altogether or 
subject them to less scrutiny than the method of wide reflective equilibrium.  If an 
alternative method eschews intuitions altogether, then it runs afoul of the first 
consideration.  If an alternative method uses intuitions but subjects them to less or no 
scrutiny, then it fails to take the second consideration seriously. 21 
                                                
21 Nagel’s method as described in Mortal Questions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979) is an example of subjecting one’s intuitions to less scrutiny than 
the method of reflective equilibrium requires.  Nagel writes, “I believe one should trust… 
intuitions over arguments… Given a knockdown argument for an intuitively unacceptable 
conclusion, one should assume there is probably something wrong with the argument that 
one cannot detect (p. x).” F.M. Kamm’s method as described in Morality, Mortality vol. 
1, pp. 7-9, seems to involve privileging intuitions about particular cases over theoretical 
considerations.  This marks a departure from the method of reflective equilibrium in that 
in the method of reflective equilibrium, intuitions about particular cases do not have any 




Some readers will note that this argument is a methodological argument, in that if 
successful, this argument shows that the method of reflective equilibrium is the correct 
methodology to use in ethics.  However, the coherentist position I mentioned in the 
section 3.1 is epistemological, it is an account of when a moral belief is justified.  An 
objector might claim that even if the argument of the last few sections is correct, it 
establishes only a methodological claim and not an epistemological one.   
In response, I want to note that this apparent distinction between an account of 
methodology and an account of when a belief is justified collapses if we understand 
‘justification’ as I characterized it back section 1.1.  There, I stated that to say that a 
proposition is justified is to say that it is rational or appropriate to believe it.  The claim 
that method M is the correct method for inquiry I, seems to me to just be the claim that 
we should use M to decide what to believe about I.  In other words, a claim that method 
M is the correct method for inquiry I entails that it is rational or appropriate to believe the 
results of M.  Thus, if we understand ‘justification’ as I have suggested, claiming that the 
method of wide reflective equilibrium is the correct method for moral inquiry entails that 
the moral beliefs that are justified are just those that we would hold had we attained wide 
reflective equilibrium. 
3.11 Conclusion 
 More needs to be said about the theory of justification exposited and defended 
here.  Some central notions employed in theory require further clarification and perhaps 
modification.   Furthermore, philosophers have proposed a range of objections against the 




project of clarifying, modifying, and defending the theory discussed in this chapter will 






Chapter 4: Reflective Equilibrium, Coherence, and Moral 
Intuitions 
 
4.1 The Worry about Intuitions 
 The juxtaposition of chapters 2 and 3 may leave the reader somewhat perplexed.  
In chapter 2, I argued that we should take certain skeptical worries about intuitions 
seriously.  In chapter 3, I endorsed a theory of justification that made use of our 
intuitions.  If there are serious grounds for worry about the reliability of intuitions, how 
can we accept a theory of justification in which they play a prominent role? 
 If the reader has this worry, she is not alone.  The most enduring and troubling 
objection to the method of reflective equilibrium is that, in the form of considered moral 
judgments, intuitions play a prominent role in constraining the moral principles we adopt. 
1  However, we have no reason to think such intuitions are credible and some reason to 
think that they are not credible. 
 In this chapter, I begin by discussing two suggestions that have been made by 
other authors for solving this problem.  In my view, neither of these suggestions is 
adequate as stated.  I then argue for a modification to the method of reflective equilibrium 
as described in chapter 3.  Finally, I argue that with this modification, we can answer the 
worry about intuitions. 
4.2 The First Proposed Solution – The Analogy to Non-moral Observation Reports 
 The first attempt to solve the worry about intuitions is due to Norman Daniels.2  
Daniels makes an analogy between moral and scientific inquiry.  Scientific inquiry begins 
                                                
1 For references, see footnote 3 in the introduction. 




with our observations.  Eventually from a kind of non-moral reflective equilibrium we 
were able to derive an account of how these observations work that vindicates their role 
in scientific inquiry.  This account is presumably the familiar one in which the external 
world impinges on our sensory organs which then send signals to our brains causing us to 
have our sensory experience of the external world.  The important thing to note is that we 
started with just brute observations.  However, by testing those observations against 
various principles that systematized and explained them, we were able to develop an 
account of the reliability of these brute observations.   
 Daniels speculates that something similar could be done in the moral case.  By 
trying to bring our considered moral judgments into reflective equilibrium, we might be 
able to develop an account that vindicates our considered moral judgments, just as an 
attempt to bring our observation reports into reflective equilibrium allowed us to develop 
an account about the reliability of our observations.  It is important to note that Daniels 
does not give us any hint of what such an explanation would look like; he merely 
suggests that there could be one. 
I think that there is a genuine possibility such an account may emerge from 
reflective equilibrium.  In chapter 2, we saw that our considered moral judgments 
sometimes lead us astray.  However, our observations sometimes lead us astray (e.g. 
when it is dark, when we are looking at far away objects, or in familiar optical illusions).  
This gives us no reason to assume that we cannot give an account of how our moral 
intuitions are reliable in many cases, just as our observations are reliable in many cases.  
 However, another possibility looms.  This is the possibility that the best 




shows that they are unreliable.  Peter Singer suggests that our moral intuitions “are likely 
to derive from discarded religious systems, from warped views of sex and bodily 
functions, or from customs necessary for the survival of the group in social and economic 
circumstances that now lie in the distant past,”3 Joshua Greene has argued that many of 
our moral intuitions are based on emotional responses to morally irrelevant features of 
situations,4 and Peter Unger has also offered debunking explanations for many of our 
central moral intuitions.5     
 Ideally we would compare Daniels’ vindicating explanation to the various 
debunking explanations that have been offered and see which one best explains the data.  
However, we cannot do that since Daniels does not give us such an explanation, he only 
suggests that there could be one.  Thus, at this point, I do not see any reason for 
preferring a Daniels-style vindicating explanation of considered moral judgments to a 
Singer/Greene/Unger-style debunking explanation of considered moral judgments.  At 
best, Daniels’ reply is inconclusive.  However, I think there is a more serious problem 
with Daniels’ reply.  It makes an unnecessary concession to the critic of reflective 
equilibrium.  Daniels’ reply concedes that the plausibility of the method of reflective 
                                                
3 Singer, “Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium,” p. 47.  The adequacy of Singer’s 
debunking explanation is discussed by Kagan in “Judgments about Cases” 
 
4 Joshua Greene, R. Sommerville, L.E. Nystrom, J.M. Darley, J.D. Cohen, “An fMRI 
Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment.” Science 293 (2001): 2105-
8; Joshua Greene and Jonathan Haidt, “How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?” 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (2002): 517-33; Joshua Greene, “The Secret Joke of 
Kant’s Soul,” in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology Volume 3: The 
Neuroscience of Morality (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008). For an argument against 
Greene’s debunking explanation see Selim Berker, “The Normative Insignificance of 
Neuroscience,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 37 (2009): 293-329. 
5 Living High and Letting Die (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).  For an argument 
against Unger’s debunking explanation see F.M. Kamm, Intricate Ethics (Oxford: Oxford 




equilibrium hinges on providing a general story about the reliability of our considered 
moral judgments.   For reasons that will emerge in the next section, I emphatically deny 
that the plausibility of the method of reflective equilibrium hinges on any such story.  Let 
me now consider a reply that does not make this concession. 
4.3 The Second Proposed Solution – The Corrective Reply 
 Thus far, I have been talking of the reliability of considered moral judgments 
simpliciter.  However, talking this way runs the risk of conflating two very distinct sets of 
judgments.  One is our initial moral judgments – the set of considered moral judgments 
that we begin the reflective equilibrium process with.   These judgments serve as inputs 
in the method of reflective equilibrium.  Another distinct set of judgments is our 
considered moral judgments in reflective equilibrium – the set of considered moral 
judgments that one would have after completing the reflective equilibrium process.  
These judgments are outputs of the method of reflective equilibrium. 
 The corrective reply attempts to answer the worry about intuitions by noting how 
much the set of initial moral judgments and considered moral judgments in reflective 
equilibrium can come apart.  Recall from section 3.3 the long list of things that may serve 
as background theories.  We may have to alter our initial moral judgments quite radically 
to accommodate such background theories.  Our initial moral judgments are put under 
further pressure by the requirement that they must be systematized by a set of principles.  
It is thus likely that our considered moral judgments will undergo substantial revision in 
reflective equilibrium.  Indeed, under the twin pressures of systematization and 





 The corrective reply holds that because the method of reflective equilibrium 
allows for such radical revision, there is no need to defend the reliability of initial moral 
judgments.  Such judgments may be unreliable.  However, the procedure itself functions 
as a corrective for these potentially unreliable judgments.6 
 Given the things that I said in sections 3.8-3.10, it should come as no surprise that 
I think that the corrective reply is on the right track.  However, I do not think that it is 
adequate as stated.  To show why this is, allow me introduce a new character to our 
discussion: the dogmatist. 
 The dogmatist holds some considered moral judgment C very strongly.  In fact, 
she holds C so strongly that she would give up any of her other beliefs to preserve C.  
Furthermore, the dogmatist believes C independently of any reasons for C.  She may give 
you some reasons why she believes C, but if those reasons turn out to support ~C, then 
she will continue to believe C. 
 I take it that the dogmatist is a paradigm case of an epistemically irresponsible 
agent.  Whether or not she is justified in believing C will of course depend on C’s 
evidential and inferential relationships to other things she believes.  That much is 
relatively uncontroversial.  However, it would be a serious defect of a theory of 
justification if that theory had the implication that whatever C was, and whatever 
relationships it had to dogmatist’s evidence, it would be justified.  I worry, however, that 
the method of reflective equilibrium has that implication.  Allow me to explain. 
                                                
6 Very explicit statements of the corrective reply are hard to find, but many defenders of 
the method of reflective equilibrium come very close to stating it.  See Rawls, “The 
Independence of Moral Theory,” p. 289; Daniels, “Wide Reflective Equilibrium and 
Theory Acceptance in Ethics,” pp. 26-28; and David Brink, Moral Realism and The 





 C will clearly be one of the dogmatist’s initial moral judgments.  Let us just 
suppose, for the sake of argument, that C conflicts with other things that the dogmatist 
believes.  When the dogmatist is going through the reflective equilibrium process she will 
uncover these conflicts and then, to paraphrase Rawls, she will have a “choice.”7  She can 
either revise C or revise those beliefs of hers that conflict with C.  Of course, we have 
already stipulated that the dogmatist would give up any of her beliefs to preserve C.  
Thus, the dogmatist will give up her beliefs that conflict with C.  No matter what kind of 
evidence the dogmatist has or lacks for C, C will be the output of the method of wide 
reflective equilibrium.  Even if the dogmatist has strong evidence for ~C and no evidence 
for C, C will be the output of the wide reflective equilibrium process.  This result is 
unacceptable. 
 We are left with this result because the way that the method of reflective 
equilibrium is commonly formulated it requires that agents revise their beliefs when 
faced with a conflict.  However, the standard formulations say very little about how the 
agent is to go about deciding what to revise. What has been said makes it sound as if the 
decision about what to revise is entirely in the hands of the agent. 
 I suspect that it is this feature of the method of reflective equilibrium that is 
especially worrisome to its critics.  Moreover, I think the critics have a legitimate cause 
to worry.  The solution, I will argue, is to take the decision about what to revise out of the 
hands of the agent.  In the rest of this chapter, I search for a way to do this. 
                                                





 As I noted in the last section, defenders of the method of reflective equilibrium 
have said very little about how agents should go about revising their beliefs when they 
find conflicts.  Ironically, the only philosopher who has described this process in any 
detail is a critic of reflective equilibrium, R.B. Brandt.8  On Brandt’s account one assigns 
all of their beliefs a value based on how strongly one believes them.  Call this value a 
credence level.  When one finds conflicts between beliefs one revises so as to maximize 
the overall credence level of her set of beliefs.9 
 While this account does make the process of belief revision in reflective 
equilibrium more determinate, it does not solve the problem of the dogmatist nor the 
more general worry about intuitions (nor does Brandt think it does, his view is that 
worries of this sort should lead us to reject the method of reflective equilibrium).  The 
dogmatist will presumably assign a very high value to C such that it will not make sense 
to revise C no matter what her overall set of evidence suggests.  We are still left with the 
conclusion that the method of reflective equilibrium allows an agent to be justified in 
holding a moral belief independently of its evidential and inferential relations to other 
beliefs that she holds. 
                                                
8 A Theory of the Good and the Right, pp. 17-20.  Brandt’s account draws on an account 
of non-moral justification described by Israel Scheffler, “Justification and Commitment,” 
Journal of Philosophy 51 (1954): 180-190. 
 
9 To see that there really is an issue about how one ought to revise her beliefs when she 
comes across conflicts in reflective equilibrium, note that Brandt’s account and Rawls’s 
account may come apart, since, one may choose to revise in ways that do not maximize 
the overall credence level of her set of beliefs.  If an agent were to revise in such a way, 





 Some readers will note that one notion that plays a central role in this dissertation 
has not been explicated, the notion of coherence.  Eventually, I will argue that a better 
understanding of coherence can solve the specific worry about the dogmatist and the 
general worry about the credibility of our moral intuitions.  Unfortunately, I cannot 
provide a complete account of coherence. 10  However, I do want to offer a sketch of 
some of the things that are involved. 
 It is, I think, fairly obvious that coherence involves brute logical consistency.  But 
it should also be clear that coherence involves more than logical consistency.  Consider 
two sets of propositions, set A and set B.  Set A consists of two propositions: 
A1) There is life on Mars 
A2) Given everything that we know, it is very unlikely that there is life on Mars. 
Set B also contains two propositions 
B1) There is no life on Mars 
B2) Given everything that we know, it is very unlikely that there is life on Mars. 
Set A and Set B are both logically consistent.  However, set B is clearly more coherent 
than set A.  The reason is that set A has what Laurence BonJour calls “probabilistic 
inconsistency.”11  While there is no logical contradiction between A1 and A2, the 
conjunction of A1 and A2 is very unlikely.   Let us generalize and say that other things 
                                                
10 In fact, BonJour has suggested that a complete account of coherence is not possible 
“within the scope of any work of a manageable length (The Structure of Empirical 
Knowledge, p. 93).”  He does not take this to be a problem for the coherentist since 
virtually all non-skeptical theories of justification (even foundationalist ones) make use 
of the concept of coherence. 
 




being equal, the more probabilistically consistent a set of propositions is, the more 
coherent it is. 
 Probabilistic and logical consistency are not the only elements of coherence.  This 
point is best brought out using another example.12  Consider two sets of propositions set 
C and set D.  Set C consists of three propositions 
 C1) This chair is brown. 
 C2) Electrons are negatively charged 
 C3) Today is Thursday 
Set D also consists of three propositions 
 D1) All ravens are black 
 D2) This bird is a raven 
 D3) This bird is black 
Set C and D are both logically and probabilistically consistent.  However, set D is 
obviously more coherent than set C.  The reason is that set D involves what Geoffrey 
Sayre-McCord calls “connectedness.”13   
The connectedness of a set of beliefs is determined by the degree to which the beliefs 
in the set possess evidential or inferential relations to each other.  As with ‘coherence,’ I 
will not be able to provide a complete account of ‘connectedness.’  I am not sure that 
such a thing is possible and if it were it would require a higher degree of formalization 
than is necessary or desirable here.  However, I do want to say a bit more about what 
                                                
12 This example is taken from Ibid, p. 96. 
 
13 “Coherentist Epistemology and Moral Theory,” in Sinnott-Armstrong and Timmons 




connectedness consists in.  Importing some suggestions from BonJour (once again), 14 I 
claim that the connectedness of a set of beliefs is determined by the number and strength 
of the inferential connections between beliefs.  The greater the degree to which such 
connection are present, the more connected the set of beliefs is.  When the set of beliefs 
contains unconnected subsets of beliefs, the connectedness of the set of beliefs is 
diminished. 
In addition to connectedness and consistency, coherence also involves what 
Sayre-McCord calls ‘comprehensiveness.’15  I will, once again, illustrate 
‘comprehensiveness’ using an example.  Compare two sets of beliefs C and E.  Set C 
contains three beliefs: 
 C1) This chair is brown. 
 C2) Electrons are negatively charged 
 C3) Today is Thursday 
Set E contains one belief 
 E1) This chair is brown 
Now suppose a believer encounters two further claims 
 ~C2) Electrons are not negatively charged 
 ~C3) Today is not Thursday 
Note that a believer with the beliefs in set C will be able to pass judgment on these two 
claims but a believer whose belief system contained only the belief in set E would have 
nothing to say about ~C2) and ~C3).   
                                                
14 The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, pp. 96-100. 
 




Generalizing from this example, I think we can explain comprehensiveness in the 
following way.  The comprehensiveness of a set of beliefs is determined by the degree to 
which the beliefs contained in that set allow a believer to pass judgment on a range of 
further propositions.  A set of beliefs that enables a believer to pass judgments on a more 
varied set of further propositions is more comprehensive than a set of beliefs that is able 
to pass judgment on a less varied range of propositions. 
Of course, this only raises further questions.  What is it for a set of beliefs to pass 
judgment on a further belief?  While I cannot fully answer these questions here, let me 
make a few remarks.  The simplest way a set of beliefs can pass judgment on a further 
belief is if that set of beliefs entails that the further belief is true or false.  However, there 
are other ways a set of beliefs can pass judgment on a further belief.  A set of beliefs may 
imply that a further belief is likely to be true or likely to be false or a set of beliefs may 
imply that there is strong evidence for or against a further belief.  A set of beliefs fails to 
pass judgment on a further belief when it simply has nothing to say about it, as set E has 
nothing to say about ~C2) and ~C3). 
Let me now move to the question of what it is for a set of beliefs to be more 
varied.  One may say a set of beliefs is more varied if it contains a higher number of 
beliefs.  While this is often evidence that a set of beliefs is more varied it need not entail 
that a set of beliefs is more varied.  Set C and set D above have the same number of 
beliefs, however, set C is clearly more varied than set D.  In fact, I think that if we added 
one further belief about ravens to set D, set C would still be more varied.  One could say 
a lot more about what is involved in ‘varied’ but an intuitive grasp will good enough for 




I have not provided a complete account of either ‘connectedness’ or 
‘comprehensiveness.’  Let me mention that even if I had, my account of ‘coherence’ 
would not be complete.  First, I’m leaving open that there may be more elements to 
coherence than consistency, comprehensiveness, and connectedness, though I will not 
speculate on what they might be.  Second, a complete account of coherence would 
require a function that specifies the contribution that consistency, connectedness, and 
comprehensiveness make to the overall coherence of a set of beliefs.  My guess is that a 
simple function such as  
coherence = consistency + comprehensiveness + connectedness  
will not work.  First, one may doubt that we could quantify consistency, 
comprehensiveness, and connectedness.  Even supposing we could, there is a further 
problem.  Imagine two sets of beliefs with the following values: 
A: consistency=1, comprehensiveness=0.9, connectedness=0.01 
B: consistency=1, comprehensiveness=.45, connectedness=.45 
A has a higher overall value than B, however, since A has so little connectedness, I am 
inclined to say that B is more coherent than A.  This raises an important point: 
maximizing coherence may not simply be a matter of maximizing consistency, 
comprehensiveness, and connectedness. 
 This leads to a third important point.  It may be that in some cases the elements of 
coherence (i.e. consistency, connectedness, and comprehensiveness) conflict.  For 
example it could be that making one revision increases connectedness while decreasing 




coherent?  A complete account of coherence would have to provide an answer but I offer 
none here. 
Let me conclude by drawing some lessons from our discussion of coherence.  
First, as I hope it is clear, coherence is much more than simple consistency.  Second, 
while consistency may be a matter of kind, connectedness and comprehensiveness are 
clearly a matter of degree.  This means that coherence is also a matter of degree.  We can 
therefore speak of a set of beliefs as being more or less coherent. 
4.6 Coherence and Reflective Equilibrium 
 In discussing the dogmatist, we saw that defenders of the method of reflective 
equilibrium have said little about the process of belief revision in reflective equilibrium.  
We have so far surveyed two alternatives.  The first, suggested by Rawls’ use of the word 
‘choice’ in describing the method of reflective equilibrium, is that it is completely up to 
the agent.  On this view there are simply no restrictions about how one should go about 
revising her beliefs in reflective equilibrium.  The second alternative, suggested by 
Brandt in his critique of reflective equilibrium, is that an agent revises so as to maximize 
the overall credence level of her set of beliefs. 
 In this section, I shall suggest a third alternative.  Let me explain this alternative 
by invoking a familiar metaphor. Recall from chapter 1 that coherentists typically see the 
structure of justification as being something like a spider’s web (as opposed to a 
building). It is commonly thought that some beliefs are more central to the web than 
others.  For instance, my belief in the laws of logic is close to the center of the web 




the web.  It is also typically thought that when one discovers conflicts between two 
beliefs one should revise so as to preserve the more central belief. 
 This point can be illustrated by an example.16  Suppose I believe that last week I 
weighed 200 pounds.  Furthermore, I believe that I maintained a low calorie diet this 
week and have lost weight.  In other words, I believe that I now weigh less than 200 
pounds.  I walk over to my trusty scale, step on it, and observe that my scale reads 205 
pounds.  I believe that my scale is extremely reliable and so infer that I now weigh 205 
pounds.  I am faced with an apparent conflict.  I believe that I weigh less than 200 pounds 
and that I weight 205 pounds.  What to do?   
 One option is to revise my mathematical belief that 205 is greater than 200.  A 
second option is to revise my beliefs about logic so that there is no conflict after all. 
There is yet a third option; my belief that my scale read 205 pounds was formed on the 
basis of sensory perception.  Up until now, I believed that sensory perception was 
reliable.  However, I could revise this belief.  
 Most of us agree that none of these options are the right way to resolve this 
conflict.  Why is this?  The explanation is that these beliefs are all fairly central to my 
web of belief.  I am better off revising something at the periphery, perhaps my belief that 
I maintained my diet last week.  In general, when faced with a conflict of beliefs one 
should revise the beliefs to the periphery of one’s web. 
 What determines how central a belief is to one’s web?  It seems to me that the 
beliefs central to one’s web are those that make significant contributions to the 
comprehensiveness and connectedness of one’s overall set of beliefs.  To see this imagine 
                                                
16 This is a variation on an example from Thomas Nagel, “The Sleep of Reason,” The 




we removed our beliefs about mathematics or logic from our set of beliefs.  Such a set 
would now be radically less connected and be able to pass judgment about much fewer 
propositions.  It also seems to me that the beliefs that are close to the periphery of one’s 
web are those that do not make much of a contribution to the comprehensiveness and 
connectedness of one’s overall set of beliefs.  My belief that “I wore a black t-shirt 
yesterday” could be rejected without radically decreasing the comprehensiveness and 
connectedness of my overall set of beliefs.   
After reflecting on these and other examples, the following seems to me to be a 
good explication of the notion of centrality to one’s web of beliefs: how central or 
peripheral a belief is to one’s web of beliefs is determined by the contribution that belief 
makes to the comprehensiveness and connectedness of one’s overall set of beliefs.  The 
greater the contribution a belief makes to the comprehensiveness and connectedness of 
one’s overall set of beliefs the more central that belief is to one’s web of belief.  
Conversely, the lesser the contribution a belief makes to the comprehensiveness and 
connectedness of one’s overall set of beliefs the closer to the periphery that belief is to 
one’s web of belief. 
 My suggestion for how to handle the question of how one ought to revise her 
moral beliefs when she finds conflicts in the method of reflective equilibrium is the 
following: in the moral case, like the non-moral case, when we are faced with a conflict 
we ought to revise that belief that is less central to one’s web of moral beliefs.  Put 
differently, my suggestion is that when an agent comes across an inconsistency in her 
overall set of moral beliefs (i.e. her considered moral judgments, the moral principles that 




maximize the coherence of her overall set of moral beliefs, where coherence includes 
comprehensiveness and connectedness as well as consistency.  On this account of belief 
revision, which belief one should revise in cases of conflict is determined by the 
contribution that belief makes to the overall comprehensiveness and connectedness of 
one’s set of beliefs.  For this reason, I will refer to this account as the contributionist 
account of belief revision. 
 I have quite a bit to say about this account, but let me begin by attempting to 
forestall a misunderstanding.  The contributionist account does not hold that one should 
throw away their current set of moral beliefs and exchange it for the most coherent set of 
moral beliefs possible.  If one were to do this, one might end up with a truly bizarre set of 
moral beliefs.  Instead, the contributionist account holds that one starts with the moral 
beliefs they have and then searches for inconsistencies.  One revises for the sake of 
coherence only when she comes across inconsistencies.   
 This means that, on the contributionist view, justification is not solely a function 
of coherence.  A radical coherentist might simply equate justification with coherence. 
The contributionist account is a moderate coherentism, according to which coherence 
plays a crucial role in justification, however coherence by itself does not determine 
whether a moral belief is justified or not.    The view still avoids foundationalism because 
it denies that any moral belief is justified independently of its relations to other beliefs (a 
point that I shall return to in section 4.10). 
 We now have three alternative accounts of how belief revision is supposed to 
work in reflective equilibrium.  The reader may ask, why should they prefer the 




this section.  We agreed that it would be a mistake for him to revise his logical or 
mathematical views to reconcile his beliefs about his weight.  My worry is that both 
Rawls and Brandt’s accounts allow one to pull off the moral analogue of this mistake.  
These accounts allow agents to revise beliefs at the center of their web of moral belief in 
order to preserve beliefs close the periphery.  This is abundantly clear with Rawls’ view, 
which seems to allow an agent to revise any way she sees fit.  Brandt’s suggestion is 
unhelpful since nothing prevents an agent from assigning a high credence level to a belief 
at the periphery of her web of moral belief.  A defender of Rawls’ or Brandt’s view may 
deny that there is any mistake if one revises a belief at the center of her moral web in 
order to preserve something at the periphery.  However, it is clearly a mistake in the non-
moral case.  If this is so, then, absent some argument, it is difficult to see why we should 
treat the moral case differently. 
4.7 Time Slice Justification vs. Historical Justification 
 We need to modify this account to answer an important objection.  Suppose that 
an agent face a conflict between two beliefs U and J.  Suppose further that the 
contributionist account implies that U is unjustified and the agent ought to revise U and 
preserve J but the agent irrationally revises J to preserve U.  Now he no longer believes J 
and, let us assume, there is no further belief that conflicts with U.  Since U now coheres 
(or is at least not inconsistent) with his other beliefs, the theory of justification now 
implies that the agent may be justified in believing U but this result is absurd.  The only 
reason the agent is justified in believing U is that she made an irrational revision to her 
set of beliefs. An irrational revision should not justify one in believing anything.17 





 To solve this problem, we need to insure that the beliefs that serve as inputs to the 
method of reflective equilibrium are not just the agent’s current beliefs.  We need to 
insure that those earlier beliefs of the agent that have not already been defeated (i.e. ruled 
unjustified by the procedure) serve as inputs to the method. 
4.8 Moral Coherence 
 We can now see that coherence plays a crucial role in the theory of ethical 
justification.  In section 4.6, I explicated the notion of coherence by importing an account 
of coherence that has been developed in the epistemology of perceptual beliefs.  This is 
one case where results obtained in one area of philosophy (epistemology) can help to 
illuminate another area of philosophy (ethics).  However, importing an idea from one 
field to another carries certain dangers.  In particular, it carries the danger that one 
ignores the subtleties of the field receiving the import.  For this reason, I want to spend 
some space discussing how the notion of coherence applies in the moral case.  I will 
argue that there are some unique features of the moral case that deserve our attention. 
 Let us begin with consistency.  In non-moral epistemology we are typically 
concerned with two kinds of consistency, logical and probabilistic.  However, ethics is 
often, if not chiefly, concerned with a third kind of consistency, what I will call practical 
consistency.  Like many other notions, this is best illustrated by example.  Consider the 
following two claims  
1) One ought to always be kind 
2) One ought to always be just18 
                                                
18 The examples and the term ‘practical consistency’ are taken from Roger Crisp, 
“Sidgwick and the Boundaries of Intuitionism” in Stratton-Lake (ed.), Ethical 




There is no logical inconsistency in holding both 1) and 2).19  However, there is a kind of 
practical inconsistency, in that there are certain cases in which one cannot consistently act 
in accordance with both 1) and 2). 
 I am inclined to say that ethical coherence involves not just logical and 
probabilistic consistency, but also practical consistency.  However, this raises a further 
problem.  Some philosophers believe that there are genuine moral dilemmas, cases where 
there are conflicting moral obligations such that no matter what one does, one acts 
wrongly.20  To take an example from Sartre, we can imagine an able-bodied French man 
during World War II whose mother is extremely sick.21  It seems that he has both a duty 
to care for his sick mother and a duty to fight in the French resistance.  A defender of 
moral dilemmas might claim that both of these duties are genuine all-things-considered 
duties even though our able-bodied French man cannot act in accordance with both of 
them.  Accordingly, the defender of moral dilemmas urges, to have beliefs that are 
completely practically consistent is wrong.  There are genuine practical inconsistencies 
and a failure to recognize them is a genuine failure. 
                                                
19 It is true that one cannot act on both 1) and 2) but this is due to contingent features of 
our world and thus the inconsistency between 1) and 2) cannot just be a matter of logic.  
One might object here and insist that as a conceptual matter all kind actions are also just.  
This strikes me as implausible but, in any case, one who holds this view should just 
substitute another example.  Perhaps ‘one should always keep the promises’ and ‘one 
should always save other lives when they can’ will conflict in a case where I have 
promised to meet someone at a certain time but I run across a person trapped in a burning 
vehicle.   
 
20 See e.g. Ruth Barcan Marcus, “Moral Dilemmas and Consistency,” Journal of 
Philosophy 77 (1980): 121-136 and Bernard Williams, “Ethical Consistency,” 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society supp. 39 (1965): 103-124. 
 
21 Jean-Paul Sartre, “Existentialism is a Humanism,” in Walter Kaufmann (ed.), 




 There are of course, philosophers who deny that there are moral dilemmas.22  
Perhaps, the easy answer is to side with them and move on.  However, that would be a 
mistake here since whether or not we should believe in moral dilemmas is something that 
should be decided within our theory of justification and not something that should be 
presupposed by it.  For this reason, let me say a bit about how the method of reflective 
equilibrium and the contributinist account of belief revision should deal with the issue of 
moral dilemmas. 
 It will be helpful if we have in mind an actual argument for moral dilemmas.  Let 
us take a look at one influential argument, which I will call the argument from guilt.23  
The argument notes that whatever the agent in Sartre’s case does, it will be appropriate 
for him to feel guilt.  If he joined the French Resistance, it would be appropriate for him 
to feel guilt for abandoning his sick mother and if he cared for his sick mother it would be 
appropriate for him to feel guilt for failing to aid the French Resistance.  From this case, 
the argument derives the following existential claim: 
G1) There are some cases where no matter what the agent does it is appropriate to feel 
guilt 
The argument goes on to claim 
G2)  It is only appropriate to feel guilt if one acts wrongly 
Therefore, 
                                                
22 See e.g. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (1787), pp. 224-225 and David 
Brink, “Moral Conflict and Its Structure,” Philosophical Review 103 (1994): 215-247. 
 
23 This is a version of the argument offered by both Marcus, “Moral Dilemmas and 
Consistency,” and Williams, “Ethical Consistency.”  Since, we will not be evaluating the 





G3) There are some cases where no matter what the agent does, she acts wrongly.  That 
is, there are genuine moral dilemmas. 
In the method of reflective equilibrium G1) and G2) serve as background theories.  
Accepting these background theories would compel us to accept a third background 
theory, G3). 
 Suppose that we accept G1) through G3) and hold that Sartre’s case is a genuine 
moral dilemma on the ground that it is appropriate for Sartre’s Frenchman to feel guilt no 
matter what he does.  We would be committed, on grounds of logical consistency to hold 
both: 
1) It would be wrong for Sartre’s Frenchman to abandon his mother 
2) It would be wrong for Sartre’s Frenchman to stay with his mother. 
Denying 1) or 2) would be logically inconsistent with our background theories (G1-G3).  
However, accepting both 1) and 2) would be practically inconsistent. 
 Denying the claim that practical consistency is a part of overall coherence is much 
too costly.  Such a denial would leave us with no grounds to say that one ought to revise 
either their judgment that ‘one ought always to be just’ or their judgment that ‘one ought 
always to be kind.’ What we have is a case where practical consistency conflicts with 
logical consistency.  Of course, we noted earlier that there can be conflicts between the 
elements of coherence.  Just as there may be cases where comprehensiveness and 
connectedness conflict, there can be cases where logical consistency and practical 
consistency conflict.  We could resolve this conflict by rejecting the relevant background 
theories (G1-G3).  However, if these background theories are sufficiently well supported 




inconsistency.  This is consistent with claiming that other things being equal, the more 
practically consistent a set of beliefs is the more coherent it is.  Here, we have stumbled 
on a case where other things are not equal and coherence may demand that we hold on to 
the sufficiently well grounded background theories and tolerate the practical 
inconsistency. 
 Whether or not it will make sense to tolerate the practical inconsistency will 
depend on how well grounded the background theories are.  Opponents of moral 
dilemmas hold that these background theories are not sufficiently well grounded and 
should be rejected.  For all I have said here, they may, in the end, be correct.  My aim 
here is not to settle the debate between friends and opponents of moral dilemmas but to 
explain how a particular theory of justification need not beg the question against one side 
or the other.  It need not beg the question because coherence itself, in this case coherence 
with well -supported background theories, may require that we tolerate a practical 
inconsistency.  I conclude that we can accept that practical consistency is a genuine 
element of coherence and a desirable feature of a moral system without pre-supposing 
that there are no moral dilemmas. 
 This may, in some sense, constitute a qualification in my overall account of the 
method of reflective equilibrium.  Earlier I said that when one finds a conflict one must 
make that revision which maximizes coherence.  I still hold that his claim is correct.  
However, we must recognize that in some cases tolerating an (practical) inconsistency 
may be the best way of maintaining overall coherence.  In these cases, we ought to 




 This concludes my discussion of applying consistency to ethical coherence.  I take 
it that connectedness raises no special problems for moral beliefs.  However, 
comprehensiveness does raise some issues.  Earlier we said that the comprehensiveness 
of a set of beliefs is determined by its ability to pass judgment on a varied set of further 
beliefs.  If a set of beliefs can pass judgment on a large variety of further beliefs, we say 
it is very comprehensive.  Applying this to the moral case, we say that the 
comprehensiveness of a set of moral beliefs is determined by its ability to pass judgment 
on varied set of further moral beliefs including case-judgments, principles, and moral 
background theories.    
 This account raises some apparent difficulties.  In discussing the role of 
comprehensiveness in ethical coherence, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong notes that, “we do 
not want a moral system to tell us whether to part or hair on the left or the right.”24  This 
is surely correct, but we do want a moral system to tell us something about the case, 
namely that it would be morally permissible to part our hair on either side.  
 As this example shows us, it is important not to conflate passing judgment with 
telling us what to do.  We do not want a moral system to tell us what to do in the hair-
parting case.  However, a moral system can pass judgment on a case without telling us 
what to do, as does the moral system that tells us that it is permissible to part our hair on 
either side.  My point is that we can hold that comprehensiveness is a desirable element 
of a moral system without holding the absurd view that a moral system must tell us what 
to do in all cases. 
                                                




 Holding that comprehensiveness is a desirable element of a moral system is also 
compatible with holding that there are moral dilemmas.  Indeed holding that case is a 
moral dilemma is a way of passing judgment on a case.  
 I now want to consider a different kind of objection to comprehensiveness 
inspired by Bernard Gert.  Gert holds that there are some moral questions with no unique 
correct answer.25  We might call such cases ‘morally indeterminate.’   To get a handle on 
‘moral indeterminacy’ it will be useful to have a little background in Gert’s moral theory. 
 Gert claims that an action is immoral if it violates a justified moral rule without 
adequate justification.26  Justified moral rules, according to Gert, are those rules that all 
rational persons would endorse as part of a public system of conduct that applies to all 
rational beings.27  Gert thinks, pace some Kantians, that there are some cases where 
impartial rational beings will not agree about whether or not there should be a moral rule 
forbidding the action.28  He gives the example of abortion.29  Perhaps impartial rational 
beings could not agree on whether or not there should be a moral rule forbidding 
abortion.  If so, then whether or not abortion is immoral is morally indeterminate. 
 One might worry that holding that comprehensiveness is a desirable feature of a 
moral system begs the question against theories like Gert’s which hold that there is some 
moral indeterminacy.  However, this is not so.  A set of beliefs fails to pass judgment on 
                                                
25 Morality: Its Nature and Justification Revised edition (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006).   
 
26 Ibid, p. 111. 
 
27 Ibid, pp. 159-162. 
 
28 Ibid, pp. 150-152. 
 




a further belief only if it has nothing to say about it, as we saw that set E had nothing to 
say about ~C2 or ~C3.  To take a moral example, imagine the set of moral beliefs M, 
which only includes one moral belief: 
M1) Stealing is wrong 
M has nothing to say about whether or not abortion is immoral.   
In contrast, Gert’s view does have something to say about abortion; it says that 
abortion is morally indeterminate.  Holding that the moral permissibility of abortion is 
indeterminate is not an instance of having nothing to say about abortion.  Indeed, it is an 
instance of saying something about it.  This becomes clear if we recall that Gert actually 
provides a means of determining whether or not a case is morally indeterminate. It is not 
that Gert’s theory fails to pass judgment on the morality of abortion. On the contrary, 
Gert’s theory does pass judgment on it; it holds that it is indeterminate.  This shows us 
that claiming that comprehensiveness is a desirable feature of a moral theory does not beg 
the question against theories that allow for moral indeterminacy. 
 Gert raises the point of moral indeterminacy as part of a more general objection to 
the method of reflective equilibrium.  Gert charges that the method of reflective 
equilibrium presupposes that there is a correct answer to every moral question.30  Gert’s 
charge is false.  The claim that there is not a correct answer to every moral question could 
easily be incorporated into the method of reflective equilibrium.  It would be a 
background theory.  Suppose one accepted it as a background theory and accepted some 
moral principle (e.g. the principle of utility, one ought to do that action which maximizes 
overall utility) that gives an answer to every moral question.  One would then have a 
                                                





conflict and have to revise either the principle or the background theory.  If the 
background theory is as well grounded as Gert claims it is, then one should reject the 
principle in favor of one that does not provide an answer to every moral question. 
 Of course, this is compatible with the utilitarian claim that Gert’s background 
theory is not well grounded and should be rejected.  My purpose is not to adjudicate the 
dispute between Gert and the utilitarian but only to show that Gert’s claim that there is 
genuine moral indeterminacy can be accommodated within the method of reflective 
equilibrium.  Therefore, Gert’s claim that the method of reflective equilibrium 
presupposes that there is a unique answer to every moral question is false. 
 In this section I have discussed some complications that arise when we attempt to 
apply the explication of coherence discussed in section 4.5 to moral epistemology.  I 
think that provided we make some additions and clarifications we can apply this account 
to moral epistemology.  In particular, we can do so without presupposing that there are no 
moral dilemmas or that there is no moral indeterminacy.  In section 4.5, I conceded that 
my account of coherence is incomplete.  Perhaps my account of how coherence applies to 
moral epistemology is similarly incomplete.  While I am open to that possibility, I hope 
that I have dissolved at least a few of the main worries. 
4.9 The Dogmatist Revisited 
 This lengthy discussion about the nature of coherence has been somewhat of a 
digression.  The main aim of this chapter was to solve the worry about intuitions 
discussed in section 4.1.  Before I attempt that, however, I want to return to a more 
specific worry about the dogmatist discussed in section 4.3.  Seeing how we can solve 




 Let me begin by re-stating the problem of the dogmatist.  The dogmatist believes 
some considered moral judgment C so strongly that she is willing to revise any of her 
beliefs to accommodate C.  We saw that, as described in Chapter 3, the method of 
reflective equilibrium allows the dogmatist to be justified in believing C, no matter what 
relationships C bears to the dogmatist’s evidence.  This consequence is unacceptable. 
 In section 4.6, we saw, however, that the account of reflective equilibrium given 
in chapter 3 needs to be modified.  In particular, it needs to be modified in the following 
way: When one finds a conflict in her overall set of beliefs she must make the revision 
that would maximize coherence in her overall set of moral beliefs. 
 I contend that this modification can solve the problem of the dogmatist.  As 
before, the dogmatist begins by searching for inconsistencies in her set of beliefs. 
Suppose C is inconsistent with some further belief F.  The dogmatist must now compare 
the inferential and evidential relationships that C and F have to her other beliefs as well 
as the contribution C and F make to the comprehensiveness of her set of beliefs.  To 
revert to the metaphor of the spider’s web, she attempts to discern whether C or F is 
closer to the periphery of her web of belief. If her set of beliefs would be more coherent if 
she revised C, then she must revise C regardless of her confidence in it. 
 The problem we noted earlier is that as the method of reflective equilibrium had 
been described in chapter 3, it allowed C to survive in reflective equilibrium no matter 
what evidence the dogmatist has for it.  The modified reflective equilibrium avoids this 
result.  With our modification in place, C can only survive reflective equilibrium if it is 
supported by the dogmatist’s best evidence, that is, if it bears strong inferential and 




 Note that the modification in the method of reflective equilibrium that yields our 
proposed solution is not ad hoc.  It is ultimately motivated by the kind of concerns for 
producing a highly coherent set of beliefs that motivate coherentist theories of 
justification generally. 
4.10 The Epistemology of Moral Intuitions 
 I now turn, finally, to moral intuitions.  I hope it is clear that on the account we 
have been developing, it is likely that many of our intuitive judgments will not be 
justified.  Going through the reflective equilibrium process we will find conflicts between 
our considered moral judgments and the principles that best systematize them as well as 
our background theories.  When faced with such conflict we will often be required to 
revise our considered moral judgments rather than the principles and background theories 
that conflict with them. The method of reflective equilibrium leaves open the possibility 
that none of our considered moral judgments are justified. 
 Given this possibility, it should be clear that the corrective reply is correct in 
asserting that we owe no story about why we should trust our current set of intuitions.  
However, the question remains, why should we trust our considered moral judgments in 
reflective equilibrium?  With the modification of the method of reflective equilibrium 
suggested in section 4.6 we can see why we should trust these judgments.  We should 
trust them because they form a part of a highly coherent set of judgments, a set of 
judgments that includes a well-grounded set of background theories and systematizing 
principles. 
 We can see exactly how this is supposed to work if we consider an argument from 




derivative credibility.  Moral intuitions have non-derivative credibility “if and only if we 
can ascribe to them a kind of initial credibility independent of their being derived from, 
or being dependent on some moral principles [and, I would add, background theories].”31  
A moral intuition has derivative credibility if and only if it has credibility that is 
dependent on moral principles or background theories.  It should be clear that my view is 
that moral intuitions have merely derivative credibility.  Their credibility is dependent 
upon the inferential or evidential relationships they bear to other principles or background 
theories. 
 However, Sencerz goes on to argue that for a defender of the method of reflective 
equilibrium to claim that moral intuitions only have derivative credibility is viciously 
circular.32  This is because the credibility of our intuitions would be dependent on moral 
principles and background theories.  However, these principles and background theories 
are justified by their relationship to our moral intuitions.  This certainly does appear to be 
a vicious circle 
 I think Sencerz’s description of the view is misleading.  First, Sencerz describes 
things as if what is justified is not particular beliefs but sets of beliefs (e.g. intuitions and 
principles).  Second, Sencerz’s description has one of set of beliefs, intuitions, being 
justified in what seems to be a linear fashion by another set of beliefs, principles, which 
are in turn justified linearly by intuitions.  This is surely viciously circular but it is not the 
picture that I, or other defenders of the method of reflective equilibrium, advocate.  First, 
what we aim to justify is not sets of beliefs (e.g. considered moral judgments) but instead 
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particular considered moral judgments.  Each considered moral judgment is justified by 
its complex inferential and evidential relationships to a large set of beliefs that not only 
includes other considered moral judgments but also moral principles and background 
theories.  These particular moral principles and background theories are then justified by 
their complex inferential and evidential relationships to each other and our considered 
moral judgments. 
 There is still an element of circularity here.  A particular considered moral 
judgment C is justified by its relationship to our other moral beliefs.  Suppose these moral 
beliefs include a further belief D.  D itself would be justified by its relationship to a large 
number of moral beliefs that includes C.  This is a kind of circularity.  However, it is a 
very minimal circularity.  If one objects to this kind of circularity, then one objects not 
only to our account, but to every coherentist theory of justification, moral or non-moral, 
as well as some of the weaker versions of foundationalism.  Of course, one might press 
on and say that every single coherentist theory must be rejected because it involves this 
kind of circularity.  However, I will not take up that argument here because it seems to 
me that moral epistemology has nothing unique to contribute.  That battle must be fought 
in more traditional epistemology.   
 This completes my response to the worry about intuitions. To sum up, I agree 
with the corrective reply in claiming that it is not our initial set of considered moral 
judgments that requires credibility, it is our set of moral judgments in reflective 
equilibrium.  However, as the dogmatist brings out, the corrective reply is not in a 
position to explain the credibility of those considered moral judgments in reflective 




following way: it can be modified so that when an agent is faced with an inconsistency, 
she must make that revision which maximizes overall coherence.  This modification is 
not ad hoc since it derives its motivation from the coherentist considerations that 
motivate the method of reflective equilibrium in the first place. With this modification in 
place, we can see why we should trust our considered moral judgments in reflective 
equilibrium.  We should trust them because they cohere well with our best evidence.  
These judgments have strong evidential and inferential relationships to other beliefs in a 
highly coherent set of judgments, a set of judgments that includes a well-grounded set of 
background theories and systematizing principles.   In making this modification we are 
not claiming that moral intuitions have non-derivative credibility, only derivative 
credibility.  However, to make this claim is not viciously circular since it involves only 
the kind of weak circularity that we find in all coherentist accounts of epistemic 
justification. 
4.11 The Moral Center 
 Now that we have an idea of the role of coherence in the theory of ethical 
justification, it will be useful to return to some points made in our earlier discussion of 
the metaphor of the web of belief.  Since, the notion of centrality to the web of belief 
plays a crucial role in the theory of ethical justification, it is a natural question to ask, 
‘which moral beliefs lie closest to the center or our web of belief?’ 
 This question is ultimately an empirical question and answering it would require 
laying out one’s moral beliefs and carefully examining the inferential and evidential 
relationships between them.  While I cannot undertake such a project here, I do want to 




 Earlier I suggested that the sorts of non-moral beliefs that lie closest to the center 
of our web of belief are our beliefs about mathematics, logic, and the reliability of sense 
perception.  I suggested that my beliefs about what I wore yesterday or ate last week lie 
close to the periphery of our web of belief.  This may give the impression that what lies at 
the center of our web of belief are deep abstract principles and what lies closer to the 
periphery is our more ordinary and particular beliefs.  This may in turn suggest that the 
moral beliefs closest to the center or our web of belief are deep principles in ethical 
theory, or perhaps even metaethics, and the moral beliefs that lie at the periphery of our 
web of beliefs are our judgments about particular cases, types of cases, institutions, or 
policies.  This impression, though perhaps suggested by our earlier discussion, is 
mistaken and I want to correct it here. 
 Recall that how central or peripheral a belief is to one’s web of belief is 
determined by the contribution that belief makes to the comprehensiveness and 
connectedness of one’s overall set of beliefs.  It is also important to keep in mind that just 
as moral principles will provide evidential support for particular judgments, particular 
judgments will provide evidential support for moral principles.  It is often the case that 
we subscribe to a moral principle because of the results it entails in a relatively small 
number of cases.  Given these two facts, it is not at all obvious that abstract moral 
principles will lie at the center of our moral web.  It may be that certain more particular 
moral judgments, say that racial discrimination is unjust or torture for amusement is 
wrong are far closer to the center of our web of belief than much of the sorts of beliefs we 
have in the more abstract parts of normative ethics and metaethics.  For instance, my 




consequentialism succeeds will likely have far fewer evidential and inferential 
relationships to my other beliefs than my view that racial discrimination is unjust.  Thus, 
it is likely that in this case my belief about abstract normative ethics will be closer to the 
periphery than my more particular belief about racial discrimination.   
 These points help to show how I answer an objection that has been pressed the 
contributionist account.  It has been suggested that even if this account solved the 
problem of the dogmatist, as I presented it, we can imagine a theory dogmatist who holds 
on to some abstract moral belief in the face of widespread evidence against it.33  One 
might worry that the contributionist account cannot show that a theory dogmatist might 
have to revise his view in the face of widespread evidence against it.  This objection is 
plausible if we think that abstract moral principles lie at the center of my web of belief 
while more particular moral beliefs lie at the periphery.  However, as I have argued 
above, this is not the case.  The moral beliefs closest to the center of my web of belief are 
likely to include certain beliefs about particular cases, types of cases, policies, and 
institutions.  If these judgments conflict with an abstract moral principle, we will have to 
revise the principle unless the principle itself can be shown to better cohere with our 
evidence. 
 This allows the contributionist account to accommodate an important point made 
by Rawls.  Rawls argues that within the method of reflective equilibrium certain 
“convictions are provisional fixed points which we presume any conception of justice 
                                                
33 This objection was raised by John Maier in his comments on my presentation at the 
Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress in August, 2009.  Discussion with Maier pushed me to 




must fit.”34  In our theory we can say that these provisional fixed points are the moral 
beliefs that are closest to the center of one’s web of belief.  Of course, as Rawls notes, 
“even the judgments that we take to be provisionally fixed are liable to revision.”35  In 
extreme circumstances, even these judgments may ultimately have to be revised.  
However, in the absence of such extreme circumstances we can be reasonably certain that 
these judgments are justified and that other judgments will have to be revised to 
accommodate them.  We get this result not by appealing to anything independent of 
coherence, but by appealing to coherence itself.  These judgments have this special place 
in the method of reflective equilibrium because of the inferential and evidential 
relationships they bear to other beliefs.  It is worth emphasizing that we can get the result 
that these judgments are provisional fixed points without making the dubious assumption 
that the contents of these judgments are self-evident moral truths. 
 A related, but distinct objection that has been pressed against the proposal here is 
that it stacks the deck against pluralistic moral theories.36  Some moral theories, such as 
act-utilitarianism, are extremely unified in that they claim that only one moral principle 
that can tell us whether or not any action is right or wrong by itself.  Other theories are 
more pluralistic.  Rossian deontology, for example, proposes a plurality of principles and 
requires judgment to determine what to do in cases of conflict.  Other theories such as 
Aristotle’s are even less unified than Ross’s.   It has been suggested that the 
contribitionist account’s emphasis on coherence wrongly stacks the deck in favor of 
                                                









unified moral theories.  This is a serious objection because how unified a theory should 
be is something that needs to be settled within a theory of justification not presupposed 
by it. 
 In response I want to point out that pluralist moral theories are often motivated by 
background theories about the role or function of ethics.  This is certainly the case with 
Aristotle’s moral theory.  If these background theories cohere well with our evidence, 
they may give us reason, within the method of reflective equilibrium, to reject unified 
moral theories.  Other times, pluralist moral theories are motivated by their ability to 
capture judgments about particular cases or types of cases more naturally than unified 
moral theories.  Again, supposing these more particular judgments cohere with our best 
evidence, they give us reason, within the method of reflective equilibrium, to reject 
unified moral theories that cannot capture them. 
 Of course, the act-utilitarian will respond by claiming that such background 
theories either fail to cohere with our evidence or fail to support pluralism.  The act-
utilitarian will also make these claims about the relevant case judgments.  My purpose 
here is not to adjudicate this dispute but only to note that it takes place within the method 
of reflective equilibrium.  The method itself does not assume that one side or the other is 
correct. 
4.12 Ideal and Non-Ideal Moral Reasoning 
 This completes my presentation of the theory of ethical justification.  As I stated 
at the beginning of chapter 3, my view is that a moral belief is justified if and only if it 
would be the output of a version of the method of wide reflective equilibrium.  The 




Rawls, Daniels, and Brink in that it makes determinate the process of belief revision in 
reflective equilibrium.  In particular, it holds that when one finds an inconsistency, one 
must revise so as to maximize coherence.  My account also differs from earlier defenses 
of the method of reflective equilibrium in that I do not concede that the plausibility of the 
method of reflective equilibrium hinges on providing any general story about why our 
intuitions are reliable.  The credibility of those judgments that are justified comes from 
the evidential and inferential relationships they have to our other beliefs in reflective 
equilibrium. 
 Even though my presentation of the theory is complete, our work is not done.  
There are a rather large number of objections that have been proposed against reflective 
equilibrium accounts and if these objections are successful, they would rebut not only 
Rawlsian reflective equilibrium but my own variant as well.  For this reason, I will 
devote the next chapter to showing that these objections fail.   
 In the remainder of this chapter, I want to consider an objection to the view that I 
have presented.  I deal with this objection here, rather than the next chapter, in order to 
indicate that I give this objection a sort of priority.  This objection cuts to the heart of 
what it is that our theory of justification is supposed to achieve. 
 This objection begins by noting that way back in section 1.1, I stressed the 
importance of a theory of justification being useful to actual believers trying to decide 
what to believe.  However, it is not at all clear that the account I have given is useful to 
actual believers.  Following the reflective equilibrium procedure would require being able 
to have all your moral beliefs, as well as the inferential and evidential connections 




I mean it would require you to be cognizant of all of your moral beliefs at the same time.  
However, no human being has the working memory that would be required for such a 
project.  Furthermore, even if one did, my account requires a moral believer to maximize 
coherence.  However, I myself have not been able to state fully what is involved in 
coherence.  What chance do non-philosophers have?  Finally, even if we could figure out 
exactly what coherence was, there is some dispute about whether or not the project of 
determining the coherence of a complex set of beliefs is computationally tractable.37  
Given all of this, how can a theory like mine be useful to actual human moral believers? 
 In some sense, this is a variation on an old complaint.  No one could actually 
achieve reflective equilibrium.  As Rawls puts is, “Reflective Equilibrium… is a point at 
infinity we can never reach, though we may get closer to it in the sense that through 
discussion, our ideals, principles and judgments seem more reasonable to us and we 
regard them as better founded than they were before.”38   
 The fact that none of us can ever achieve reflective equilibrium shows us that 
none of us will ever be fully justified in all of our moral beliefs.  This is, I grant, an 
unhappy state of affairs.  It would be better if there were some sure fire way to arrive at 
fully justified moral beliefs.  However, a theory of justification that had this consequence 
would not do justice to the phenomenology of moral reflection.  All of us who have 
engaged in serious moral reflection can agree about at least one thing; it is difficult.  A 
theory that held that there were some easy to follow decision procedure for arriving at 
                                                
37 Paul Thagard and Karsten Verbeurgt argue in “Coherence as Constraint Satisfaction,” 
Cognitive Science  22 (1998): 1-24, that coherence itself in not computationally tractable 
but that there are algorithms which are computationally tractable that approximate 
coherence.  I think that his claim dovetails nicely with what I say below. 
 




justified moral beliefs would not do justice to the difficulty of moral reflection.  I 
concede, then, that this implication of our theory of justification is unhappy but it is, 
unfortunately, accurate. 
 As Rawls indicates above, the fact that we can never attain reflective equilibrium 
does not show us that the method of reflective equilibrium is worthless.  While we cannot 
attain reflective equilibrium, we can follow procedures that get us closer.  Let me suggest 
one such procedure.  During the course of an agent’s life, she seeks out opportunities for 
moral reflection.  When she reads a novel or hears a story on the news, she thinks 
carefully about what she takes to be the moral implications of the events described.  If 
she is like me, she will fairly often discover inconsistencies in her moral beliefs.  When 
she does, she thinks carefully about the implications of her inconsistent beliefs.  In 
particular she pays close attention to the connections between her inconsistent beliefs and 
her other beliefs (obviously, she will not be able to discover all of these connections).  
She then revises the belief that seems to her, after careful reflection, to be closer the 
periphery of her web of belief.    
 Given the cognitive limitations of human beings, this procedure will not lead one 
to reflective equilibrium.  However, I contend that following this procedure throughout 
one’s life will get one closer to reflective equilibrium.  While reflective equilibrium is not 
something that can be attained, it is something that we can strive for.  In providing a 
target to strive for, our theory of justification becomes useful to actual human moral 





Chapter 5:  In Defense of Reflective Equilibrium: A Response to 
Some Objections 
 
5.1 Reflective Equilibrium and Its Critics 
 In the nearly forty years since the publication of A Theory of Justice, the method 
of reflective equilibrium has been subject to a wide range of objections.  In my view, 
many of these objections are interesting and require the defender of the method to make 
explicit some important background assumptions and features of the procedure.  
However, I believe that all of these objections can be answered without modifying the 
method of reflective equilibrium. 
 A slight complication emerges because the version of the method that I defend is 
somewhat different from the version that others defend.  The objections that I consider in 
this chapter were all formulated to rebut the version of the method that Rawls and 
Daniels have defended.  Nonetheless, I take it that all of these objections turn on features 
of Rawlsian reflective equilibrium that are shared by my own version.   Therefore, it is 
important part of this project to answer these objections.   
5.2 Reflective Equilibrium and Moral Conservatism 
Objection:  The method of reflective equilibrium is unduly conservative in the sense that 
it merely serves to reaffirm the status quo.  This is because it asks agents to test principles 
against their intuitions but merely doing this is unlikely to result in any major revisions to 
our current set of moral beliefs.1 
                                                
1 This objection is raised by Hare in “Rawls Theory of Justice;” Singer in Sidgwick and 




Reply: This objection ignores the fact, emphasized in the last chapter, that the joint 
pressures of systematization and accommodating background theories can produce 
extremely radical changes in one’s set of moral beliefs.  Indeed it is consistent with the 
method of reflective equilibrium that an agent may have to revise every single one of her 
intuitive moral beliefs.  Because the method allows for such radical revision, it is not 
committed to any kind of conservatism and it has the resources to allow for extreme 
changes to status quo morality. 
 This argument shows that the structure of the method allows for radical revision.  
Critics, however, may not be convinced until they see how, in practice, the method of 
reflective equilibrium allows for, or even requires, one to modify a deeply held moral 
belief.  I recognize the force of this challenge and attempt to meet it in the next chapter. 
5.3 Reflective Equilibrium and Moral Relativism 
Objection: It seems that two agents who accepted very different sets of considered moral 
judgments may end up with very different beliefs in reflective equilibrium.   This fact 
shows that the method of reflective equilibrium is objectionably relativist or subjectivist.  
It has the implication that one set of moral beliefs may be true for one person but not 
another.2 
 
                                                
2 This objection has been raised in Hare, “Rawls’ Theory of Justice,” p. 82; Singer, 
“Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium,” pp. 30-31; and Wood, Kantian Ethics, p. 51.  
Singer uses the word ‘valid’ rather than ‘true,’ ‘however, ‘true’ seems to me to be the 
better word here since philosophers primarily use ‘valid’ to refer to inferences, not 
propositions (it sounds odd to say ‘abortion is wrong is invalid.’)  ‘True’ may seem to 
have its own set of problems because some non-cogntivists have denied that moral 
statements can be true.  However, most contemporary non-cogntivists have no problem 




Reply: It is worth noting that the question of how much moral disagreement there would 
be if everyone had completed the method of reflective equilibrium is an open one.  Brink 
puts the point as follows: 
Because the dialectical process of the coherence theory can produce fundamental 
changes in the beliefs with which people begin the process, the fact that people 
begin the process with significant differences is no evidence that their 
disagreement would persist to the end of the dialectical process.  Because the 
dialectical process is one we can at best approximate, even the existence of 
reflective moral disagreement fails to show that moral disagreement is in principle 
inevitable… For as we have seen, the moral beliefs with which people might 
emerge from the dialectical process need not overlap at all with the beliefs with 
which they started the process.  This makes it possible, at least in principle, for 
those who enter the process with completely different moral beliefs to emerge 
with the same beliefs.3 
 
This point is worth emphasizing since many critics of the method of reflective 
equilibrium speak as if the output of the method is merely a function of the considered 
moral judgments that one begins with.4  Brink responds to these critics by noting, as we 
did in the last section, that the method may produce radical changes in one’s moral 
beliefs.  Thus, the fact that persons currently disagree about the truth of moral 
propositions does not show that they will continue to disagree after the process is 
complete.  Of course, there is no guarantee that there will be substantial agreement at the 
end of the process either. 
Let us assume that there will remain substantial disagreement at the end of the 
process.  Does this mean that the method has relativist or subjectivist implications?  One 
                                                
3 Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, pp. 142-143. 
 
4 See for example Jonathan Weinberg, Shaun Nichols, and Stephen Stitch, “Normativity 
and Epistemic Intuitions,” Philosophical Topics 29 (2001): 429-460.  I do not discuss 
their paper here since their target is the use of the method of reflective equilibrium to 
generate epistemic norms rather than moral norms.  However, the objection they discuss 
in this paper is a species of the objection being discussed here.  For this reason, I believe 




must keep in mind that relativism and subjectivism are theories of what make moral 
claims true.  For example, cultural relativism holds that the truth of a moral claim is 
dependent on the practices, beliefs, or traditions of one’s culture.  Subjectivism, in one 
form, holds that the truth of a moral claim is dependent on the mental states of the person 
making the claim. 
The method of reflective equilibrium is not an account of what makes a moral 
claim true, it is an account of what makes a moral belief epistemically justified.  Thus, it 
is not committed to any particular theory of moral truth and a fortiori, it is not committed 
to relativism or subjectivism.   
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the method of reflective equilibrium does have 
the implication that a moral belief can be epistemically justified for one person but not 
another.  This implication, however, is not problematic.  As we noted when discussing 
the concept of justification in section 1.1, whether or not one is justified in having a belief 
is surely dependent on what evidence is available to her.  This means we must be 
prepared to accept that if you and I have very different evidence I may be justified in 
believing something that you are not and vice-versa.   
Perhaps this confusion has arisen because some of reflective equilibrium’s critics 
think that justification implies truth.  It does not.  If it did, then the traditional analysis of 
knowledge as justified true belief would be redundant.  We can be, and often are, justified 
in believing false things.  Testimony provides a useful example.  Most of us who are not 
skeptics believe that if I tell you P, you have every reason to believe that I have 
knowledge of P, and you have no reason to suspect that I am lying about P, then you are 




is infallible.  For a concrete example, suppose you believe that I wore a green t-shirt 
yesterday on the basis of my testimony.   Suppose further that I have a good memory, am 
quite honest, and have no reason to lie.  It seems that if you are ever justified in believing 
something on the basis of testimony, then you are justified in this case.  However, I might 
be misremembering.  If I am, then you have formed a justified false belief.   
5.4 Reflective Equilibrium and Moral Truth 
Objection: I can see that the method of reflective equilibrium has some virtues.  It 
obviously leads one to a coherent set of beliefs, and there is a sense of ‘rationality’ in 
which reflective equilibrium leads one to beliefs that are rational to hold.  However, the 
primary aim of belief is not coherence or rationality, it is truth.  Indeed we are concerned 
about the coherence or rationality of our beliefs only insofar as coherence and rationality 
lead to truth.  One thing that has not been shown is that following the method of 
reflective equilibrium will lead one to moral truth.5 
 
Reply: This is of course, a variation on a familiar objection to coherentist theories of non-
moral justification.  Since belief aims at truth, a theory of what we ought to believe 
should tell us how to increase the probability that our beliefs are true, but it is far from 
clear that coherentist theories do this.   
 One might raise this objection because they have a particular theory of moral truth 
in hand.  For such a critic the objection amounts to “A moral belief is true if and only if it 
meets a set of conditions C.  Why think that the method of reflective equilibrium tends to 
lead one to beliefs that meet conditions C?”  If this is all that the objection amounts to, it 
                                                




can be answered using a familiar pattern of argument.  Either the theory of moral truth 
coheres well with the other things we believe or it does not.  If it does not, then it is not 
clear why should we believe the theory of moral truth in the first place. If the theory of 
moral truth does cohere well with the other things we believe, then the theory of moral 
truth itself can play a role in the method of reflective equilibrium.  It will be a 
background theory.  If the background theory is sufficiently well-grounded, we will have 
to revise our other moral beliefs to cohere with the theory of moral truth and we will end 
up with a set of moral judgments that is not just coherent but coherent with a plausible 
theory of moral truth.6   
 One may raise this objection without any particular theory of moral truth in mind.  
In this case, I am less sure how to answer the objection.  However, it is not the fact that I 
am a coherentist that makes the objection in this form hard to answer.  I cannot see how a 
foundationalist could hope to show that their theory gets one closer to moral truth without 
invoking a particular theory of moral truth. 
 Allow me to make a controversial supposition.  The nature of moral truth is not 
immediately graspable in the way that the truth of propositions such as ‘7 + 5 =12’ are.  
How then, could we hope to find out what moral truth is like?  My guess is that we will 
                                                
6 To see how a moral realist might expand upon this claim, the reader should refer to 
Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, pp. 125-133.  There, Brink argues 
that second-order realist beliefs ( e.g. “beliefs about our psychological makeup, our 
cognitive and perceptual equipment and their hookup to the world,” p. 127) are among 
the beliefs that one seeks to bring into coherence.  This solution parallels Laurence 
BonJour’s defense of a coherentist epistemology and a realist metaphysics in The 
Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Ch. 8.  Both BonJour and Brink go further and 
suggest that second-order beliefs are necessary for a set of beliefs to justified.  I have 
doubts about this further suggestion because it seems to imply that ordinary people who 
have no particular view about the metaphysics of moral (or non-moral in Bonjour’s case) 




have to think carefully about our substantive moral judgments as well as various 
background theories that we hold in metaphysics, the philosophy of language, and 
perhaps other areas of philosophy and even the sciences.  We will then have to begin with 
the theory of moral truth that best fits with these judgments and background theories.  Of 
course, we may eventually have to modify some of the judgments and background 
theories to accommodate our account of moral truth and we may have to modify our 
initial account of moral truth to fit further judgments and background theories.  We will 
have to work back and forth until everything fits together in a coherent way.  Of course, 
this procedure looks a lot like the method of reflective equilibrium.  If my supposition is 
right, then the search for the nature of moral truth is not divorced from the general search 
for reflective equilibrium. 
 One may doubt that the only way to reach an account of moral truth is to start 
with our substantive moral judgments and background theories.  But such a critic would 
have to offer an alternative.  Short of the implausible claim that the nature of moral truth 
is revealed by a sort of Cartesian light of reason, I do not know how else to arrive at a 
theory of moral truth. 
5.5 Reflective Equilibrium and Moral Skepticism 
Objection:  The theory of justification defended here begs the question against moral 
skepticism, the view that no moral belief is justified.  The theory defended here claims 
that a moral belief is justified if and only if it would be the output of the method of 




of the method are justified.  This is an assertion of what moral skepticism denies, namely 
that some moral beliefs are justified, and is thus question begging.7 
Reply:   Since this objection rests on a confusion, it is necessary to sort matters out before 
responding directly to the objection.  In pressing this objection, David Copp writes, 
“skepticism itself should be counted as a theory of moral justification.”8  There is a sense 
in which this is misleading. 
 A theory of justification will typically present us with a condition or set of 
conditions that a belief must meet in order to be justified.  Such a set of conditions will 
have an output, a list of which, if any, beliefs meet these conditions and are thus, 
according to the theory, justified.  We must be clear to distinguish between a theory and 
its output.   
 Moral skepticism, by itself, is a view about the output, about which beliefs are 
(not) justified, not a view about the conditions under which a belief is justified.  This can 
be seen from the standard way in which skeptics argue. 
1) In order for beliefs in domain D to be justified, these beliefs must meet condition 
N 
2) Beliefs in domain D do not meet condition N 
3) Therefore, beliefs in domain D are unjustified. 9 
                                                
7 Copp, “Considered Moral Judgments and Justification: Conservatism in Moral Theory.” 
8 Ibid, p. 142. 
 
9 Many familiar skeptical arguments fit into this schema.  Consider Barry Stroud’s well 
known reconstruction of the Cartesian argument for skepticism (The Significance of 
Philosophical Scepticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), Ch. 1.   While Stroud 
originally puts the argument in terms of knowledge, I put it in terms of justified belief but 




It is important to see that skepticism is the conclusion of this argument, not a premise in 
the argument.  Thus, moral skepticism is the view that moral beliefs are unjustified, 
external world skepticism is the view that beliefs about the external world are unjustified, 
skepticism about other minds is the view that beliefs about other minds are unjustified, 
etc.  In principle, two moral skeptics could agree that no moral beliefs are justified but 
disagree about which conditions a moral belief would have to meet in order to be 
justified. 
 This is why it is misleading to say that skepticism is theory of justification.  
Foundationalism is a theory of justification in that it lists a set of conditions that a belief 
must meet in order to be justified.  It is a further question whether there are any moral 
beliefs that meet those conditions.  Skepticism is a view about which beliefs are justified, 
not a view about the conditions under which a belief is justified.  Thus, foundationalism 
need not beg the question against the skeptic. 
                                                                                                                                            
1) In order for a belief B to be justified we must know the falsity of all the things 
that we know to be incompatible with the truth of B 
2) For any belief about the external world we do not know the falsity of all the things 
we know to be incompatible with the truth of our beliefs about the external world  
(This is because we do not know that we are not dreaming, deceived by an evil 
demon, etc.) 
3) Therefore, our beliefs about the external world are not justified 
Peter Unger’s argument from certainty (Ignorance: A Case for Skepticism (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1975), Ch. 3) can also be understood this way.  For a belief to 
be justified it must be certain.  Beliefs about the external world are not certain.  
Therefore, they are not justified.  Joyce’s argument for moral skepticism can also fit into 
this schema.  If we have evolved to form some beliefs regardless of whether they are true, 
then those beliefs are not justified.  We have evolved to form moral beliefs regardless of 
whether they are true.  Therefore, moral beliefs are not justified (Joyce, The Myth of 




 Similarly, the theory of justification defended here is a theory of justification in 
that it gives a condition that a moral belief must meet in order to be justified: it must 
survive the reflective equilibrium process.  It is a further question whether or not any 
moral beliefs survive this process.  It is a possibility that, in working through the 
reflective equilibrium process, the agent will discover that, perhaps given certain 
background theories, it is best to reject all of her moral beliefs.10  Indeed, Joyce has taken 
exactly this position.  He writes: 
Pursuing a strategy of “wide reflective equilibrium” may lead to a wholesale 
exclusion of moral discourse just as smoothly as it may lead to a vindication.  I 
have argued that once we see clearly the quasi-mystical commitments embodied 
by moral discourse, elimination is the more probable result.11 
 
Joyce is correct that wide reflective equilibrium “may lead to a wholesale exclusion of 
moral discourse.”  To be clear, I strongly disagree with Joyce that all of moral discourse 
embodies “quasi-mystical commitments” and I think that vindication of at least some 
more beliefs is much more likely than wholesale elimination.  However, these disputes 
are best left for another occasion.  Here, I am content to point out that, pace Copp, the 
dispute between Joyce and I takes place within the method of reflective equilibrium.  
Because reflective equilibrium is a theory about the conditions under which a belief is 
justified and not a list of beliefs that are justified, it does not beg the question against 
skepticism. 
                                                
10 This point is also made by T.M. Scanlon in “Rawls on Justification,” in Samuel 
Freeman (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), pp. 139-167. 
 




5.6 Reflective Equilibrium and Deductive Moral Arguments 
Objection:  There is a tradition in moral philosophy, call it deductivism, that attempts to 
justify moral theories and particular moral judgments by deductive argument.  Why 
should we prefer the method of reflective equilibrium to deductivism? 
 
Reply: Examples of what I am calling deductivism can be found in the work of Brandt, 
who attempts to derive a version of rule-utilitarianism from a theory of rationality12 and 
R.M. Hare, who attempts to derive a utilitarian moral theory from a semantic analysis of 
moral terms conjoined with facts about human nature.13  It is, I think, no coincidence that 
Hare and Brandt are two of the method of reflective equilibrium’s most vocal critics.  For 
they see the method as in competition with the deductivist view they favor. 
 Though these authors seem to find deductivism inconsistent with the method of 
reflective equilibrium, there is actually no inconsistency.  These thinkers both take it that 
there are strong reasons to favor their theories of practical rationality and/or the semantics 
of moral discourse.  If there are such strong reasons, then the method of reflective 
equilibrium can accommodate such theories as background theories.  If these theories 
deductively entail a set of moral judgments, there will be strong reason to accept these 
moral judgments, even if they conflict with other things that the agent believes.   
 Thus, my response to the deductivist objection is simply that the deductivist 
method is not inconsistent with the method discussed here.  Though deductivists often 
                                                
12 Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right 
 
13 See Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952); Freedom 
and Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), and Moral Thinking: Its Levels, 




believe they must reject the method of reflective equilibrium to preserve their 
deductivism, they need not. 
5.7 The Charge of Vacuity 
 I have argued that the method of reflective equilibrium is quite a bit more flexible 
than its critics take it to be.  For instance, it is compatible with the view that there are 
irresolvable moral dilemmas, moral questions about which there is no right answer, and 
deductive arguments for moral propositions.  This naturally gives rise to a quite different 
charge that the method is vacuous.  For instance, Singer writes, 
The price for avoiding the inbuilt conservatism of the narrow interpretation [of the 
method of reflective equilibrium], however, is that reflective equilibrium ceases to 
be a distinctive method of doing normative ethics. Where previously there was a 
contrast between the method of reflective equilibrium and ‘‘foundationalist’’ 
attempts to build an ethical system outward from some indubitable starting point, 
now foundationalism simply becomes the limiting case of a wide reflective 
equilibrium.14 
 
 In this passage, Singer is unfair even to the foundationalist position that he is 
sympathetic with.  For, as we saw in Chapter 1, the foundationalist need not, and should 
not, claim her starting points are “indubitable” but only that they are prima facie justified 
independently of their evidential and inferential relationships to other propositions. 
 Even if we accept this more modest account of foundationalism, there are two 
crucial contrasts with the coherentist position discussed here.  First, the coherentist denies 
that any belief is prima facie justified independently of its inferential and evidential 
relations to other propositions.  Thus, even allegedly foundational propositions require 
inferential or evidential support from other beliefs in order to be justified.   
 A second contrast is that for a foundationalist, foundational beliefs are required 
                                                




for non-foundational beliefs to be justified, whereas a coherentist can deny this.  This is a 
contrast where, I believe, coherentism emerges as the clearly superior position.  Suppose 
we adopt Sidgwick’s foundationalism according to which certain consequentalist 
propositions are foundational.  According to moral foundationalism, non-foundational 
moral beliefs are only justified if they have some evidential or inferential relationship to 
foundational moral beliefs.  In other words, non-foundational beliefs can only be justified 
on the basis of foundational beliefs.  Suppose, plausibly, that an agent can only be 
justified in believing p on the basis of q, if the agent also believes q.15  Propositions that 
an agent does not believe, or that she actively disbelieves cannot render her justified in 
believing other propositions.  It follows that for an agent to be justified in believing any 
moral proposition, the agent would have to believe Sidgwick’s consequentialist axioms.  
In other words, deontologists could not be justified in believing that torturing babies 
solely for amusement is morally wrong.  This result strikes me as quite absurd even if we 
were to accept Sidgwick’s utilitarianism. 
 Non-utilitarian foundationalists are likely to reply that this is due to the inherent 
implausibility of Sidgwick’s foundational propositions but the same problem can be 
raised for a Rossian deontology.  Suppose that it is foundational that we have certain 
prima facie duties and that any non-foundational moral belief is justified by bearing an 
inferential or evidential relationship to these foundational beliefs.  Suppose further, that 
beliefs that the agent does not hold or actively rejects cannot render an agent justified in 
holding further beliefs.  As we saw in chapter 1, many utilitarians are committed to 
                                                
15 This is the first clause of what Richard Fumerton calls “the principle of inferential 
justification” (Metaepistemology and Skepticism (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 




denying that we have Rossian prima facie duties.  Thus, it follows that such utilitarians 
have no justified moral beliefs.  But again, this strikes me as absurd. 
 In any case, the main point of this section is not to object to foundationalism yet 
again but to re-emphasize the contrasts between the coherentist position advocated here 
and foundationalist positions.  Even in the very wide method of reflective equilibrium 





Chapter 6:  Aid to the Worst Off:  A Case Study 
 
6.1 Reflective Equilibrium, Moral Conservatism, and Deeply Held Moral Intuitions, 
Again 
 In the last two chapters, I have argued against two related objections to the 
method of reflective equilibrium.  (1) Critics have charged that the method does not have 
the resources to require, or even allow for, the revision of strongly held intuitive 
judgments and (2) it has been argued that the method is unduly conservative, in the sense 
that it would merely reinforce the moral status quo.  In previous chapters, we have seen 
that there are reasons to doubt both of these claims but these reasons were based on 
abstract arguments from the structure of reflective equilibrium.  A critic may, perhaps not 
unreasonably, retain her doubts in the face of these abstract arguments until she sees that, 
in practice, the method may require revisions to deeply held moral intuitions and/or status 
quo morality. 
 In order to meet this challenge, I turn now to Peter Singer’s well-known paper, 
“Famine, Affluence, and Morality.”1  The conclusion of Singer’s paper is starkly at odds 
with our moral intuitions and the moral status quo.  Singer is not exaggerating when he 
claims that, if his argument is correct, “the whole way we look at moral issues – our 
moral conceptual scheme – needs to be altered, and with it, the way of life that has come 
to be taken for granted in our society (p. 146).”  In this chapter, I argue that an 
application of the method of reflective equilibrium modeled on Singer’s original 
argument yields Singer’s conclusion.  Given how radical Singer’s conclusion is, this 
                                                
1 Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1972): 229-43.  Reprinted in Unsanctifying Human 
Life ed. by Helga Kuhse (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), pp. 145-56.  Page references refer to 




result would no doubt be very surprising if we thought the method of reflective 
equilibrium merely served to reinforce the status quo. 
 Before we begin, a few qualifications about the scope of the argument are 
necessary.  My primary aim is neither to directly argue that Singer’s conclusion is correct 
nor even to argue that the method of reflective equilibrium compels one to accept 
Singer’s conclusion.  Instead, the main aim of this chapter is to show something about the 
structure of the method of reflective equilibrium, namely, that the method can require 
agents to revise deeply held intuitive judgments.  One might retain her doubts about 
Singer’s conclusion while being convinced of the main point about the structure of the 
method of reflective equilibrium.   
 Secondly, while I will be drawing from Singer’s text frequently, my aim here is 
not quite Singer interpretation.  That is, my aim is not to argue that Singer himself uses 
the method, though I believe his argument does resemble an application of the method in 
certain ways.  Instead, I will construct a new argument that is modeled on Singer’s 
original argument but is framed explicitly as an application of the method of reflective 
equilibrium. 
6.2 Starting Points 
One of the things that I emphasized in chapter 3 is that the method of reflective 
equilibrium begins with an agent’s considered moral judgments as they are are at the 
outset of inquiry.  For this reason, it will be worthwhile to characterize the considered 
moral judgments that we start with before we encounter Singer’s argument.  Of course, I 
cannot guarantee that all readers have (or had) these considered moral judgments before 




and family members about their intuitions on these issues, and an overwhelming majority 
share the intuitions described below. 
 Consider the following case. 
Pond: Albert is walking by a shallow pond where a young child is drowning.  
Albert can save the child easily but, if he does, his fifty-dollar pair of shoes will 
be ruined.  Albert decides not to go in and the child drowns.2 
Almost everyone that I have put this case to insists that Albert’s action is impermissible.  
Indeed, in his recent book, Singer notes that an event that was very similar to this 
fictional case actually occurred in Manchester.3  Two police community service officers 
(PCSOs) did not enter the water as a ten-year-old boy, Jordon Lyon, drowned in a pond. 
The officer’s inaction was defended on the grounds that PCSOs, unlike regular police 
officers, are neither trained nor required by job description to rescue drowning victims.  
Even if attempting to save Lyon was not a duty the PCSOs had as a result of their 
occupation, those who were interviewed by the BBC seemed to think that the officers had 
a moral duty to go in anyway.  For instance, Lyon’s mother told the BBC, “I don’t know 
why they didn’t go in… if you’re walking down the street and you see a child drowning 
you automatically go in that water.”4   
 In presenting the case, I sometimes add the detail that Albert is generally a Good 
Samaritan and has, in the past, donated money to relief organizations and even saved 
                                                
2 This is, of course, a variation of Singer’s famous pond case (p. 147). 
 
3 Peter Singer, The Life You Can Save (New York: Random House, 2009), p. 4.  The 
BBC’s report of the event can be found at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/manchester/7006412.stm. 
 




other children in similar situations.  I have yet to find anyone whose evaluation of 
Albert’s action is changed by this variation.  I will refer to this modified pond case as the 
Good Samaritan pond case. 
 Now consider another case 
Donation: Brad could donate money to a relief organization that would use the 
money to save an African child dying of a preventable disease.  If Brad does not 
do so, the relief organization will be able to treat one less child.  Instead of 
donating money, Brad decides to buy a $50 pair of shoes.  He does not need these 
shoes for his livelihood.  He purchases them solely because they appeal to his 
sense of fashion. 
Few people claim that what Brad did was wrong.  Sometimes, rather than giving a case, I 
ask people for their general intuitions on donating to relief organizations.  Most take the 
position that, while doing so is praiseworthy, no one is required to make a donation.  This 
view is indeed widespread, as Singer notes. 
The bodies which collect money are known as “charities.”  These organizations 
see themselves in this way – if you send a check, you will be thanked for your 
“generosity.”  Because giving money is regarded as an act of charity, it is not 
thought that there is anything wrong with not giving.  The charitable man may be 
praised but the man who is not charitable is not condemned.  People do not feel in 
any way ashamed or guilty about spending money on new clothes or a new car 
instead of giving to famine relief (pp. 149-150). 
A sizable minority of those whom I ask insists that we do have some obligation to donate 




appropriate, it is clear the amount that these persons have in mind is very small.  Few will 
say that one is required to donate even one percent of their income, much less five or ten 
percent. 
 I will refer to our considered moral judgment about the donation case and our 
general considered moral judgments about donating to aid organizations collectively as 
our ‘considered moral judgments about aid.’  I will only distinguish between them when 
it matters for the argument. 
6.3 Singer’s Argument as an Application of the Method of Reflective Equilibrium 
 After we have characterized our initial considered moral judgments, the next step 
is to find a principle that accommodates them.  Singer proposes two principles both of 
which entail our judgment in the pond case. 
Singer’s Strong Principle: “If it is in our power to prevent something bad from 
happening without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, 
we ought, morally, to do it (p. 147).” 
Singer’s Moderate Principle: “If it is in our power to prevent something very bad 
from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything morally significant, we 
ought, morally, to do it (p. 147).” 
Singer prefers the strong principle but, in what follows, I will use the moderate principle 
unless I specify otherwise.  This is because the moderate principle is less controversial 
and is still enough for Singer’s argument.   
 Singer’s principles clearly entail our considered moral judgment about the pond 
case.  Albert may protest that his shoes are very nice, but we take it that they are not 




 While these principles, therefore, have some intuitive plausibility, both of 
Singer’s principles conflict with our intuitions about aid given three plausible 
assumptions. 
1) “Suffering and death form lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad (p. 
146).” 
2) Much of what we do with our money does not bring about anything morally 
significant 
3) Our money could be used to prevent suffering and death from lack of food, 
shelter, and medical care. 
I will follow Singer in saying little about 1).  Virtually every moral theory is committed 
to 1) as is ordinary moral thought.  2) is difficult to deny as well.  While we do spend 
money on necessities that have moral significance, it is implausible to think that most of 
the things we spend our money on (e.g. expensive food that brings little health benefit, a 
higher rent or mortgage to live in a nicer building in a nicer part of town, clothes for 
fashion rather than warmth, etc.) are morally significant.  Of course, 2) leaves it open 
where this line should be drawn.  This is the most precise we can be without getting into 
some difficult debates in moral theory. However, on any plausible way of drawing the 
distinction between the morally significant and insignificant, much of what we bring 
about with our money will fall on the insignificant side. 
 3) is widely accepted though perhaps not entirely uncontroversial.  There are, of 
course, better and worse ways that aid organizations can use our donations and some 
well-meaning organizations have used donations inefficiently and some continue to do 




than good.  For example, giving food directly to the poor often has the effect of driving 
down food prices in local markets and putting farmers out of business in regions where 
farming is one of the few ways in which persons can earn an income.  For this reason, 
major aid organizations rarely give food directly to non-disabled persons except in 
emergency situations (e.g. natural disasters where the local food market has collapsed).  
Nonetheless, there is much that can be done with our money that would directly save 
lives.  Many persons in Africa are dying of easily treatable diseases, some of which have 
been eradicated in the West.  With contributions from private individuals, aid 
organizations are able to provide treatment.  Recently, aid organizations have had much 
success preventing starvation by giving locals the resources needed to start their own 
business and provide for themselves.5 
 We can now see how this argument, modeled on Singer’s own, has the structure 
of an application of the method of reflective equilibrium.  We propose a principle to 
capture a considered moral judgment.  Given some plausible assumptions, this principle 
conflicts with another set of considered moral judgments.  In cases of conflict, the 
method tells us that we need to make revisions. Singer would urge us to abandon our 
considered moral judgments about aid in order to preserve a principle and our judgment 
about the pond case. 
 This is, I think, sufficient to establish that an application of the method of 
reflective equilibrium can imply that we should abandon a deeply held considered moral 
                                                
5 For a philosophically motivated review of the empirical issues, see Garett Cullity, The 
Moral Demands of Affluence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), Ch. 3 as well as 




judgment.  Even those not convinced that they should abandon their judgment can accept 
the point about the structure of the method. 
 Nonetheless, if Singer’s conclusion is easily overturned one may retain their 
doubts that, in practice, the method can allow for substantial revision to our considered 
moral judgments or status quo morality.  Thus, in what follows I will examine the most 
common responses to Singer’s argument.  Some of these responses, I will argue, fail on 
their own terms.  Others may raise difficulties for the details of Singer’s position but they 
do little or nothing to preserve our considered moral judgments as I characterized them 
above. 
6.4 Kant on Imperfect Duties 
 An obvious response to what has been said so far is that we were too quick to 
accept Singer’s principle.  While Singer’s principle does capture our judgment about the 
pond case, perhaps another principle can capture this judgment without sacrificing our 
considered moral judgments about aid.   
While Singer’s principles do not imply act-consequentialism, since neither 
principle requires us to maximize the good (though the strong principle requires us to 
minimize the bad), they do have a sort of consequentialist flavor to them.  Perhaps the 
place to look for alternatives is in non-consequentialist theories. 
 Many familiar non-consequentialist restrictions on maximizing the good simply 
fail to apply here.  Since both the pond case and the donation case involve allowing death 
rather than causing death, a moral distinction between doing and allowing will be of no 




such well-known non-consequentialist restrictions are of no help, the next obvious place 
to look is the moral theory of Kant. 
 Unfortunately, the relevant passages from Kant are obscure and their proper 
interpretation is controversial.6  However, this need not detain us because all that matters 
for our purposes is whether or not we can glean a plausible account from Kant’s texts.  
We can accept such an account for our philosophical purposes even if a careful reading of 
the text shows that Kant thought otherwise. 
 In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant makes a distinction between perfect and 
imperfect duties.  Perfect duties require an agent to or forbid an agent from performing 
actions that have certain properties.  If I have a perfect duty to refrain from committing 
suicide, then I must never perform an action that has the property of being an instance of 
committing suicide.  In contrast, imperfect duties require an agent to adopt certain ends 
rather than prescribing certain actions.7  A non-moral analogy may be helpful here.  
Suppose that I have adopted the end of becoming a successful professional philosopher.  
In order to fulfill this end, I must become familiar with the literature in my area, write 
philosophy papers, etc.  However, suppose that on a particular occasion, when I could 
work toward becoming a professional philosopher, I decide to instead go have a drink 
with friends.  This need not mean I have abandoned my end of becoming a professional 
                                                
6 For three incompatible interpretations of the relevant passages see: Thomas Hill, 
Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant’s Moral Theory (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1992), Ch. 8; Marcia Baron, Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1995); David Cummiskey, Kantian Consequentialism (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 1996), Ch. 6.  My interpretation largely follows Hill’s unless 
otherwise noted. 
 
7 Kant says that imperfect duties “prescribe only maxims of actions rather than actions 




philosopher.  So long as I regularly work towards my goal, it is compatible with my 
having this end that I sometimes forego opportunities to advance my end.  Imperfect 
duties are duties to adopt an end but they leave it up to us how that end is to be promoted.  
For this reason, Kant says that an imperfect duty, “leaves a playroom (latitudo) for free 
choice in following (complying with) the law, that is, the law cannot specify precisely in 
what way one is to act and how much one is to do by the action.”8 
 Kant regards the duty of beneficence as an imperfect duty to adopt “the maxim of 
making other’s happiness one’s end.”9  If beneficence is regarded as an imperfect duty 
we must perform actions that promote the happiness of others.  However, this is 
compatible with my deciding, on particular occasions, to forego performing such actions 
even when I could.  This understanding of the duty of beneficence seems better able to 
accommodate our considered moral judgments about aid than Singer’s principles. 
 It is sometimes objected that this understanding of beneficence as an imperfect 
duty simply abandons our considered moral judgment about the Good Samaritan pond 
case.10  For if I regularly perform actions that promote the happiness of others, and 
beneficence is an imperfect duty, why can I not simply decide while walking past the 
pond that, on this occasion, I will forego saving the child? 
This objection does not make use of the most plausible reading of what 
constitutes an imperfect duty.  Consider the non-moral analogy again.  While I may, 
consistently with my end of one day becoming a professional philosopher, forego 
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9 Ibid, p. 452. 
 
10 Brad Hooker raises this objection in Ideal Code, Real World (Oxford: Oxford 




opportunities to promote this end, it does not follow that I am never rationally required to 
perform or refrain from specific actions.  For instance, one might think that having drinks 
with friends rather than attending one’s dissertation defense is inconsistent with having 
the end of becoming a professional philosopher. Similarly, while one who has adopted 
the end of promoting the happiness of others has some latitude in deciding how to do this, 
one who simply walked past a shallow pond where a child was drowning cannot seriously 
claim to have the end of promoting the happiness of others.  Just as having the end of 
becoming a professional philosopher may require certain actions in certain 
circumstances, so does the end of promoting the happiness of others. 
 This response is plausible but it only gives rise to a further problem.  We now 
have to explain why saving the drowning child in the pond case is required but sending in 
fifty dollars is not required in the donation case.  What is it that makes these cases 
different? 
 The fact that this question comes up again shows that we are not far from where 
we started.  What is interesting is that the Singer problem, the problem of accounting for 
our considered moral judgments about aid and our judgment about the pond case, comes 
up again within a Kantian deontology.  Though Singer himself is a consequentialist, it is 
not only consequentialists that must grapple with this problem. 11 
 Nonetheless, we might think that we can make more progress on this problem 
within a Kantian framework.  Consider the following passage from Kant. 
                                                
11 As we’ll see below, the problem comes up within both a Kantian and Rossian 
deontology.  Though I will not discuss it here, Scanlonian contractualism faces the same 
issue.  See Elizabeth Ashford, “The Demandingness of Scanlon’s Contractualism,” Ethics 





A wide duty is not to be taken as permission to make exceptions to the maxim of 
actions but only as permission to limit one’s maxim of duty by another.12 
This passage can be read as implying that one may forego promoting the happiness of 
others only if one is performing an action that satisfies another moral requirement.13  This 
would render Kant’s understanding of the duty of beneficence roughly equivalent to that 
of Ross.14  On Ross’s view we have a prima facie duty of beneficence.  Recall from 
Chapter 1 that prima facie duties are duties that become all things considered duties 
unless they conflict with another duty.  On Ross’s view we have an all things considered 
duty to improve the condition of others unless doing so conflicts with another duty. 
 This Ross-Kant-inspired view certainly captures our judgment in the pond case.  
Albert is required to wade into the pond so long as he can do so without foregoing an 
opportunity to comply with another duty.  However, this view is not consistent with our 
considered moral judgments about aid.  Indeed, if foregoing an opportunity to fulfill 
another duty is an instance of “sacrificing something morally significant,” then this view 
is consistent with Singer’s moderate principle.   
 Earlier we saw that, in order to account for our judgment in the Good Samaritan 
pond case, we must concede that there are times when beneficence requires certain 
actions of us.  However, once we make this concession, it becomes difficult to explain 
                                                
12 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, p. 390. 
 
13 Though this does not strike me as the best reading of this passage.  For an argument 
against it see Hill, Dignity and Practical Reason, p. 151. 
 
14 A point also made by Hill, Dignity and Practical Reason, p. 150.  I say “roughly” 
because Kant understands the duty of beneficence as a duty to promote the happiness of 
another person while Ross understands it as a duty “make [the condition of others] better 




why beneficence does not require a certain action of us in the donation case.  It may 
seem, then, that we can preserve our considered moral judgments about aid by giving up 
our judgment in the Good Samaritan pond case, instead holding that one who has already 
done significant good or made significant sacrifices for others may permissibly walk past 
the pond.  While this certainly counts as an intuitive cost, it is a smaller intuitive cost than 
giving up our considered moral judgments about aid. 
 Accordingly, one might interpret an imperfect duty of beneficence as requiring 
one to put forth some effort to promote the happiness of others but hold that how much 
one must help is limited. Call this interpretation of the duty of beneficence the weak 
imperfect duty account.  Since this account still requires us to help others sometimes, it 
will require one who has not saved lives in the past to wade into the pond.  Thus, it need 
not give up our judgment in the standard pond case. 
The weak imperfect duty account will not provide a complete vindication of our 
considered moral judgments about aid.  Most of us are not faced with opportunities to 
save drowning children from ponds and will have to promote happiness in other ways.  In 
so far as the duty requires saving lives on at least some of the occasions in which we are 
presented with opportunities to do so, it will require those of us who have not already 
rescued persons to donate sometimes.   
Nonetheless, this view does not require the kind of radical giving that Singer 
advocates.  While it does not vindicate our considered moral judgments about aid, it 
comes closer than Singer’s view.  It does, however, have intuitive costs that Singer’s 
view does not have.  Namely, it requires us to give up our judgment about the Good 




Murphy’s view, which I discuss in section 6.10.  For our purposes we can leave open the 
question of whether or not this view has more overall plausibility than Singer’s view and 
note that we have yet to find a principle that preserves our judgments in both the original 
and Good Samaritan pond cases as well as our considered moral judgments about aid. 
6.5 Kamm on Distance 
 A promising strategy is to return to the cases that we began with.  Perhaps if we 
can find a difference between the pond case and the donation case, we can use that 
difference as the basis for a principle that could explain our pond judgment without 
giving up our considered moral judgments about aid.  Of course, there are many 
differences between the pond case and the donation case but the challenge is not just to 
find a difference.  It is to find a difference that could underwrite a plausible moral 
principle.  This means that the difference has to be one that is morally relevant.  For 
instance, the fact that Albert’s name starts with ‘A’ while Brad’s starts with ‘B’ cannot 
help us here since that difference has no moral relevance. 
 One difference between the two cases is that the drowning child is very close to 
Albert whereas the African child is far away from Brad.  In “Famine, Affluence, and 
Morality,” Singer is dismissive of the idea that distance has the requisite moral relevance. 
I do not think I need to say much in defense of the refusal to take proximity and 
distance into account.  The fact that a person is physically near to us, so that we 
have personal contact with him, may make it more likely that we shall assist him, 
but this does not show that we ought to help him rather than another who happens 
to be far away.  If we accept any principle of impartiality, universalizability, 




is far away from us (or we are far away from him)… There would seem, 
therefore, to be no justification for discriminating on geographical grounds (pp. 
147-148). 
 Nonetheless, in recent work, F.M. Kamm has suggested that distance does in fact 
make a moral difference.  It is important to note that Kamm’s thesis is not just that 
distance is correlated with something else that has moral relevance but that distance itself 
makes a moral difference.  There are, of course, cases where distance does not make a 
moral difference.  Compare the following two cases 
Near Costless:  A child is drowning in a pond near Candace.  Candace can save 
the child by pressing a button.  She does nothing and the child drowns 
Far Costless: A child is drowning in a pond in Manchester.  David, who is in the 
United States, can press a button to save the child.  He does not and the child 
drowns. 
Intuitively, what Candace does is just as bad as what David does.  However, Kamm notes 
that from the fact that distance does not make a difference in one case, it does not follow 
that distance never makes a difference in any case.15 Her view is that distance matters 
only when the costs of helping are significant.16 Nonetheless, Kamm recognizes that it is 
not immediately clear why the fact that the person in distress is far from the agent is not 
                                                
15 F.M. Kamm, Intricate Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 348.  Shelly 
Kagan makes the same point in “The Additive Fallacy,” Ethics 90 (1988): 5-31. 
16 This idea might be more made more precise in the following way.  Suppose that we can 
rank the strength of an agent’s duty to aid on a scale from 0 to 1, with 1 being very strong 
and 0 being no duty to aid at all.  The formula for determining the strength of the agent’s 
duty is 1 – (cost)(proximity to the agent).  If the cost is 0, then regardless of distance the 
agent’s duty to help will be 1.  If the cost is very small then, distance only makes a small 
difference in the agent’s duty to aid.  However, where the cost is high, distance can make 





like the hair color of the person in distress, something we can dismiss as not morally 
relevant.  Thus, she writes, “we cannot, I think, truly justify the moral relevance of 
distance in some contexts without a theory explaining why this factor should have 
relevance.”17 
The theory that she thinks justifies the role distance plays in morality runs as 
follows.  It is a hallmark of many non-consequentialist moral theories that there are 
agent-centered prerogatives that allow agents to favor their own projects rather than 
maximizing the good.18  Of course, prerogatives themselves do not give rise to any 
duties.  They are, after all, prerogatives, not obligations.  However, Kamm thinks that in 
acting on a prerogative an agent thereby generates “a duty to take care of the area near 
herself or her means.”19 
 The idea has some plausibility.  Suppose that I am offered a position as the 
general manager of a chain of banks.  If I accepted the position, I would be responsible 
for the overall good of the bank and I would have to treat each branch equally.  But 
suppose I were to decline the position in favor of being the manager of a particular 
branch. I would then have responsibilities to take care of my specific branch even if, in a 
particular circumstance, I could do more good for a different branch.   
 The idea is that in acting on a prerogative I decline to maximize the overall good 
but instead focus my energies on projects that are of special concern to me.  However, 
doing so generates a special duty to take care of the things in the area near me. 
                                                
17Kamm, Intricate Ethics, p. 379. 
 
18This idea was originally developed, albeit within a broadly consequentialist framework, 
by Samuel Scheffler in The Rejection of Consequentialism (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1982). 




 Despite this argument’s initial plausibility, I do not think that Kamm has 
established a connection between acting on agent-centered prerogatives and distance.  
Consider the bank case again.  While choosing to be the manager of a particular branch 
does give rise to special duties, these duties need not covary with distance.  Presumably, I 
would retain these duties to my specific branch even if, at the moment. I am physically 
closer to another branch.   
 Suppose I act on an agent-centered prerogative and decide to build a house in 
California.  Plausibly this gives rise to special duties in the area of the house.  Perhaps I 
now have a duty to participate in a neighborhood watch program or watch out for 
children playing in the area.  But these special duties need not always cover the area 
around me.  I may take a vacation to India.  In such a case, it is hard to see how building 
a house in California gives rise to special duties to help the Indians in the area near ne.  
Thus while it is plausible that acting on an agent-centered prerogative may give rise to 
special duties, it is not clear at all why these duties need to covary with distance.   Thus, 
Kamm’s argument fails to show that distance itself is morally relevant. 
6.6 Slote on Empathy 
  Another difference between the pond case and the donation case is that, assuming 
Alfred and Brad are normal human beings, Alfred will feel a great deal of empathy for 
the drowning child while Brad will not feel much empathy for the African child.  The 
psychological mechanisms at work here are not complex.  Alfred can see the suffering of 
the drowning child while Brad has no such direct access to the suffering of the African 




form the basis of a plausible principle that can capture our judgment in the pond case and 
our considered moral judgments about aid.20   
 Here is Slote’s first statement of such a principle 
Speaking very roughly, an ethics of caring holds that an act is morally (all) right if 
it doesn’t exhibit a lack (or the opposite) of caring and wrong if it does.  
(Brushing your teeth may not evince caring but the point is that it also doesn’t 
evince, exhibit, or reflect a lack of caring concern about others.)21 
This principle does capture our judgment about the pond case.  Albert’s walking past the 
pond surely exhibits a lack of caring about the child drowning in the pond.  But what is 
not initially clear is why Brad’s not donating $50 to an aid organization does not show a 
lack of concern for the African child who will not receive medical treatment.  Indeed, as 
Slote himself suggests, one plausible psychological explanation for why we do not donate 
to aid organizations is that we do not have the same sort of caring concern for children 
whose suffering has not been made vivid for us as we would for a child drowning right in 
front of us.22  If we did have the same sort of caring concern for those whose suffering 
was not vivid for us, we would help them as well.  If this is the explanation for why we 
do not do more for the world’s worst off, then we should conclude that Brad’s action 
exhibits a lack of empathy as well.   
                                                
20 Michael Slote, “Famine, Affluence, and Empathy,” in David Boonin and Graham 
Oddie (eds.), What’s Wrong? Applied Ethicists and Their Critics (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), pp. 548-556. 
 
21 Ibid, p. 548 





 Slote did say that he was “speaking very roughly” in his first statement of the 
principle.  He then offers another formulation of the principle that is not equivalent to the 
initial formulation. 
One can say that actions are wrong or right depending on whether or not they 
reflect or exhibit a deficiency of normally or fully empathic caring motivation.23 
Slote thinks that this principle can explain why, other things being equal, it would  
be morally worse to prefer a fetus or embryo to a fully developed human being, 
because such a preference runs counter to the flow of developed human empathy 
or caring motivation that is shaped by such empathy.  And similar points, 
arguably could be made about our moral relations with the lower animals.24 
This principle differs from the earlier one in that it makes reference to “normally or fully 
empathic caring motivation” and the “flow of developed human empathy.”  One could 
argue that preferring a fetus to a fully developed human does exhibit less caring concern 
for the fetus than the fully developed human but since such a difference of concern is not 
counter to normal fully developed empathic caring motivation, this difference of concern 
need not be impermissible according to Slote’s second principle.  Thus, in light of what 
Slote says about preferring a fully developed human to a fetus, a natural interpretation of 
the second principle is that the wrongness of an action is determined by whether or not it 
runs counter to what a human being with normal, fully developed empathic motivation 
would do.  Preferring a fetus to a fully developed human being is indeed not what a 
normal human with a developed sense of empathy would do.  The same goes for Alfred’s 
                                                






actions in the pond case, and thus these actions would, according to Slote’s principle, be 
wrong.  Brad’s action, in contrast, is not counter to normally developed human empathy.  
It is the sort of thing that normal human beings with normal capacities for empathy do 
regularly, buying consumer goods with money that could be used to save lives.   
 Slote’s principle appears to be our holy grail; it captures our judgment about the 
pond case without sacrificing our considered moral judgments about aid.  Nonetheless, I 
will argue, the principle is not plausible.  There are many situations in which human 
beings with normally developed empathic caring motivation do things that are 
uncontroversially wrong.  Consider the Milgram experiments, where participants were 
told by an actor posing as a scientist to shock what they believed was another participant 
in the experiment (actually a confederate who was not being shocked).  As the 
experiment went on, participants delivered higher and higher voltage electric shocks as 
they heard what they believed was another participant howling in pain.  65% of the 
participants turned a dial that they believed would deliver a 450-volt shock to another 
human being.25  Or consider the Stanford prison experiment in which participants were 
randomly chosen to be either guards or prisoners and placed in a mock prison.  The 
guards quickly turned sadistic, refusing to empty the sanitation buckets of prisoners, 
removing their mattresses so the prisoners had to sleep on concrete, and forcing the 
prisoners to go without clothing.26  While the Milgram and Stanford experiments were 
controlled experiments, they have important parallels to real life events.  Milgram’s study 
was intended to help us understand the behavior of Nazi guards at concentration camps 
                                                
25 Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (New York: Harper 
Collins, 1974). 
 




and there are close parallels between the Stanford experiment and the events at Abu 
Ghraib.  Optimists might hope that the participants in the Milgram and Stanford studies, 
as well as their real-life analogues, were all somehow different from normal human 
beings but as the experiments have been replicated and as more historical examples can 
be adduced, a more plausible explanation is that normal people with normally developed 
capacities for empathy will do very bad things in certain situations.  Thus, the rightness 
or wrongness of an action does not depend on whether or not the action reflects a 
deficiency of normally empathic caring motivation.   
 Earlier we noted that Slote’s view is that whether or not an action is right or 
wrong depends on whether or not it reflects “a deficiency of normally or fully empathic 
caring motivation.”  Thus far, I have been interpreting Slote’s use of ‘fully’ to mean fully 
developed.  Fully developed is not the same as normal.  A two-year-old child may have 
normal empathic caring motivation without having fully developed empathic caring 
motivation.  Nonetheless, this is not the only interpretation one can give of the phrase 
‘fully empathic caring motivation.’  ‘Fully’ can also mean ‘completely’ as opposed to 
‘deficiently’ or ‘partially.’  One might argue that, while the participants in the 
experiments described above possessed normal empathic caring motivation, they were 
not fully empathic.  Instead their empathy was rendered partial or deficient.  Thus, the 
experiments above do not constitute counter-examples to Slote’s principle.  Instead, they 
show us that normal human beings with normal and fully developed empathic caring 




 If we interpret Slote’s use of ‘fully’ this way we can avoid the problem raised by 
the Milgram and Stanford experiments.  However, this interpretation renders Slote’s 
second principle vulnerable to the same objection we raised against his first principle. 
For it now open to us to argue that our attitudes toward the worst off represent a case 
where human beings with normal empathic caring motivation fail to be fully empathic.  
As we saw above it is a plausible claim about our psychology that the fact that the 
suffering of those far away is less salient for us weakens our empathy for those persons.  
Why should we not conclude from this that our empathic caring for those who are far 
away is only partial?  It is, after all, weakened by the fact that the suffering of those far 
from us is not salient.   
 The mechanism that allowed Slote’s principle to capture our judgment about the 
pond case without giving up our considered moral judgments about aid is that it made 
reference to normal or fully developed empathic caring motivation.  Once we allow that 
even actions with normal or fully developed empathic caring motivation can be wrong, 
we open up the possibility that our actions toward the world’s worst off, though normal, 
are wrong.  Slote’s principle faces a dilemma.  If we interpret his use of ‘fully’ to mean 
‘fully developed’ we can capture our judgment in the pond case without sacrificing our 
considered moral judgments about aid.  However, we are then faced other counter-
examples.  If we interpreted ‘fully’ to mean ‘complete,’ then we can avoid counter-
examples but it is difficult to see how such a view can vindicate our considered moral 




6.7 Giving up the Pond 
 I have not considered every principle that could potentially capture our judgment 
about the pond case without conflicting with our considered moral judgments about aid.  
Nonetheless, I have shown that several prominent attempts fail and we should now be 
more pessimistic about the possibility of finding such a principle.   
 Now is a good time to return to our re-interpretation of Singer’s original argument 
as an application of the method of reflective equilibrium to see if there are other 
strategies for resisting.  The argument begins by characterizing our initial considered 
moral judgments.  We then attempt to find a principle (or set of principles) that 
systematizes those judgments.  In the absence of such a principle we must give up one of 
the judgments.  Singer would urge us to give up our considered moral judgments about 
aid.  Perhaps this is the place to object.  We can concede to Singer that there is no 
plausible principle that captures both judgments but hold that he has chosen the wrong 
judgments to reject.  Instead, we should hold that rescuing the drowning child is not 
required but instead supererogatory.   
 There are two things to note about this strategy.  First, even if it works, the main 
point of this chapter, that the method of reflective equilibrium can, in practice, compel us 
to reject a deeply held considered moral judgment or a part of status quo morality, is still 
vindicated.  It just turns out that the judgment that we should reject is not the one that 
Singer urges us to. 
 However, I do not want to rest here because the contributionist account of belief 
revision defended in chapter four gives us a means to adjudicate the debate between one 
who thinks that we ought to reject our considered moral judgments about aid and one 




look closely at the evidential and inferential relationships that our pond judgment and our 
considered moral judgments about aid have to the other things we believe and attempt to 
discover which set of judgments makes the greater overall contribution to the 
comprehensiveness and connectedness of our overall set of beliefs.   
It is important to note that on the contributionist account of belief revision, which 
judgment we should give up is determined solely by which judgment makes a greater 
contribution to the overall connectedness and comprehensiveness of the agent’s set of 
beliefs.  The contributionist theory does not take into account the agent’s preferences 
with regard to belief revision.  Thus, even agents who would rather reject the pond 
judgment may not be justified in doing so if the pond judgment makes a large enough 
contribution to the comprehensiveness and connectedness of the agent’s set of beliefs. 
 At first, it may seem surprising that our judgment about the pond case could have 
stronger evidential and inferential relationships to the other things we believe than our 
considered moral judgments about aid.  After all, the pond judgment is a judgment about 
a single case.   
 It is important to emphasize, however, that there is nothing special about the pond 
case.  We can generate an infinite number of cases just like it, in which we are face to 
face with someone who we could easily save at little cost to ourselves.  Unless there is 
some other morally relevant factor present, we almost always judge that it would be 
wrong not to save the person.  Motivating our judgment in the pond case is the common-
sense idea that we have a duty of easy rescue, which is a genuine duty in the sense that it 
gives rise to a moral requirement.   This is what gets the Singer problem off the ground.  




millions of cases of easy rescue.  One can either reject the duty of easy rescue or accept 
that morality requires that we dedicate many of our resources to rescue.  Preserving our 
considered moral judgments about aid requires that we reject a duty of easy rescue. 
 There may indeed be principled reasons for doing so.  Jan Narveson suggests that 
we are only required to help others if we consented to help (by formal contract or perhaps 
just informal promise) or are responsible for their predicament.27  This is a principle that 
would indeed justify rejecting the duty of easy rescue but it would also involve rejecting 
the idea that we have any duty of beneficence at all.28 
 Perhaps, it is not so surprising that rejecting a duty of easy rescue involves 
rejecting the notion of a duty of beneficence.29  It would be an odd position to hold that 
we have duties to help others but no duty to save their lives when we could do so easily.  
                                                
27 Jan Narveson, “We Don’t Owe Them a Thing!  A Tough-minded but Soft-hearted 
View of Aid to the Faraway Needy,” The Monist 83 (2003): 419-33. 
 
28 Narveson distinguishes between two senses of ‘duty’.  In the strong sense, in which a 
duty to X implies that one is required to X, we have no duty to help those we have not 
contracted with or harmed.  There is a weaker sense of ‘duty’ in which to call an action a 
duty is to say that the actions proceed from morally commendable motives.  Narveson 
thinks that there is a duty in this weaker sense to help those whom we have not contracted 
with or harmed.  See Narveson, “We Don’t Owe them a Thing!” p.  419.  In this chapter I 
exclusively use ‘duty’ in the strong sense.  This seems to me to comport better with 
ordinary usage. 
 
29 It might be thought that the weak imperfect duty account rejects a duty of easy rescue 
without giving up wholesale the idea of a duty of beneficence.  I think it is more plausible 
to see this view as preserving a kind of weak duty both of easy rescue and beneficence.  
On the weak imperfect duty account there are genuine duties of easy rescue and 
beneficence but these duties do not require one who has already done a certain amount of 
good for others to continue aiding or rescuing.  As I argued above, this view preserves 
our judgment in the standard pond case, though it does give up our judgment in the Good 
Samaritan pond case.  Thus, one may be able to give up our judgment in the Good 
Samaritan pond case while maintaining that we have a duty of beneficence but I am not 
aware of any position that would allow us to maintain a duty of beneficence and give up 




The view that we have no duty of beneficence is consistent but it involves radical 
revision to our moral conceptual scheme, a revision that is perhaps more radical than the 
one Singer suggests. 
 This is an example of how we might use the notions of comprehensiveness and 
connectedness, in practice, to settle a moral controversy.  We begin with a case judgment 
and when we find that the case judgment conflicts with other judgments, we consider the 
inferential and evidential relationships that between these judgments and our other 
beliefs.  If we find that we cannot give up the case judgment without giving up other 
beliefs that play a central role in our web of belief, then there are strong grounds to hold 
onto the case judgment.  Here we find that our judgment in the pond case is supported by 
the belief that we have a duty of easy rescue and a general duty of beneficence.  Since 
these beliefs play a central role in our web of beliefs, there are strong grounds for 
thinking that they should not be given up. 
 To show definitively that they should not be given up we would have to show not 
only that our judgment in the pond case makes a large contribution to the 
comprehensiveness and connectedness of our overall set of beliefs but that it makes a 
larger contribution than our considered moral judgments about aid.  While I cannot 
complete this project here, I do want to note that it is much harder to find considerations 
at the center of our web of belief that support our considered moral judgments about aid.  
Most of us do have the belief that complying with the demands of morality leaves room 
for an individual to purse the projects that she identifies with.30  I will return to this idea 
                                                
30 This needs to be qualified.  Most of us think that morality could require an agent to 
fight in a war of self-defense even if this means sacrificing goods necessary for the 




when I discuss Richard Miller’s view in section 6.9.  To preview the results from that 
section, this idea may support the belief that the duty of beneficence demands less than 
Singer thinks it does but it does not vindicate our considered moral judgment that we are 
permitted to do little or nothing for the world’s worst off.   
 I think, then, that there is a strong prima facie case for thinking that our judgment 
about the pond case makes a greater contribution to the connectedness and 
comprehensiveness of our overall set of beliefs that our considered moral judgments 
about aid.  If this is true, then the theory of justification defended in chapter four requires 
that agents abandon their considered moral judgments about aid even if they would prefer 
not to. 
6.8 Concession and Mitigation 
 Understanding Singer’s argument as an application of the method of reflective 
equilibrium involves the following steps. 
1) Characterizing our initial considered moral judgments 
2) Finding a principle that systematizes these judgments 
3) Observing that any plausible, well-motivated principle that systematizes our judgment 
about the pond case conflicts with our considered moral judgments about aid 
4) Realizing that faced with this conflict we should give up our considered moral 
judgments about aid. 
The most obvious places to resist are 3) and 4). However, I have argued in previous 
sections that resisting at either of these points is not easy. 
                                                                                                                                            
sacrificing one’s life.  Most of us think that morality demands paying back one’s debts 
even if doing so requires sacrificing goods necessary for the pursuit of projects one 




 Before concluding, let us consider a different type of strategy, which I will refer 
to as ‘concession and mitigation.’  This strategy involves conceding that we do, as Singer 
suggests, have a duty to make sacrifices for the world’s worst off.  However, proponents 
of this strategy then argue that this duty is mitigated in certain ways and thus does not 
require as much of us as Singer thinks.  I will note below, that all versions of this strategy 
force us to give up the idea that we are required to donate nothing or very little to aid 
organizations.  Thus, they all involve rejecting our considered moral judgments about aid 
as I characterized them above.   
6.9 The Limits of Beneficence 
 One version of the concession and mitigation strategy is to insist that while we do 
have a duty to donate to aid organizations, there are certain things that this duty cannot 
require us to give up.  Thus, this strategy aims to put a limit on the requirement of 
beneficence.  The arguments that proponents of this strategy use to justify the idea that 
beneficence has limits are complex.  Rather than discussing them in detail here what I 
will do is simply note that no version of this strategy yet proposed vindicates our 
considered moral judgments about aid.  Instead, they all require us to make significant 
sacrifices for the least well off, though the sacrifices these authors advocate are not as 
extreme as what Singer advocates. 
 An example of this strategy is found in Garett Cullity’s The Moral Demand of 




If it is absurd to deny that your pursuing or having x can ground requirements on 
others to help you, then your pursuing or having x violates no requirement of 
beneficence.31 
Certain goods, including what Cullity calls life-enhancing goods, are important enough 
that is absurd to deny that they ground requirements on others to help you.  Life-
enhancing goods include friendship and the pursuit of certain intrinsically worthwhile 
projects.32  If this is right, then it follows from Cullity’s principle that one may pursue 
friendships and certain intrinsically worthwhile projects without violating any 
requirement of beneficence.  
 Nonetheless, Cullity’s principle is unlikely to help us to preserve our considered 
moral judgments about aid.  While it may be absurd to deny that others are required to 
sacrifice to save my life, it is not absurd to deny that others are required to sacrifice so 
that I may purchase a $50 pair of shoes solely because I find them fashionable.  As 
Cullity acknowledges, “the conclusion I defend does still demand more of us than many 
of us find comfortable.”33  For instance, Cullity concludes that, “buying expensive 
clothes or furniture, a new car (or often, any car at all), or books for a private library is 
usually morally wrong, as the world now stands.”34 
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32 Ibid, p. 129 and 161-5. 
33 Ibid, p. 3. 
 





 A more permissive version of the same strategy is pursued by Richard Miller.35  
Miller’s view is that the duty of beneficence cannot deprive one of the resources 
necessary to pursue “a goal with which someone identifies.”36  These goals are the sort of 
thing that is a “constituent of someone’s personality” or “part of her description of “the 
sort of person that I am.”37  Miller’s view is more permissive than Cullity’s because one 
who identifies with displaying a certain kind of aesthetic sense is permitted to 
“occasionally purchase a luxury or frill, namely, some stylish clothing rather than pursue 
a less expensive, plain alternative,” provided that doing so is necessary to pursue her goal 
of displaying a certain aesthetic sense.38 
 Miller’s view provides a partial vindication of our judgment in the donation case.  
If Brad is the sort of person who identifies with the goal of displaying a certain fashion 
sense, then he may occasionally purchase a frill such as a pair of shoes that he does not 
require for his livelihood.  This is only a partial vindication because, I take it, most 
people have the considered judgment that what Brad does is permissible even if 
displaying a certain aesthetic sense is not a goal with which Brad identifies.  However, 
Miller’s view only vindicates Brad’s action if he has such a goal.  Furthermore, most 
people have the considered judgment that Brad is not acting wrongly if he purchases 
more shoes than are necessary for pursuing his goal.  However, Miller’s view only allows 
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one to make the sort of occasional purchases that are necessary for pursuing the goals that 
they identify with. 
Moreover, Miller’s view is unable to accommodate our general judgments that we 
are permitted to give little or nothing to relief organizations.  Miller recognizes this, 
noting that his view, 
still requires significant giving from most of the nonpoor.  The underlying goals 
to which most of us who are not poor are securely attached leave room for this 
giving: we could pursue these goals enjoyably and well and fulfill our other 
responsibilities, while giving significant amounts to the needy.39 
We have seen then that two versions of this strategy fail to vindicate our considered 
moral judgments about aid.  This is not surprising.  Indeed to use this strategy to 
vindicate our judgment that one is required to donate little or nothing to aid organizations 
one would have to hold that beneficence can only demand little or nothing from us.  But, 
aside from the difficulties of defending such a position, the intuitive cost is high.  For 
there are many cases, including the pond case, where we intuitively believe that 
beneficence can require us to make sacrifices.  
6.10 Fair Share Views  
 One reason why Singer’s principle gives rise to such stringent demands in our 
world is that so few people comply with it.  If everyone complied with the principle, it 
would demand much less of each individual.  As Singer notes, to infer from this that we 
must only comply with the lesser demand is to fallaciously affirm the consequent (p. 
                                                




148).  However, there is something appealing about the idea that it is unfair to require us 
to pick up the slack from others failing to comply with their duty. 
 Liam Murphy has attempted to defend this appealing idea by introducing a 
compliance condition, which he spells out as follows: “very roughly, the idea is that the 
demands on a complying person should not exceed what they would be under full 
compliance with the principle.”40 
 How much Murphy’s condition would limit the demands of beneficence depends 
on some complicated moral and empirical matters.  On the empirical side, we would have 
to know what it would cost to prevent all the suffering and death from lack of food and 
medical care that can be prevented.  On the moral side, we would have to know what 
would be a fair way to distribute this cost.  Simply dividing it evenly would presumably 
result in a large burden to the least rich persons in industrialized countries while only 
requiring trivial sacrifices from millionaires.  Plausibly, the fairest distribution of these 
burdens would be a progressive system.  On his website, Singer proposes such a system 
asking between 1% (for those who make less than US $105,00) and 33% of one’s income 
(for those making more than US $10,700,00).41 
 If Singer’s numbers are a fair distribution of the cost of preventing suffering and 
death from lack of food and medical care, then Murphy’s view requires less from us than 
Singer’s original demand but more than most people intuitively think they are required to 
donate.  In other words, Murphy’s view does not preserve our considered moral 
judgments about aid but comes much closer than Singer’s view. 
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 Murphy’s view, however, has other sorts of intuitive costs.  Suppose one has 
already sacrificed as much as they would be required to under full compliance.  Then, on 
Murphy’s view, one is free to walk to past the pond without helping the drowning child.  
Indeed, a poor person who is already worse off than she would be under full compliance 
is not required to do anything at all, even wade into a pond to save a drowning child. 
 Murphy acknowledges these intuitive costs but insists that we must give up some 
of our intuitions about these rescue cases because “any limited principle of beneficence 
designed to match common sense about rescue cases will turn out to be very much more 
demanding than common sense when it comes to general beneficence.”42  In other words, 
if we attempt to match common sense about pond cases, we will end up with a principle 
that is extremely demanding in the actual world.  Murphy insists that his view has more 
overall plausibility than its rivals.43  Since no principle can capture all of our pond 
judgments and all of our judgments about aid, we must make some revisions to these 
judgments and Murphy asks for less radical revisions than rival views. 
 For our purposes, we can leave open the question of whether or not Murphy’s 
view is more plausible than all its rivals.  Murphy’s view does not capture our considered 
moral judgments about aid or all of our judgments about pond cases but it does ask for 
less radical revisions to these judgments than some rivals.  Here we need only note that 
preserving our considered moral judgments about aid and rescue cases as they now stand 
is not an option under Murphy’s view. 
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 In this chapter I have aimed to rebut a criticism of the method of reflective 
equilibrium according to which the method cannot require us to revise our deeply held 
moral intuitions and serves merely to reinforce the moral status quo.  I have argued that 
one argument with an extremely counter-intuitive conclusion can be interpreted as an 
application of the method of reflective equilibrium.   
 I have also considered some of the most well known responses to this argument.  
In many cases, I have not taken a stand on whether these responses succeed but instead I 
have noted that even if these responses do succeed, they do not vindicate our considered 
moral judgments at the outset of inquiry.  Those rival principles to Singer’s that are well 
motivated and plausible fail to vindicate our considered moral judgments about aid.  One 
who responds to Singer’s argument by denying the pond judgment ipso facto rejects a 
deeply held considered moral judgment.  Mitigating strategies may lessen our obligations 
of beneficence but they do not fully vindicate our considered moral judgments about aid 
and in Murphy’s case entail rejecting other judgments about variants of the pond case.   
 From these considerations, I draw the conclusion that it is plausible, perhaps even 
likely, that the method of reflective equilibrium will compel us to revise deeply held 
moral intuitions and status quo morality.  Therefore, the objection that the method cannot 






In order to be plausible, a theory of justification must meet its own epistemic standards.   
For the theory of justification defended here, this means that the theory must cohere with 
our most central judgments about the nature of moral inquiry.  Throughout this 
dissertation, I have argued that the method of reflective equilibrium when combined with 
the contributionist account of belief revision scores quite well on this measure.  It 
acknowledges a role for intuitions in moral inquiry but it also acknowledges that these 
judgments must be subject to intense critical scrutiny.  It acknowledges the Quinean 
insight that, when deciding what to believe, we have no choice but to start with what we 
already believe while at the same time avoiding the vice of being unduly conservative.  
The theory is compatible with a range of opinions on controversial matters in moral 
theory.  For instance, it is compatible with both the view that there are and the view that 
there are not moral questions with no answer.  It is also compatible with both the view 
that there are inescapable moral dilemmas and the view there are no such dilemmas.   
 If we acknowledge the virtues of the theory defended here, important questions 
remain within moral epistemology as well as potential applications to normative ethics 
and moral psychology.  In this conclusion, I mention some of these questions as possible 
directions for future research 
Moral Epistemology 
 Throughout this dissertation, I have treated moral knowledge as a special case of 
propositional knowledge.  To know the wrongness of murder is to know the proposition 
that murder is wrong.  There is, however, a tradition in moral philosophy that sees moral 




This distinction between propositional knowledge, or knowledge that, and knowledge 
how can be illustrated by example.  An expert bike rider knows, in some sense of ‘know,’ 
how much to slow down when a tight turn is coming up but she may not be able to 
articulate this knowledge.  In other words, while she may know precisely how much to 
slow down, she may not know the proposition, ‘a bike rider should slow down x amount 
when taking a tight turn.’  Her knowledge is best described as a sort of knowledge how 
rather than knowledge that.   
 It is not implausible to think of moral knowledge on the same model.  A virtuous 
person may know, in some sense of ‘know,’ when (if ever) it is appropriate to lie to a 
friend to spare them pain.  But she may not be able to articulate precisely how much pain 
would have to be spared in order to make telling the lie permissible.  She may have a 
kind of knowledge how rather than knowledge that. 
 This raises a series of important questions for future research.  First, is it true that 
moral knowledge is better thought of a sort of know how rather than knowledge that?  
Can the theory of justification exposited here accommodate that insight?  If so, how?  If 
not, how might the theory be revised? 
 A separate set of questions in moral epistemology concerns the role of testimony 
in moral judgment.  In other areas of human thought, testimony plays a crucial role in 
deciding what to believe.  Is there a comparable role for testimony in moral judgment?  
Can the theory exposited here accommodate a role for testimony?  These questions 
become especially interesting when we receive testimony that contradicts our intuitions.  




 Finally, a third set of questions in moral epistemology concerns the plausibility of 
moral skepticism.  In chapter 5, I argued that the theory of justification defended here 
leaves open the possibility that moral skepticism is true.  Future research might discuss 
the extent to which skeptical challenges emerge within reflective equilibrium and 
whether or not these challenges can be defeated. 
Moral Psychology 
 As we saw in chapter 2, questions remain about how our intuitions are produced.  
The answers to these questions have a direct bearing on how intuitions ought to be used 
in the method of reflective equilibrium.  If we find that a set of intuitions is produced by 
an untrustworthy cognitive process, this may serve as a background theory in the method 
of reflective equilibrium and this background theory may, in turn, count against the 
intuition when it conflicts with other judgments.  We have seen that there are cases in 
which our intuitions are the product of prospect theory biases and ordering effects.  
Which other intuitions might be the product of untrustworthy cognitive processes?  This 
question raises further questions.  Which cognitive processes count as untrustworthy?  
Recently, several thinkers have proposed that certain intuitions are the emotional 
responses and that emotional responses are untrustworthy.44  Is such skepticism about the 
value of emotions warranted?  To date, I am aware of no plausible argument that suggests 
an affirmative answer to this question. 
 
 
                                                
44 Greene, “The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul;” Singer, “Ethics and Intuitions;” and Walter-
Sinnott Armstrong, Liane Young, & Fiery Cushman, “Moral Intuitions as Hurestics,” 
(forthcoming).  For a response to this sort of argument see Berker, “The Normative 





Perhaps most importantly, the theory of justification defended here gives us a 
framework for thinking about what morality requires of us.  There are debates in 
normative and practical ethics that persist after years.  One hypothesis is that the 
participants in these debates rely on conflicting intuitions.  Supposing this hypothesis is 
correct, the theory of justification here suggests that conflicting intuitions need not lead to 
argumentative deadlock.  The contributionist account of belief revisions suggests a way 
of deciding between conflicting intuitions.  I am cautiously optimistic that this account 
could break up some of the deadlock we find in normative and practical ethics and 
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